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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact of pervasive regulation in the 
financial system on the economy, in general, and on private investment 
activity, in particular. A survey of the relevant literature 
concentrates on the issue of the arguments for, and against, financial 
deregulation. A macroeconomic growth model is analysed which focuses on 
the implications of an abrupt rise in the (private) debt service burden, 
following a removal of interest rate ceilings. Subsequently, selected 
models of investment are estimated on Greek annual data covering the 
period 1958-1985. The aim of the empirical work is to detect the effects 
of the elaborate controls imposed on the Greek banking system. (The 
possibility of such effects, and associated policy implications, were 
discussed in the preceding, theoretical, part of the thesis.) Particular 
effort has been expended to generate the appropriate series required for 
the estimations, especially those relating to the fiscal factors which 
influence investment behaviour. The empirical results reveal the 
important role of policy induced financial rationing in the determination 
of aggregate investment in Greece.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis enquires into the effect on aggregate investment of the 
operation of the Greek financial system. The enquiry takes as its 
starting point the pervasiveness of regulations, i.e. interest rate 
ceilings, reserve requirements etc., in the Greek financial system. Some 
detail about the particular institutional structure of the financial 
system in Greece is given towards the end of this introduction.
The thesis begins with a categorization and formalization of the 
issues confronting heavily regulated financial systems, in general.
Chapter 1 surveys the literature that deals specifically with such 
economies: the 'financial repression* literature. Blinder (1987, p.336)
describes it as "a growing literature in development economics that argues 
- on both institutional and econometric grounds - that credit 
restrictions, which reduce the supply of credit for either working capital 
or investment, are a major channel through which financial policies have 
real effects". A substantial part of this literature is characterised by 
Jao (1985) as the "Stanford financial development school".
We analyse the drawbacks of pervasive regulations. We point out 
their adverse consequences both from a microeconomic and a macroeconomic 
perspective. The main policy issue confronting repressed financial 
systems is the issue of deregulation. The central question, however, is 
whether financial liberalization contributes to an increase in output 
growth or not. In Chapter 1 we summarise the position of both sides in 
this debate. Some of the arguments in this debate are expressed by means 
of formal models, which characterise the short run dynamic path to be 
followed by the economy after financial liberalization. We analyse these 
models.
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A consideration, which appears often rather casually in this debate, 
is that financial regulations may be imposed in order to extract 
government revenue. Therefore financial liberalization may induce a 
reduction in the resources available for public investment. This would 
tend to reduce output growth. In order to pursue this argument we are 
led in two directions. First, we discuss some formal models which 
elaborate on the following issues that are subsidiary to the argument:
(i) How is the lending behaviour of financial intermediaries affected by 
the imposition of regulations? In particular, what is the trade-off 
between the extraction of government revenue and the finance of 
private investment from banks?
(ii) What is the net impact on the economy from the financing efforts 
(by financial restriction) of the government, assuming that 
government revenue is channelled to public capital formation?
Second, we explore whether there are reasons, other than the 
extraction of government revenue, that motivate the imposition of 
pervasive financial regulations. Such reasons could be political 
economic, prudential or distributional in nature. It is important to 
discover whether financial regulations serve some purpose. For, in that 
case, benefits (to at least some agents) are foregone upon their removal.
Chapter 2 develops several possibilities, first discussed in Chapter 1
(i) It is stated in Chapter 1, that a significant argument against
financial liberalization could be the accompanying increase in the 
burden of interest payments on borrowing firms. This consideration, 
together with the implications of deregulation for government 
finances, are aspects of the matter which those concerned
11
with the Greek economy ought not to ignore.
This is suggested, for example, in the latest (July 1987) OECD 
Survey of Greece: "By 1979, after a marked deterioration in the
second half of the 1970s the net profit rate had dropped to barely 8 
per cent with nearly 40 per cent of firms reporting losses,... The 
increase in financial charges contributed almost two-fifths to the 
swing from net profits in 1979 to net losses in 1984" (pp,32-33). In 
the same Survey we read: "... The 3^ percentage point rise of the PSBR 
to 17,7 per cent of GNP between 1981 and 1985 was almost fully 
accounted for by higher interest net payments. Continuation of 
existing trends would have resulted in an explosive deficit-debt 
spiral" (pp,48-49). (Nb, At the time much more than half the 
outstanding public debt was domestic),
Accordingly, in Chapter 2 our attention turns to the workings of 
a particular macromodel which places emphasis on the complications 
(reckoned in terms of potential reductions in private investment) that 
may arise because of the steep increase in interest rates in the 
course of financial liberalization,
(ii) It is noted in Chapter 1 that the rationing of loans, under financial 
repression, is potentially inefficient. Therefore, financial 
liberalization may entail an economywide rise in profits. An 
associated increase in retained profits could boost investment. In 
Chapter 2 we model this effect. We examine whether the tendency for 
private investment to rise, because of the increase in economywide 
retained profits, is likely to outweigh the effect of increased debt 
service (see (i) above), which is contractionary for investment,
(iii) In Chapter 1, we take the view that the implications of financial 
deregulation for government revenue (hence government investment) are
12
somewhat neglected in the literature. In Chapter 2 we attempt to 
make good this omission. In the model, we assume that the government 
raises an inflation tax on bank reserves in order to finance capital 
formation (having covered the operating losses of banks).
We organise the exposition of Chapter 2 as follows: First the basic
model, originally developed by Currie and Anyadike-Danes (1980), is set 
out and its recursive structure is analysed in detail. Then, we add to 
this basic model the features described under (i) to (iii) above, step by 
step. At each stage we work out the ’verdict' of the (steady state 
reduced form of the) model on whether a rise in the deposit rate is likely 
to increase the growth rate of the economy.
In much of the work surveyed in Chapter 1 and also in the theoretical 
model of Chapter 2, one can distinguish a preoccupation with the potential 
of credit expansion for the stimulation of economic activity. Indeed,
(as recently argued e,g, in Bernanke and Blinder 1988; Gertler 1988), this 
mechanism appears either alien or capable of a trivial interpretation only 
to somebody educated in the wider IS/IM tradition. However, recent 
theoretical work (e,g, Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988a, 1988b) and empirical 
research (e,g, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988a) relates investment to 
a similar influence, the availability of internal funds. This work is 
based on the presence of rationing caused by imperfect information, mainly 
in the equities (and also loans) markets, in advanced financial systems. 
Less subtle, though perhaps more compelling, is the prevalence of loan 
rationing due to interest rate ceilings under financial repression.
Under rationing, the short side of the market determines the volume of 
transactions, therefore the availability of loans influences the
13
aggregate level of investment.
Thus in Chapter 3 we attempt to detect the existence and to discern 
the precise nature of a potential dependence of investment expenditures on 
credit conditions. A number of issues need to be settled before this can 
be accomplished: First an estimating investment function must be derived
from firm behaviour. Here we adopt the neoclassical approach and put 
forward four distinct specifications of the investment equation. Second, 
we must clarify this matter; Do such neoclassical investment equations 
(with a measure of credit as an additional regressor) provide an adequate 
test of the theoretical view of the determination of investment under 
financial repression, (which was developed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2)? 
Third, the appropriate variables (e.g. private net investment, private net 
capital stock) have to be constructed from the available raw, aggregate 
data (e.g. private gross investment, total [private plus public] 
consumption of fixed capital). This is done here. The sample is annual 
and covers the period 1958-1985 in Greece.
A considerable part of the literature on investment behaviour deals 
with the impact of tax policy on investment. We take a particular 
interest in the role of fiscal parameters in an investment function for 
another reason as well: Within the neoclassical framework, fiscal policy
impinges on investment via the user cost (in a complicated manner which we 
analyse in the opening Sections of Chapter 4). The sign on the user cost 
variable in an investment equation may indicate the presence of financial 
repression. In order to be able to detect this effect with some 
confidence, we must obtain as precise a measure of the user cost as 
possible. Therefore our measure for the user cost must not leave out the
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relevant fiscal parameters. Otherwise the sign on our user cost variable 
may be the outcome of mispecification.
Thus, Chapter 4 refines the construction of a series for the user 
cost, which began in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we compute an adjustment 
to the user cost variable, required to represent the influence of 
corporate taxation and investment incentives. To carry out these 
calculations we must become familiar with the detail of the Greek 
legislation providing for corporate taxation, investment allowances, 
investment grants, depreciation for tax purposes and allowable 
accelerations of tax depreciation.
Constrained by the availability of data, we manage to compute 
effective rates for corporate taxation, depreciation for tax purposes and 
investment allowances only. This latter set of estimates, enables us to 
obtain an additional by-product from Chapter 4. It enables us to assess 
the quantitative importance, on an aggregate level, of the string of 
policy measures that granted generous investment allowances in Greece, 
over the extended period 1959-1985. Further calculations illuminate the 
factors that may have limited the actual importance of these investment 
incentives.
In Chapter 5, we estimate the four distinct specifications of the 
investment equation that are worked out in Chapter 3. We employ a 
variety of alternative measures for dependent and independent variables, 
constructed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The empirical methods of Chapter 
5 aim to establish whether the principal characteristics of financial 
repression can be identified in our sample.
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Specifically, in Chapter 5 we wish to examine empirically the
following questions :
(i) Whether credit conditions play a large and significant part in the 
determination of investment.
(ii) Whether investment is more closely related to a measure of credit 
availability that subtracts the interest payments on outstanding loans 
from the flow of new loans than to one that does not. Indeed, that 
this might be so is the premise from which the argument of (most of) 
Chapter 2, that financial liberalization might not promote growth, is 
deduced.
(iii) Whether the negative dependence of investment on the user cost 
(according to neoclassical theory) is masked under conditions of 
financial repression. As argued in Chapter 1, this can happen if 
investment responds positively to some other variables that are 
themselves positively associated with the real interest rate. It is 
suggested in Chapter 1 that such variables would comprise the 
availability of credit or of internal funds. Chapter 1 also explains 
why self financed investment may be positively related to the real 
deposit rate, under financial repression. The conclusions of Chapter 
5 (especially concerning this point) could be read as having far 
reaching policy implications: If investment is found not to be 
negatively affected by rises in real interest rates, many of (but not 
all) the objections to financial deregulation, discussed in Chapter 1, 
cannot be sustained.
In order to resolve these issues validly, we estimate the investment
16
function adopting (a simple version of) an econometric methodology that 
"... is part of a tradition which originated at the London School of 
Economics in the 1950's and 1960's" (Gilbert 1986, p.305; see also Gilbert 
1989). We check the robustness of our answers to questions (i) to (iii) 
above, across alternative estimation techniques, different equation 
specifications and numerous variable definitions.
This thesis represents an effort to understand the effect on 
investment of the operation of the Greek financial system. The way it 
proceeds is first to classify the Greek economy in the class of 
financially repressed economies. Then, theory is invoked to delineate 
the characteristic tendencies in such economies (Chapter 1 and Chapter 
2). Finally, empirical methods are applied to identify exactly how such 
tendencies are manifested in Greece (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).
To what extent are we justified in assuming, at the outset, that the 
approach of financial repression is relevant to Greece? From a practical 
point of view, to what extent can we expect the application of this 
approach (rather than any other), to the Greek case, to be fruitful? The 
scientific method judges assumptions on the basis of the comparison of any 
conclusions deduced therefrom with the empirical data. So, strictly 
speaking, these questions cannot be resolved before Chapter 5.
However, a brief outline of the institutions in the Greek financial 
system and their recent history, reveals that the scope of regulation has 
been so pervasive, so as to leave little doubt about the appropriateness 
of the financial repression approach. Furthermore our approach seems to
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be relevant on this count as well: that practitioners in banking and
academics in Greece, are aware and speak of those same issues and problems 
that standard financial repression analysis of the financial system would 
have identified.
X. Zolotas, who was the Governor of the Bank of Greece for about a 
quarter of a century, proclaimed in 1963 that:
In the less developed countries ... The people who are 
willing and able to pay the higher interest rates on bank 
loans are mainly those engaged in trade, who use credit to 
finance imports or luxury products, or to finance consumer 
credit, thus diverting to consumption funds that would 
otherwise be available for economic development ... we have 
to direct banking activities towards economic development 
targets by applying the appropriate credit controls. 
(Zolotas 1977, p.392)
It seems that opinion on the effectiveness of pervasive financial 
regulations changed with the passage of time. For example, D. Halikias, 
then on the staff later to be appointed Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
concluded in a monograph on money and credit in the developing economy of 
Greece, published in 1978, that:
The highly complex system of qualitative credit regulations, 
the structure of the official interest rates and a series of 
other legal restrictions on the establishment of new banking 
institutions or branches of foreign banks and on the operation 
of the capital and money markets in general, are obstacles to 
the development of a flexible and more efficient credit 
mechanism ... (Halikias 1978, p.237).
Academic economists in Greece seem to espouse this view. For example 
we read in Demopoulos (1981, pp.21-22) that "... the prevailing structure 
of reserve requirements is accompanied by negative allocative effects on 
bank credit, introduces uncertainty in the implementation of monetary
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policy, and gives rise to losses of economic welfare .... controls over 
the availability of credit and artificially low interest rates produce 
perverse effects on the desired objectives of economic development and 
stabilization. Therefore, it is inferred that a policy of market 
determined interest rates should be slowly adopted". Similar remarks can 
be found in Papadakis (1979, pp.110-115) mainly in connection with the 
destabilizing role of administered interest rates.
Over the past decade the matter has moved into the focus of debate on 
policy making. Two major committee reports (Bank of Greece 1981; Union 
of Greek Banks 1987) were compiled and the 1985/86 OECD Survey of Greece 
(OECD 1986) devoted an entire 'part' to the examination of prospective 
'financial reforms'. All these documents condemned the existing nexus of 
selective credit controls, reserve requirements and other bank portfolio 
constraints as well as interest rate ceilings and recommended financial 
liberalization.
In the section 'interest rate and credit controls' in the Karadjas 
report (Union of Greek Banks 1987), we read that the basic characteristics 
of the Greek financial system are the poor development of the securities 
markets, administered interest rates and the heavy dependence of the 
public sector on the banks for finance. Further it is claimed that the 
misallocation of resources towards less productive lines of activity or 
speculative uses, the creation of credit over-intensive projects and the 
restriction of bank competition are among the adverse consequences of the 
(then) existing arrangements in the Greek financial system. Taken 
together these tendencies fit the description of financial repression 
given say in Fry (1988, Chapter 1), perfectly. The report also
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acknowledged the resulting limitation of the possibilities of monetary 
policy and related macroeconomic instability as implications of the 
controls. (Cf. Blinder 1987). The view occurs in the same report that 
financial deregulation is feasible only if accompanied by a reduction of 
the public sector borrowing requirement and by a favourable macroeconomic 
climate e.g. in Dooley and Mathieson (1986). The policy proposal that 
selective credit controls be replaced with transparent subsidies through 
the government budget is also standard.
Indeed after certain preliminary policy measures (e.g. deregulation of 
the interbank market in 1978) the main thrust of liberalization came in 
1987, when loan rates and rates payable on a progressively broadened range 
of deposits were effectively freed from official control, and bank 
portfolio constraints were somewhat relaxed. In particular during 1987 
short term deposits and medium term certificates of deposit, both bearing 
a negotiable rate, were introduced as financial innovations. Interest 
rates and other contractual conditions on bank bonds and term deposits 
with initial maturity over three months as well as savings deposits on 
notice were also liberalised. Over the same period loan rate 'ceilings' 
on short term loans and long term advances to manufacturing, mining, 
tourism and the shipbuilding industries were replaced by 'floors' which 
were subsequently abolished. As stated by the Governor of the Bank of 
Greece (Bank of Greece 1988, p.27) by 1988 rates were deregulated on 
approximately 80% of the commercial banks and 1 0 0 % of the development 
banks private loan portfolios. In addition banks were relieved of the 
obligation to onlend at least 15% of their drachma deposits for 
'productive investment' or place the amount in a (low) interest bearing 
deposit with the Central Bank. However in the annual report (for 1987)
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by S. Panagopoulos, the Governor of the major commercial bank in Greece, 
the National Bank of Greece, doubt was cast on the pervasiveness of reform:
Banks are still compelled to earmark a specified proportion of 
their deposits for special purposes (purchase of treasury bills, 
lending to public enterprises and organizations, credit to small- 
scale manufacturing industry, deposits with the Central Bank), 
which absorb nearly 66% of aggregate deposits .... for a similar 
pecentage of bank deposits, the interest rate is also determined 
exogenously, since both for savings deposits - representing 60% 
of total drachma deposits with commercial banks - and for the bulk 
of foreign exchange deposits, interest rates are set by admini­
strative decisions ....
[The monetary authorities] gradually raised the percentage of 
commercial banks' compulsory deposits with the Bank of Greece ... 
[and] raised the percentage of funds earmarked for the financing 
of public enterprises and organizations. The combined effect of 
these two increases was the absorption of the funds released by 
the abolition of the requirement that banks allocate 15% of their 
deposits to finance productive investment. (National Bank of 
Greece 1988, pp.18-20)
There was further backtracking as the government, worried by spiralling 
nominal interest rates, administered a reduction in (savings) deposit 
rates in the second half of 1988. So, the subject of this thesis is 
regarded as an immediate and important issue of policy in Greece.
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CHAPTER 1
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS UNDER PERVASIVE REGULATION: 




We first discuss in Section 1.2 a number of the basic arguments 
advanced in favour of liberalizing previously repressed financial 
systems. This latter concept is illustrated by a diagram for the 
market for loanable funds under interest rate ceilings. It is 
suggested that, in this situation, externally financed investment is 
positively related to the interest rate. We discuss also the McKinnon 
hypothesis and its recent elaborations. In this approach it is argued 
that internally financed investment as well responds positively to the 
deposit rate, under financial repression. There follows a brief 
discussion of likely loan rationing practices in this situation. This 
naturally leads on to a survey of the literature on the microeconomic 
consequences of financial repression; for these are mostly due to the 
fact that loans are rationed by non-price criteria. Having presented 
its microeconomic implications, we proceed to analyse the 
macroeconomics of financial repression. Specifically, we summarise 
the models of Kapur (1976), Mathieson (1980) and Blinder (1987),
Kapur and Mathieson examine the short run path followed by the economy 
once interest rate ceilings are relaxed or removed completely.
Blinder deals with the dynamic instability which is likely to be 
particularly conspicuous in a financially repressed economy.
Then, in Section 1,3 we summarise the model of van Wijnbergen 
(1983), This advises against financial liberalization on the grounds 
that it is likely to result in stagflation. In Section 1,4 we deal 
with some further objections to financial liberalization. The model
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of Mathieson (1980) is revisited since this gives some attention to the 
financial problems for banks that may be entailed by financial 
liberalization. However, financial liberalization may cause financial 
difficulties to other (e.g. industrial) firms as well, though the 
majority of the literature makes only passing references to that 
serious problem. The single article (Currie and Anyadike-Danes 1980) 
which provides a relevant formal discussion is reviewed extensively in 
Chapter 2. We conclude Section 1.4 with summaries of two recent 
theoretical models that are quite sceptical about the potentialities of 
financial liberalization.
Section 1,5 begins by setting out the following argument: Some of
the work surveyed in the previous Sections of this Chapter condemns the 
repression of the financial system and supports financial 
liberalization. However, repression seems to be the result of 
official regulation. Therefore it is caused deliberately by a 
government. Hence it might be serving some 'purpose'. Presumably 
this 'purpose' would no longer be fulfilled when financial 
liberalization removes repression. To the extent, then, that the 
'purpose' served by financial repression was beneficial, financial 
liberalization must entail the loss of some benefit. Therefore the 
literature which gives unequivocal support to financial liberalization 
is incomplete: support for financial liberalization can only be
conditional on a comparison of benefits with costs.
The question arises, what could be the purpose of financial 
repression? It is usually stated in the literature, that this is the 
extraction of government revenue from the financial system. We also
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generalise the notion of financial repression (which was understood 
until now as a situation of rationing under deposit rate ceilings) to 
include situations where loan rate ceilings or reserve requirements are 
imposed. We are now ready to restate, in specific terms, the argument 
cast in the beginning of Section 1.5 in very general terms : Assume 
that the government revenue, that is extracted by financial 
restriction, finances government capital formation. In this case, 
financial liberalization (when this revenue is lost) stimulates private 
investment only at the expense of government investment. Hence 
financial liberalization does not necessarily maximise output growth 
(since growth depends on total i.e. private plus government investment)
This is conditional on the proposition that financial repression 
fulfills a well defined purpose. This proposition can be challenged - 
financial repression may be an accident or an error of policy. 
Furthermore, there are some indications in the literature that 
financial repression should better be viewed as a political economic 
phenomenon: it is suggested that financial regulations are devices
designed to benefit directly some 'class' of economic agents.
Having realised that the 'purpose' of financial repression must 
remain an open question, we change direction. We assume that it is 
sufficient to view financial repression as a means to raise government 
revenue. We assume that government revenue finances government 
capital formation. On the other hand, private investment is crowded 
out in the process of extracting government revenue from the financial 
system. What is the net impact on the economy from these two 
tendencies: the expansion due to government capital formation and the
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contraction because private investment is crowded out as the government 
raises revenue by financial restriction/repression?
There are two separate sets of papers relating to our question: 
First, there is the literature on inflationary finance and growth (part 
of which is summarised in this section), and second the papers 
(Courakis 1984; Fry 1981a,1981b) discussed in the succeeding Section 
1.6. First, we survey the literature on inflationary finance and 
growth: This studies the impact on the economy from government capital
formation financed by inflation, interacting with a required reserve 
requirement. (This could be interpreted as a situation of financial 
repression/restriction).
In Section 1.6, we summarize Courakis (1984) who explores the 
trade-off between additional private investment (enabled by financial 
liberalization) and government investment (financed by revenue 
extracted by financial restriction) by means of the following 
procedure: He assumes that the government maintains its investment (at
the pre-liberalization level) after liberalization. The revenue which 
the government foregoes because of the discontinuation of financial 
restriction, it replaces by borrowing from banks (at the market 
interest rate). Under this procedure, the issue of the favourability 
of financial liberalization takes the form of the following 
comparison: Which situation delivers a higher volume of loanable funds
and thus, potentially, greater output growth - financial 
restriction/repression or removal of controls combined with borrowing 
by the government?
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We begin by discussing this comparison when the regulation imposed 
on banks is a reserve ratio. We sketch the considerations that would 
be relevant in this comparison if inflation tax revenues plus bank 
profits were taken as the measure of government revenue. Next, we 
compare the volume of loanable funds in a situation with a loan rate 
ceiling to the volume of funds in a situation without a loan rate 
ceiling. We note that apart from being devices of financial 
restriction, loan rate ceilings may be imposed in the context of 
selective credit policies. We sketch the considerations that are 
relevant when the situation with selective credit controls 
(restriction/repression) is compared to the situation after the removal 
of such controls (liberalization).
At this point our attention turns to the role of deposit rate 
ceilings. There is a puzzle; Does this regulation contribute to the 
extraction of government revenue? We discuss a number of 
possibilities which support the interpretation of deposit rate ceilings 
as instruments of financial restriction (i.e. revenue extraction). 
Finally, we suggest that deposit rate ceilings may fulfill prudential 
functions. Hence their removal in the course of financial 
liberalization may precipitate a systemic crisis.
Readers who are not interested in the details of the literature 
might prefer to slip to the concluding Section, 1.7.
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Section 1.2
Some Reasons For Not Maintaining Artificially 
Low Interest Rates
Administratively fixed interest rates enable disequilibrium in the 
market for loanable funds to persist (diagram 1). (Cf. Fry 1978,
Fig.l; Fry 1980, Fig.l; Fry 1982b, Fig.l; Fry 1988, Fig.1.4; Kitchen 
1986, Fig.3.1; Roe 1982, Fig.2). For such financial systems the 
market for loanable funds may be identified more or less with the 
banking system’ according as 'unofficial* money markets are 
(quantitatively) important or not. Hence S (in diagram 1) could be 
interpreted as the supply of bank deposits. Disequilibrium generates 
the following surprising result: under disequilibrium the familiar
negative interest sensitivity of investment cannot be relied upon for 
policy purposes. Therefore the Keynesian rationale for maintaining 
low interest rates is not valid. By contrast there should be a 
distinction between the desired level of investment (point B in diagram 
1) and the level of investment which can be financed (point A in 
diagram 1) by the forthcoming volume of loanable funds. Since the 
latter responds positively to the deposit rate, it follows that actual 
investment responds positively to the deposit rate (A A'). There is 
a vicious circle operating in the sense that because of repression 
(hence insufficient investment) income can never grow so as to close 
the gap of excess demand for loanable funds by shifting the S schedule 
to the right. Rises in the inflation rate reduce the real rate 
corresponding to the nominal ceiling and thus accentuate repression.
1. Indeed in the 1986 OECD Survey of Greece we read that: "Issues of 
securities accounted for less than 0.25 percent of total identified 









There are some further (seemingly paradoxical) effects in a 
situation where administrative ceilings keep interest rates 
artificially low. For example, another paradox is proposed in van
Wijnbergen (1983): Here, a rise in the administered loan rate reduces 
holdings of free reserves thus increases bank loans thereby reducing 
the unofficial market rate with an expansionary result. Under 
McKinnon’s (1973) complementarity hypothesis, the requirement for 
accumulation of monetary balances prior to indivisible investment 
expenditures (under internal finance), implies that the costliness of 
the investment process increases when the deposit rate declines. 
Therefore there may be a positive dependence of self financed 
investment on the deposit rate. Kumar (1983) constructs a 
macroeconomic system exhibiting some corresponding comparative dynamics 
(co-movements in the capital labour ratio and in real money 
balances). Molho (1986a) presents a microeconomic intertemporal asset 
choice rationale for the McKinnon hypothesis. He argues that a rise 
in the deposit rate, by attracting additional deposits and also 
generating higher accruals of interest earnings to existing deposits, 
stimulates future investment (conduit role). However, the rise in the 
deposit rate may discourage current investment in capital assets by the 
standard substitution mechanism, when a diversified portfolio 
(comprising deposits and capital) is held because of uncertainty. In 
order to capture these effects, he recommends the inclusion of distant 
lags of the interest rate in empirical specifications of the investment 
function.
In diagram 1 reference has so far been made to a deposit rate 
ceiling only. Distinguishing now between deposit and loan rate.
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fixing the former below the S-I intersection (diagram 1), is the only 
necessary feature of the analysis. Available loanable funds may be 
rationed either by charging a high effective loan rate? or by non-price 
criteria such as collateral assessment, if loan rates are fixed 
administratively. If the resultant bank profits are significant, then 
the consequences of interest rate repression are mitigated as the S 
curve shifts rightwards. This is because profits inspire depositor 
confidence and may be used to finance devices for non-price 
competition such as branching (Brimmer 1971). In the literature,
Liang (1988) attempts to differentiate between the macroeconomic 
implications of alternative loan rationing practices. We deal with 
this issue in Chapter 2.
At this stage, let us call the situation of financial 
disequilibrium, pictured in diagram 1, and described in the preceding 
paragraphs, 'financial repression'. In the following paragraphs we 
give a discussion of its microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences. 
There is an issue on the productivity implications of financial 
repression; the investment expenditures that are financed are quite 
likely to be characterised by low but safe returns. This is because 
the bank can benefit from the associated low risk while its pay-off is 
unaffected by (unlikely) high returns to the investment project over 
and above the value of its collateral (Demopoulos 1981, p.104). The 
tendency to rely on collateral is stressed by Costopoulos quoted in 
Courakis (1981b, p.225) for Greece. Fry (1978, p.465) writes, 
describing the loan rationing practices under financial repression:
2. Suggested for Greece in Bank of Greece (1981, p.107); loans given 
to those willing to pay the ceiling rate plus some premium effected 
by bringing other intermediation services above cost. Similarly 
Halikias (1978, p.230).
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"Nonprice rationing of investable funds must occur. This typically 
takes place on the basis of quality of collateral, political pressures, 
'name', loan size and covert benefits to the responsible loan 
officers. These criteria can be counted on to discriminate 
inefficiently between investment opportunities". Tybout (1984) shows 
that administrative ceilings on loan rates induce banks to look for
loan contracts with larger borrowers than otherwise in order to
maintain expected profits. This result comes out as a matter of 
arithmetic, but is also due to economies of scale in information 
collection and the perception that small firms are more risky. This 
explains also Maniatis's (1972) findings of "a high degree of 
concentration of bank loans of all maturities in a limited number of 
large industrial enterprises" (p.150), in Greece. (Similar 
observations about Greece in Ross and Thomadakis 1983) . In Galbis 
(1977,1982) a model is suggested where the alternative open to wealth 
holders, (faced with deposits bearing repressed interest rates), 
consists in self-financing little productive investment projects.
Thus, even when the total level of investment may not change upon a
rise in the deposit rate, there is a reallocation towards bank financed
investments which are more productive. Sundararajan (1987) detects 
empirically an association between (economywide) productivity and the 
level of real interest rates in a financially repressed economy. In 
Kim and Kwon (1977) financial reform is associated with an increase in 
the rate of utilization of capital.
The next step is to state and formalise the macroeconomic 
consequences of interest rate repression. Generally these involve 
lower investment, and hence growth rate. Accordingly the costs of
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repression have been expressed (Fry 1980) simply in terms of percentage 
points of growth lost compared to a situation of liberalization.
Formal analyses of the interconnections through which interest rate 
repression affects the growth rate are traced in the articles by Kapur 
(1976), Mathieson (1980) and van Wijnbergen (1983). They provide 
frameworks in which the growth rate and the inflation rate are 
determined simultaneously, so that a policy of financial reform has 
stabilisation implications. We summarise also the article by Blinder 
(1987). This models the problem of dynamic instability which is 
likely to be particularly acute under financial repression.
In Kapur's model the growth of bank loans translates into the 
growth of working capital,3 after allowing for bank credit taken up to 
maintain the real value of the existing stock of working capital in the 
face of inflation. Feeding the growth of working capital through a 
fixed coefficients production function, he then obtains the growth rate 
of output. In the model, inflation exceeds its expected value 
because of an excess supply of money; inflationary expectations are 
adaptive, A policy of administrative increases in the deposit rate is 
compared to a policy of lowering monetary growth. Between steady 
states they both yield similar comparative statics by raising the real 
deposit rate. But a deposit rate policy yields a more favourable 
short-run adjustment path, one that does not involve declines in the 
growth rate at any point. By contast, as monetary growth is lowered 
below the growth of prices, the real scale of the banking system (and 
thus output growth) is reduced initially. In the short run sluggish
3. Kapur states that this approach is motivated by the prevalence of 
bank finance (rather than financial disequilibrium) under financial 
repression.
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inflationary expectations do not fully internalise the implications of 
a reduction in money growth (for expected inflation hence) for the 
value of the real deposit rate corresponding to the nominal ceiling. 
Within Kapur's model the size of the banking system is determined by 
the real supply of money, whose divergence from the real demand for 
money generates the Phillips curve dynamics. Hence the initial effect 
of a rise in the deposit rate is to increase money demand and thus to 
reduce the rate of inflation. This implies that the real amount of 
loans necessary to maintain the real stock of working capital 
declines. Therefore funds are freed for net additions to the growth 
of the real stock of working capital. Hence output growth is 
stimulated at once. In addition, as the reduced inflation rate feeds 
into lower prices, the real scale of the banking system expands.
These are the particular forms that the dependence of growth on credit 
availability takes in Kapur's model.
In Mathieson (1980) there is a standard investment demand function 
for fixed capital with the real cost of loans as an argument, A 
fraction of the capital stock is (constrained by assumption to be) 
financed from the banking system generating a demand for loans. Once 
a stabilisation-deregulation package is introduced, the deposit rate is 
administratively manipulated to ensure loan market clearing. The 
structure under repression is not analysed here, whereas in Kapur 
(op.cit,) the structure under repression (credit availability channel) 
is maintained after the administered rise in the deposit rate. The 
contribution of interest rate reform is to produce a one-off rise in 
the investment/growth rate as the gap of unsatisfied loan, demands is 
closed. This counterbalances the initial real effects of
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'stabilization', i.e. the reduction in monetary growth. (We have a 
combination of a step rise in the scale of the banking system with a 
reduction in its nominal rate of growth [affecting future nominal 
scale]).
The following macroeconomic phenomenon is likely to be particularly 
conspicuous under financial repression. Blinder (1987) demonstrates 
that credit rationing may cause dynamic instability. Assume credit 
rationing tightens (because of a reduction in reserves by the monetary 
authorities). Then aggregate supply declines since production 
requires working capital (given a time lag between factor payments and 
sales). Due to a wealth effect (of money) aggregate demand is reduced 
as well. Under plausible values for the structural parameters the
former
latfeer effect predominates. As a result, (under Walrasian adjustment, 
but not under Phillips curve dynamics) prices are bid up, eroding the 
real value of loans, hence further accentuating credit rationing. A 
similar result may occur when loans financing expenditures on fixed 
capital are rationed. Here, prices inflate because firms, unable to 
expand their plant (due to credit rationing), have to operate beyond 
capacity in order to meet demand. As prices inflate, credit rationing 
is accentuated etc. The problem of dynamic instability may not, 
however, disappear after financial liberalization since some credit 
rationing is likely to remain even then (cf. Cho 1986). Indeed 
Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) suggest that credit rationing prevails, not 
only under financial repression, but also in developed financial 
systems (due to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] reasons). A firm denied 
borrowing by its bank cannot obtain (external) finance elsewhere 
(especially if small) and becomes constrained by the availability of
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credit. This is attributed to the specificity of information on 
creditworthiness (acquired by a single bank in part through handling 
the customer's transactions) and to the tendency for loan contracts to 
be contingent on past behaviour. However, dynamic instability is 
likely to be more acute in a situation of financial repression. This 
is suggested, for example, by Leff and Sato (1980). They remind us 
that movements in interest rates, which may be stabilizing, are 
prevented under financial repression.
Section 1.3
A Formal Model Advising Against 
Financial Liberalization
A class of models, known as 'new structuralist', argue, more or 
less, against financial liberalization. They draw our attention to 
the operation of unofficial funds markets, in financially repressed 
economies. Such models focus on the portfolio substitution 
possibilities between bank deposits, unofficial loans and inflation 
hedges and also introduce the cost of borrowing in the aggregate supply 
(of goods) function. They are represented here by van Wijnbergen
(1983).
In van Wijnbergen (op.cit.) no channel of credit availability is 
included, and all effects are transmitted through the interest rate in 
the unofficial money market. This is because the total market for 
loanable funds is not in disequilibrium; loan demands unsatisfied by 
the banking system are met in the parallel market. Once the interest 
rate is determined in the unofficial money market, it feeds into
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aggregate expenditure and allowing for feed-back the equilibrium level 
of income is determined in classic IS/LM fashion.
Another channel, pointed out by new structuralists, through which 
credit finance acquires macroeconomic implications, is aggregate 
supply. This channel is assigned importance in such financial 
systems, because of the large fraction of working capital externally 
(bank) financed under financial repression.< The aggregate supply 
curve is derived from the profit maximising condition of an economy 
wide price-taking firm. Hence a rise in the unofficial money market 
rate (in real terms) represents an adverse supply shock. Assume that 
the contractionary effect (of the rise in the unofficial rate) on 
aggregate supply exceeds the Keynesian contraction (due to higher 
interest rates) in aggregate demand (Cavallo hypothesis). Then the 
inflation rate (determined by excess demand for goods) rises upon a 
rise in the unofficial money market rate caused by an administered rise 
in the deposit rate. Therefore interest rate reform leads to 
stagflation. Given an investment function depending on the real 
unofficial money market rate and the level of income per unit capital, 
the growth rate declines. It is assumed that the McKinnon effect on 
savings, because of higher saving propensities under the higher 
unofficial rate, is reversed by the decline in income. Buffie (1984), 
however, shows that if the McKinnon effect on savings is sufficiently 
strong, even a new structuralist model may yield conclusions favouring
4. For a recent exposition of this mechanism see Rojas-Suarez (1987). 
It is less frequently discussed with reference to developed 
economies, perhaps because the opportunity cost of internal 
finance is neglected or does not affect decision making. An 
exception is provided by Shaller (1983) who introduces working 
capital costs in the aggregate supply of a developed economy.
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liberalization in the longer run.
In van Wijnbergen (op.cit.) the macroeconomic implications of a 
rise in the deposit rate rest solely on its impact on the interest rate 
in the unofficial money m a r k e t ^ .  Upon the rise in the deposit rate, 
substitution into deposits leads to a reduction in the supply of 
unofficial loans. The new structuralist assumption, made by van 
Wijnbergen, is that there is relatively less substitution from third 
alternatives (typically tangible inflation hedges). In addition, new 
bank deposits only fractionally translate into new bank loans, due to 
reserve requirements. So the reduction in the pressure of demand for 
loans from the unofficial market falls short of the reduction in the 
supply of funds to this market. Hence the net result is excess demand 
for unofficial loans. The interest rate in the unofficial money 
market is bid up but the volume of unofficial transactions is reduced.
However, one could question the assumption (in the new 
structuralist arguments) that bank reserves lay idle and are not 
rerouted (say through special credit institutions) as loans, thus 
easing the pressure for funds from the unofficial market. Nor do the 
new structuralist models consider that proceeds from the reserve 
requirement may finance government investment, thus promoting growth. 
Moreover, the shrinkage of the unofficial market achieved by a deposit 
rate rise should be an independent policy desideratum both on normative 
and efficiency grounds. Assuming that the unofficial market brings 
together lenders and borrowers directly, all the cost savings, in
5. Analytically similar roles to the unofficial market have been 
assigned to the equities market (Horiuchi 1984).
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a general sense, which have provided economic explanations for the 
existence of financial intermediaries (Goodhart 1975, Chapter 6) are 
achieved when it contracts. These gains should be set against any 
direct growth losses caused by a deposit rate rise. Furthermore, if 
the recipients of unofficial loans are identified with, say, 
c o n s u m e r s , 6 then the new structuralist crunch will not hit supply or 
the rate of investment directly but only to the extent the latter 
responds to consumer demand.?
Section 1.4
Other Difficulties Possibly Accompanying 
Financial Liberalization
Next we discuss a model which deals with the short- run financial 
difficulties that may be encountered by financial firms, following
6. For Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) they are typically small urban
borrowers and the population of the rural areas. In fact in Greece
selective credit controls aim to discourage the provision of credit 
to commercial (rather than manufacturing) enterprises and consumers.
7. It seems that in Greece an unofficial inter-firm market is
operative, whereby established borrowers relend to (commercial) 
firms downstream or final consumers, thus appearing 
'overborrowed'. Identification of the suppliers in the unofficial 
market with borrowing and on-lending firms should mean that 
switches out of supplies of unofficial loans free equal amounts of 
funds for the banking system, leave the equilibrium of the 
unofficial market unchanged and have no further effect. The 
quantitative importance of this second round of intermediation is 
pointed out in Courakis (1981b). This feature is mentioned also in 
Halikias (1978, e.g. p.31), Union of Greek Banks (1987, p.24) and 
in the 1986 OECD Survey of Greece (OECD 1986). In addition, 
stockbroking firms in the small Athens Stock Exchange may have 
(illegally) diversified into intermediation functions in unofficial 
parallel money markets (Bank of Greece 1981, p.218). The press 
also occasionally reports cases of usury (see for example Nea 8 and 
9 August 1988). On inflation hedges in Greece see Brissimis and 
Leventakis (1981) as well as Niarchos and Granger (1972) .
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financial liberalization. Mathieson (1980) models the profit squeeze 
faced in times of rising interest rates by financial intermediaries 
which are typically characterised by mismatch, whereby their assets 
have longer maturities than their liabilities. It is assumed that the 
intermediaries hold an (exponentially declining) stock of old loans 
contracted at the 'repressed* loan rate. Therefore a competitive 
relationship (as under unfettered liberalization®) cannot be 
established between the new (i.e. deregulated) deposit rate and the 
loan rate without losses. The authorities are concerned (though not 
via their objective function as set out in this model) about the 
prospect of a (growth defeating) banking crisis. (Cf. Snowden 1987). 
Hence they accept, as a constraint on their optimal programme, the 
requirement that an administered loan rate guarantees zero profits to 
(established) banks at all times during the stabilisation/financial 
reform. The (non-inflationary) alternative of dealing with such 
difficulties by a tax-cum-subsidy scheme is rejected, by Mathieson, on 
grounds of higher costs of administering, given an existing nexus of 
interest rate controls. In addition the real deposit rate is
constrained to ensure that the size of the banking system is sufficient 
to finance a fixed fraction of the demand for capital. Given these 
constraints the authorities are modelled as choosing the path of 
monetary growth so as to minimise losses accumulating over 
time. Losses are computed on the basis of a quadratic loss function 
defined over departures from growth/inflation rate objectives. The 
path of inflation is determined by the loan market equilibrium 
condition (which appears as a portfolio balance equation). Given an
8. Such a relationship could be established in a competitive fringe
of, say, new entrants. Note also that liberalization (Competition 
and Credit Control) preceded the secondary banking crisis in the 
U.K.
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assumption on inflationary expectations, the administered nominal 
deposit and loan rates are determined. The moral of this model is 
that solvency problems of financial firms (dissolving exponentially) 
can be remedied by carefully administered rises in deposit and loan 
rates. The model recommends gradualism in financial liberalization.
No hindrance is put on deposit rate rises but there is a
delay in the approach to the growth objective (since higher loan rates
mean lower investment demand).
Next we record some references in the literature to the prospects 
for financial difficulties among non-financial firms upon financial 
liberalization. That such problems may result from financial 
liberalization is proposed in very general terms, in e.g. Jao (1985) or 
Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983). The analysis of such problems will be 
particularly relevant to Greece, where a large number of major 
enterprises are facing the prospect of bankruptcy (OECD 1986, 1987). 
Assuming that established borrowers have not been rationed by high 
effective loan rates (which would come down), upon interest rate reform 
they would face a steep rise in financing costs. In turn, this could 
create difficulties for financial firms. In order to avoid the 
emergence of such problems, Kapur (1976) restricts the rise in the 
deposit rate to be such that, given a competitive relationship, the 
loan rate does not rise above the constant rate of return on working 
capital (when loan demand collapses). Fry (1988) (and similarly 
Khatkhate 1980) points out that this danger never exists under 
liberalization (rather than administered rises) when an infinitely 
elastic demand for loans, at the rate of return on capital, (assumed 
constant), determines the loan rate, and this in turn determines the
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deposit rate. However, the implications of financial difficulties 
consequent upon rises in interest rates, are emphasized in Currie and 
Anyadike-Danes (1980). In this model, a rise in the loan rate eats 
into the retained earnings of borrowers. Hence there is an 
economywide reduction in the internal funds available for investment, 
not compensated by the increase in the availability of bank finance. 
Similar discussions can be found in Hong (1985) and Snowden (1987). 
These authors assume that before financial deregulation (the majority 
of) firms obtained (limited) finance at the repressed official interest 
rates. However, one could take the view that liberalization, rather 
than adding to, may bring relief from the burden of interest charges, 
as the black market (where rates presumably reach exorbitant [above 
competitive equilibrium] levels) dissolves.
Two recent theoretical models have also expressed some skepticism 
about the potentialities of financial liberalization. Montiel's 
(1986) model is built around the principle that "... in a regime of 
credit rationing, the quantity of credit extended to the private sector 
would appear directly in private demand functions. Such a conclusion 
derives from ... Glower ..." (p.586). Still this model lends only 
qualified support to the presumed influence of credit availability on 
investment expenditures (on which advocacy of financial liberalization 
often relies). It is assumed that households choose under perfect 
certainty paths for consumption and holdings of (productive) capital 
and (transactions costs reducing) money. Their objective is to 
maximise the present discounted value of utility from consuming over an 
infinite horizon subject to a (lifetime) balance sheet and an 
(instantaneous) budget constraint and a ceiling on credit. Formal
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representations for the following familiar features of financial 
repression are derived thereby: The marginal product of capital
exceeds the administered loan rate; effective demands (for capital 
etc.) are insensitive to the administered loan rate. However, the 
administered loan rate influences (consumption) behaviour by affecting 
the amounts of interest payments by households. Thus a rise in the 
administered loan (deposit) rate or the credit ceiling reduces 
(increases) consumption both on impact and in the steady state. By 
contrast, increases in the administered rates or the credit ceiling, 
within the context of financial deregulation, cannot have lasting 
effects on the capital stock of the economy. This is because the 
steady state value for the capital stock must equalise the marginal 
product of capital to the rate of time preference (which is 
invariant). A similar condition pegs the ratio of money to 
consumption (which determines the productivity of money balances). 
However, financial liberalization has transitory effects on the 
holdings of capital: A relaxation in credit rationing enables a step
increase in investment as it allows private portfolios to expand. An 
increase in the loan rate induces, on impact, portfolio redistributions 
from money to capital (since consumption falls, required money balances 
decline). By contrast a rise in the administered deposit rate causes 
a reallocation from capital to money (McKinnon's complementarity 
between money and capital does not obtain in this model). All these 
changes in the holdings of capital (which take place upon financial 
deregulation) are gradually reversed during the movement to the new 
(post-deregulation) steady state. Thus, one could argue that, if an 
investment boom takes place upon financial liberalization, this happens 
only at the cost of a succeeding slowdown. In Kahkonen's (1987) two
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period general equilibrium model, if financial deregulation (rise in 
the deposit rate towards world levels) is not implemented 
simultaneously with trade liberalization (reduction in tariffs), 
welfare may decline on second best grounds. It is argued that tariffs 
levied during the first period cause excessive savings. The 
divergence of savings from the (all-markets-liberalised) optimum widens 
if the factor by which consumers discount future flows of income is 
reduced by a rise in the administered deposit rate. Thus a second 
best case can be made for maintaining low deposit rates given that 
tariffs are imposed. This conclusion is partly overturned if capital 
flight is taken into account (Haaparanta 1988).
Section 1.5
Financial Restriction and Financial Repression
Presumably there must be a purpose behind the tight system of 
regulations imposed on some financial systems, otherwise what is 
inhibiting governments from liberalising? The unequivocal support for 
financial liberalization, often encountered in the literature, should 
rather give way to a more balanced approach. Of particular concern 
must be the implications of liberalization for government finances, a 
consideration which is given some prominence in Jao (1985) and in 
Dooley and Mathieson (1986) but is little discussed elsewhere.
First, we reconsider the definition of financial restriction and 
financial repression. Both rate and quantity controls (e.g. interest 
rate ceilings, reserve ratios) are identified in the literature as a
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means to direct financial flows into channels which are easily (or 
traditionally) tapped by government. This attempt, to influence 
financial flows in order to extract government revenues, is called 
financial restriction. It (mysteriously) leads to financial 
repression. Financial repression could be defined as a situation 
where financial flows (through official markets) are less than what 
they would have otherwise been. Financial repression is usually 
thought of in terms of its adverse implications for growth. There is 
a difference between the interpretation of repression as a situation of 
disequilibrium (diagram 1) and the Courakis (1984) and McKinnon (1981) 
interpretation of repression as an equilibrium of the banking system, 
but in the presence of government imposed controls. This latter 
interpretation is espoused in the argument to follow.
Next we examine whether financial restriction is distinct from 
financial repression. The description of the institutional set of 
controls underlying repression does not differ^ from that set of 
controls which implement financial restriction. The relationship 
between financial restriction and repression is not clear. Is 
restriction (i.e. the imposition of constraints), the action and 
repression, the natural result (i.e. the response of the equilibrium 
size of the banking system)? Or is it that only occasionally an
9. Quoting from Fry (1973, p.372): "Foreign exchange controls,
maximum interest rates, high reserve requirements etc. can be 
imposed to increase the flow of resources to the public sector .... 
Such financial control might be termed financial restriction as 
opposed to financial repression"; (p.381 referring to McKinnon): 
"... financial repression a situation in which the rate of interest 
is held below the free market rate, foreign exchange controls exist 
and the capital market is deliberately fragmented by government 
policies".
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extraneous causal mechanism turns restriction into repression? (In 
which case the latter is an unintended^ ° consequence of the former to 
be prevented by suitable policies). Perhaps there is a difference in 
degree (of the contraction in the balance sheet of the banking system) 
distinguishing restriction from repression. The only way to 
differentiate between restriction and repression is connected with the 
existence of measures, to be mentioned below, which sustain government 
receipts (and therefore constitute restriction) but, unlike other 
measures, do not result in a lower level of intermediation (hence are 
not repressive).
Assume that financial repression is synonymous to financial 
restriction. That some objective, associated with government 
revenues, is singled out to motivate financial restriction/ repression, 
enables us to think of this situation as the outcome of premeditated 
(if not optimal) behaviour on the part of the government. If we 
believe that financial liberalization must take place in order to 
alleviate repression and pursue a growth objective, trivially we must 
recognise that in the process the objective served by financial 
restriction (e.g. equity) will have to be given up, at least in part. 
One might have to analyse the trade-off between restriction and 
liberalization as a manifestation of the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. Moreover, distributional ideals exist, while 
distributional weights have been applied in analysis to justify 
distortionary taxation and could be invoked, by analogy, to justify
10. Fry (1988, p.16): "Typically, it seems, financial repression
is the unintended consequence of low fixed nominal interest rates 
combined with high and rising inflation" - no further comments on 
'unintended' follow.
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repression. 11 But it is not necessarily the case that the objective 
pursued by financial restriction is antagonistic to the growth 
objective inspiring liberalization. Firstly, government revenues (in 
a general sense) extracted through financial restriction may contribute 
to growth directly (and perhaps even more so than private loans) by 
financing investment expenditures. Secondly, complete abolition of 
all rate and quantity controls may not maximise the growth objective by 
not maximising the sum of private and government loanable funds. 
Insistence in full liberalization in the face of such possibilities 
suggests perhaps that the potential of government expenditure to 
generate growth is doubted.
Consider now, the other possible alternative to the above (i.e. 
that financial restriction/repression has a purpose). The alternative 
is to view financial repression as a haphazard situation whereby an 
accidental rise in inflation causes a shrinkage in the banking system 
because of the presence of reserve ratios and administratively fixed 
rates. However even in this case the government may become concerned 
with its revenues (since some sources may decline as inflation 
accelerates), and tighten reserve ratios, or seek to increase currency 
issue, while seldom abandoning rate ceilings, thus accentuating 
repression. Even on this view, it is government revenue which is 
extracted in exchange for further financial repression (so all the 
comments in the previous paragraph apply). Possibly there could exist 
in the background issues of government rationality. Perhaps we cannot
11. However Fry (1988, pp.102-103) surveys evidence that financial 
repression leads to adverse redistribution from small depositors 
to mostly large borrowers. Similarly Roe (1982, p.215) points 
out the perverse distributional effects of cheap agricultural 
credit programmes.
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claim that the government is causing financial repression by setting 
the values of constraints optimally with respect to some objective.
For this would require information on asset demand (deposits - loans) 
parameters unlikely to be generated in such a regime where interest 
rates are rarely changed (Courakis 1981). On the other hand, we could 
adapt Friedman's (1971) argument that the relevant optimisation horizon 
of a government is its short incumbency period, so that it generally 
pays to increase money growth, beyond what would be optimal on the 
basis of inflation tax calculations for the steady state, because of 
lags in the response of prices and in turn of real money demand. ’ 2
This issue (i.e. whether financial repression is an accident or 
whether it has some purpose) is overlooked in the literature. An 
exception is provided by Burkett (1987). According to Burkett some,
political economic, explanations attribute financial repression to 
erroneous Keynesian rationales for low interest rates, or to ill 
conceived distributional (cf. rural credit) policies. Others view the 
maintenance of pervasive financial regulations as the outcome of 
pressure from interest groups. For example, Hong (1985, p.358) 
suggests that "... the chosen few, who may well turn out to be the 
existing group of influential big entrepreneurs would be able to enjoy 
using very low cost capital". We add that capital market 
imperfections are a standard textbook 'source of monopoly' (cf.
Gravelle and Rees 1981, p.298). The potential beneficiaries from
12. But in Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983, p.7) it is asserted, for Brazil; 
"A brief departure from its historical policies [of maintaining 
high real interest rates] in 1979-80 brought an immediate response 
from savers". Also for an indication of the time horizon involved 
in financial liberalization for Turkey, liberalization in July 1980 
was followed during six quarters by a quarterly deposit growth of 
25% while inflation fell from 100% to 50% within a year.
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financial liberalization do not exercise sufficient countervailing 
power because of free rider problems or limited access to "politically 
relevant resources". Burkett's preferred explanation states that "... 
interest rate restrictions have been used in attempts [i.e. import 
substitution industrialization] to alter the international division of 
labor in favour of domestic capital" (p.11). Alternatively 
governments with "... main goal ... to ensure the domestic stability 
required for the continued enrichment of state bureaucrats ...." (p.14) 
make "... use of subsidized credit as patronage ... dispensed to 
wealthy landowners and large firms in exchange for political support"
(p.7).
At this point we leave the question of the motives behind financial 
restriction/repression. We turn to a number of authors who have 
explored the idea that revenue raised by the government, by what is 
effectively a form of financial restriction (e.g. sustained inflation 
in the presence of reserve requirements), finances investment 
expenditures.13 In Mundell (1965) the government uses inflation tax 
revenue to finance (one for one) capital formation thus inducing (given 
the capital output ratio) output growth. But the possibilities of 
inflationary finance are limited due to the shrinkage of the tax base 
of equilibrium real balances as the inflation rate is raised. Given a 
linear and also a Cagan-type velocity function and reasonable values 
for the relevant parameters, the growth rate that can be achieved by 
infinite inflation is of the order of 1.5%. Aghevli (1977) argues 
that the gains in growth from inflation may not be significant (in
13. On average, government expenditures amounted to as much as half 
of the aggregate investment expenditure of the private sector in 
Greece in the forty years to 1985.
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absolute terms) and also that the costs of inflation have to be 
considered. Costs are calculated a la Bailey (1956) and subtracted 
from consumption to reach utility. Maximisation of discounted future 
utility with respect to the inflation rate hinges on this trade-off: 
Increases in future utility, produced by the capacity created by 
government investment, involve sacrifices in current 'effective' 
consumption because of the welfare costs incurred. For some parameter 
values inflation may be a preferable tax characterised by relatively 
low collection costs (i.e. ratio welfare costs/revenue). Marty 
(1967,1973) shows that the collection costs of the inflation tax given 
a Cagan-type money demand function and reasonable parameter values are 
reduced by only a few percentage points when the revenue from the 
inflation tax is used to induce further growth (the comparison is made 
at identical rates of inflation/money growth).
Next we compare and contrast the literature on inflationary finance 
and growth to the (mainstream) financial repression literature, which 
was surveyed in the previous Sections of this Chapter. Within
Mundell's framework the influence of the financing efforts of the 
government on private sector behaviour is confined to the response of 
real money demand as the government pulls the lever of inflation. And 
this, in turn, puts a limit to the government's financing potential 
rather than working on the level of private investment. However the 
reduction of the availability of credit for private investment seems to 
be the predominant mechanism by which financial restriction is thought 
to affect the economy. Similarly Aghevli (1977) models the costs of 
inflationary finance (i.e. the costs of financial repression in this 
simple set up), disregarding however any impact on private investment.
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This is because neither authors consider a rationing determination of 
investment. Yet their conclusions that the growth gains by 
inflationary finance are not significant prejudges liberalization to be 
a preferred policy. A model of the short run dynamics following 
financial liberalization, where it is assumed that the government 
extracts inflation tax from its currency issue and directs it to 
capital formation, is provided by Hong (1 9 8 5 ).
Somewhat more favourable evidence for inflationary finance is 
provided by a model simulation by von Furstenberg (1983) . In 
addition, Newlyn (1977) offers arguments for the effectiveness of 
inflationary finance, e.g. it is not only the currency issue which 
finances government (as assumed by most of the previous authors) but 
also quantitatively significant borrowing from commercial banks.
Newlyn*s calculations, based on an estimated velocity function, show 
that significant growth rates are sustainable by inflationary finance 
but we are cautioned as to the adverse implications for growth that may 
result from consequent balance of payments problems.
14. Another complication which could be introduced is that discussed by 
Aghevli and Khan (1978). They point out that the budget deficit 
(and therefore the supply of high-powered money) is endogenous 
under inflation. This is due to lags in tax collection 
appreciably longer than those in the (proportionate) adjustment of 
government revenue (in nominal terms) during inflation in 
developing countries. A full model of the feedback, whereby the 
endogenous rise in high-powered money causes further inflation, is 
estimated, simulated and compared with the actual inflationary 
experience of various countries. However this possibility is 
dismissed for Greece in Batavia, Lash and Malliaris (1986).
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Section 1.6
Financial Restriction, Financial Intermediation 
and Financial Liberalization
There are two directions towards which one's thinking could evolve 
from here. One could develop the insight that the authorities have at 
their disposal other controls over the yield of the inflation tax apart 
from variations in the rate of inflation and that financial restriction 
is precisely the application of such policy instruments.is 
Simultaneously one could consider more complicated models for the 
financial intermediaries explaining how private investment is 
crowded-out in the course of financial restriction. With these aims, 
we single out reserve ratios, loan rate ceilings, deposit rate ceilings 
and floors and analyse how each accomplishes financial restriction as 
well as the implications of liberalization, i.e. the abolition of each 
of the aforementioned constraints separately.
15. In Fry (1973, p.372): "Successful financial restriction would be
exemplified by three effects on the demand for money, namely, a 
rightward shift in the function, higher income and lower cost 
elasticities of demand". In Nichols (1974, p.423): "A government
can shift the location and elasticity of that demand curve through 
the use of various controls and regulations and thereby change the 
level of inflationary tax receipts that is associated with any 
given level of inflation". Fischer (1982, Table A.l) gives an 
average for the ratio of the change in H to the change in H plus 
government revenue (where H is reserve money) which is around 14% 
for Greece over the period 1973-78. Over the same period the 
average for all industrial countries stands at 6% while the highest 
value recorded for this ratio is 46% for Argentina in the period 
1960-1975. By contrast, Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) suggest 
mechanisms through which government revenues are favourably 
affected by liberalization: the intermediation of wealth holdings
from tangible assets into deposits implies the generation of 
interest income flows more easily taxable than capital gains.
Higher loan rates put pressure on public enterprises for rational­
isation, hence savings. Also hopefully tax revenues respond to the 
outcome for growth. Petrochilos (1985, p.62) describing the Greek 
financial system states that "the admini- strative determination of 
interest rates and the quantitative and quali- tative controls 
have, in effect, meant that successive governments have been able 
to finance their deficits with 'cheap money'".
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Suppose we are concerned with assessing which situation (financial 
restriction/repression or liberalization) is more conducive to 
growth. For most of the analysis that follows, we adopt a common 
yardstick based on the belief that the availability of finance is a 
constraint on growth. We also assume that 1 Dr of private loans 
promotes growth by exactly as much as 1 Dr of government expenditure.
It follows that the criterion of the comparison (of a situation with 
controls to a situation without controls) should be the volume of 
loanable funds, the sum of private bank loans and government revenues 
(from financial restriction). It is an issue to be examined whether 
the appropriate measure of government revenue from financial 
restriction should be the proceeds from the reserve ratio (Courakis 
1984), inflation tax revenues on currency and reserves or inflation tax 
plus banking profits (Fry 1981a,1981b; Siegel 1981) on the grounds that 
typically the government would hold shares in the banks in such a 
system.
Consider liberalization as the abolition of a zero interest 
bearing reserve requirement. Then liberalization is entailed by the 
complete loss of the tax base of reserves. It also implies the 
disappearance of the reserve ratio as an instrument set to influence 
the equilibrium interest rates chosen by banks and thereby the volume 
of, hence inflation tax on, currency (Siegel 1981). Hence 
liberalization should lower inflation tax revenues. Even after 
liberalization, however, the rate of inflation remains as an 
instrument, which could be set by the authorities to 'maximise' 
inflation tax on currency. As far as (lump-sum taxes on) bank profits 
contribute to government revenue, they rise when the reserve
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ratio (or the Inflation rate) declines. But to work out the 
implications (of the abolition of the reserve ratio) for a joint 
objective of bank profits and inflation tax, we should take into 
account the change in the 'optimal' inflation rate (that may accompany 
such financial liberalization).
We may now discuss which situation is most conducive to output 
growth, sustainance or removal of the reserve ratio. As Courakis
(1984) points out, simple abolition of any reserve ratio will always 
lead to a rise in the volume of private loans. But, somehow, the 
adverse growth implications of the consequent loss of government 
revenue (and hence of government expenditure) also have to be taken 
into account. In order to avoid accounting in growth terms for this 
loss (and to consider the most realistic alternative open to a 
government) we assume that government expenditure is maintained 
after liberalization. To avoid analysing the impact on output growth 
of distortions introduced by non-lump sum taxes, we might assume that 
government expenditure is financed then by borrowing from the banking 
system at the going loan rate. This assumption is consistent with the 
'typical inelasticity of tax revenues' as well as the absence of open 
markets for securities in developing countries. Furthermore, the 
interest bill of the government is financed by per unit taxes added to 
the cost of attracting deposits. The distortions from the taxes
involved in this exercise are taken into account (i.e. the taxes have 
an impact on the size of the banking system). And the size of the 
banking system (i.e. total loanable funds) determines the potential of 
the economy for output growth. However, government expenditure is 
unchanged. Thus we may decide which situation is more conducive to
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growth by comparing the volume of private loans.
Courakis restricts government revenue to that obtained from bank 
reserves and also compares situations with identical zero inflation. 
Both assumptions could be relaxed in order to generalise the concept of 
government revenue to inflation tax revenue (plus [part of] bank 
profits), and to acknowledge that the 'optimal' inflation rate might 
change following liberalization.
Courakis (op.cit.) concludes that under a perfectly competitive 
banking system the two situations’® yield identical volumes of private 
loans, whereas under a monopoly banking system liberalization results 
in a lower volume of private loans for avy value of the reserve ratio. 
How might we adapt this result for a framework where the government 
sets the inflation rate so as to maximize some measure of inflation tax 
revenues? This result would probably carry forward if the optimal 
inflation rate under restriction were relatively low, irrespective of 
how the latter changes upon liberalization (since in the absence of a 
reserve requirement inflation is neutral) . ’ ’
Consider now liberalization as the abolition of loan rate 
ceilings. As Courakis demonstrates, in the case of a monopoly bank a 
loan rate ceiling in an appropriate range results in a higher volume of 
deposits and loans thus unequivocally serving a growth objective.
16. Imposition of a reserve ratio is compared to bank borrowing 
by the government combined with taxation of interest.
17. We abstract from the borrowing of differences in inflation tax 
revenues. These can be worked out only if the change in optimal 
inflation rates is known.
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Hence also a loan rate ceiling in combination with any given reserve 
ratio results in higher government proceeds (than if no ceiling were 
imposed). Therefore it can be identified as a measure of financial 
restriction not antagonistic to the growth objective. But the volume 
of deposits, hence the growth objective, can be maximised (given a 
monopoly bank) by a combination of a reserve ratio and loan rate 
ceiling which does not necessarily deliver the highest level of 
reserves and hence government revenues.
On the other hand, rather than being motivated by a revenue 
objective, loan rate ceiling policies can be inspired by a 
subsidisation ideal, whereby loan rate ceilings combined with selective 
rationing of credit correct 'divergences between private and 
social returns', They aim at favouring sectors thought to be 
contributing more than others to economic growth. Compare next a 
situation involving selective credit controls with a situation where 
loan rate ceilings have been removed. When selective credit controls 
are in place, we are not on loan demand curves as in Courakis. Assume 
that, as in diagram 1, there is a low administered deposit rate 
allowing banks to break-even (given the ceiling on the loan rate) but 
depressing the volume of deposits. Suppose that, upon abolition of 
the ceiling rate, subsidies (to the favoured sectors) are to be 
maintained and financed by taxation or by diverting government revenues 
from other uses (cf. Johnson 1974; Khatkhate and Villanueva 1978).
Then the distortions introduced by taxes or the suspension of 'other 
uses' have to be set against the benefits from liberalization (cf. 
Silber 1973). To compare (on the basis of the volume of loanable 
funds) the two situations, the amount of subsidies could be borrowed
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from banks or taxes imposed on the latter. Assume, by contrast, that 
subsidies are withdrawn but abolition of the loan rate ceiling enables 
abolition of the deposit rate ceiling and therefore results in a larger 
volume of loanable funds. Then the comparison is (perhaps more 
difficult) essentially between quantity and quality. Allegedly growth 
promoting sectors (previously not constrained by the availability of 
finance) are hit by higher loan rates and shrink, while other sectors 
(only recently entitled to credit) thrive. The net result on growth 
is an average of these two opposing tendencies.
Consider now deposit rate ceilings. What is the purpose of this 
type of financial regulation? Does it accomplish financial 
restriction? It is clear how financial restriction is accomplished by 
ceilings on, usury laws, unfavourable tax treatment of, interest rates 
payable on private capital issues. It is not clear what such purpose 
is served by ceilings on rates attracting funds into (favoured) bank 
liabilities. Because to the extent proceeds from reserves represent 
revenue to the government these decline, at any given level of the 
reserve ratio. For the imposition of deposit rate ceilings invariably 
detracts from the equilibrium volume of deposits (both under monopoly 
and perfect competition). One explanation for the imposition of 
deposit rate ceilings is the following; For presentational reasons, 
all rates may have to be pegged in order to administer a structure 
favouring bank liabilities (rather than merely fixing rates on 
competing instruments). Thus bank deposit rates may be low in 
absolute but not relative terms. Similarly administered deposit rates 
may be part of the presentation of an interest rate structure aiming to 
keep government borrowing costs or loan rates to favoured borrowers at
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low levels. One could also argue along lines suggested by Nichols 
(1974) that ceilings on deposit rates may be motivated by a desire to 
maintain relatively high currency holdings on which inflation tax is 
extracted’®. However, this happens at the cost of lower deposits, 
hence lower reserves backing them which latter are taxed as well.
But whatever the direction of the relationship between inflation 
tax revenues and deposit rates, the government may seek to use the 
deposit rate as an instrument (affecting the equilibrium of the banking 
system) to maximise inflation tax revenues. This is indicated in Fry 
(1981a,1981b) who models a nationalised banking system. Furthermore, 
he shows that maximising (with respect to the inflation rate and the 
deposit rate) inflation tax on currency and deposits net of the real 
interest bill, may result in negative real deposit rates. The 
following comment is in order, here: Unlike Fry (op.cit.), an
appropriate objective of a government owned money industry might be the 
sum of inflation tax on currency plus profits from monopoly 
intermediation. This is the natural extension of viewing maximisation 
of inflation tax revenue from fiat money as the optimisation of a 
’mineral spring’ monopolist. And it is not in general equivalent to 
the Fry objective function unless a perfectly elastic demand for loans 
at the inflation rate is assumed (a point made explicit in Siegel 
1981) . Considering a downward sloping demand for loans would of 
course alter the optimal values for the instruments and the objective. 
Thus the results of Fry (op.cit.) would not necessarily carry over in a 
model that adopts the appropriate objective for a government owned
18. In the twenty years to 1985 in Greece, currency holdings
averaged to 50% of total deposits with commercial banks (excluding 
foreign currency deposits).
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money industry. However his approach opens the way for the 
interpretation of deposit rate ceilings as devices for financial 
restriction. For example, in the case where the banking system is 
private but its profits contribute to government revenues by being 
(lump-sum) taxed, the conclusions of Fry (op.cit.) make us suspect that 
pursuit of the revenue objective may call for relatively low real 
deposit rates. These would have to be enforced by ceilings because 
this outcome would not be reached by a private monopolist.
Intuitively, this is because, on the one hand, he would not have 
control over the inflation rate and, on the other hand, he would not 
have concern with the inflation tax to be made on currency.
The following arguments hinge on semantics but enable understanding 
of deposit rate 'ceilings' as devices of financial restriction: One
could propose that what are called ceilings are rates determined freely 
(by banks in response to government policies) which appear low in 
comparison to the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive banking 
industry (but on which there is no upward pressure as in Fry (1988,
Fig.1.4) or as in diagram 1). This could be illustrated within the 
framework of Siegel (1981) where the government is not given the choice 
to set the deposit rate. Here, the deposit rate is determined by a 
(bank) monopolist in response to the value for the reserve ratio and 
the inflation rate. The latter are set by the government to maximise 
either the inflation tax on currency and reserves or a joint objective 
of inflation tax plus bank profits (that are taxed away). Another 
reason for relatively low deposit rates could be the following: 
Abstracting from inflation tax considerations, the government may be 
running a nationalised banking system as a monopoly or may be
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sheltering a private monopoly (Jao 1985, p.199) because of concern with 
bank profitability. Somewhat differently, if repression is associated 
with high inflation rates, in the presence of a reserve ratio even a 
perfectly competitive banking system is bound to yield low equilibrium 
real interest rates. Under such circumstances deposit rates below 
competitive levels, i.e. ceilings by our semantics, imply the 
generation of some form of revenue to the government. For 
liberalization to be interpreted as the removal of such 'ceilings' it 
must be envisaged as a privatisation/ trust busting policy (cf. Dooley 
and Mathieson 1986; Jao 1985).
To the extent that deposit rate ceilings augment government 
revenues, directly or indirectly, the following issue arises: Assuming
that government revenues extracted by means of deposit rate ceilings 
would be channelled into investment, their reduction upon 
liberalization has to be set against the gain in private loans to reach 
the net outcome for growth. This issue is not discussed in the 
literature, at least as far as the removal of conventional deposit rate 
ceilings is concerned. However, an analysis similar in spirit but 
revolving around a slightly different aspect of financial deregulation, 
appears in Siegel (1981). This relates to the outcome of 'financial 
liberalization' interpreted as privatisation or trust busting in the 
banking industry. The result obtained by Siegel (op.cit.) is as 
follows: The maximum revenue to the government from (completely taxed
away) profits of a monopoly bank and inflation tax on currency is equal 
to the (maximised) inflation tax revenue on currency and reserves under 
perfect competition. This is analogous to maintaining the level of 
government revenue by borrowing after liberalization as in the Courakis
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comparisons and in the example worked out by Siegel the volume of 
private loans is higher under monopoly.is
Further reliance on semantics enables us along with Courakis (1984) 
to suggest that ” ... governments sometimes actually enforce (what are 
formally defined as) deposit rate ceilings as floors" (p.345). As 
Courakis has shown suitable values for the deposit floor increase the 
equilibrium volume of deposits under monopoly. Hence, as for loan 
rate ceilings, imposition of a deposit floor in the presence of a 
reserve requirement contributes both to financial restriction and 
growth objectives. However, the combination of values for ratio and 
floor that optimises the latter does not necessarily maximise the 
former.
The optimum optimorum for the growth objective, i.e. the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium level of deposits, could be replicated under a 
monopoly structure by a combination of a deposit rate floor with a loan 
rate ceiling. This conclusion by Courakis would obviously carry 
forward in the presence of the reserve ratio. Hence it is confirmed 
that administered rates in financial markets, characterised by 
imperfections, could optimise the growth objective together with 
furthering (but not maximising and abstracting throughout from 
inflation tax) government revenues. We note that this conclusion 
illustrates the following general point as well: The market structure
in banking is a crucial consideration when evaluating whether the 
removal rather than the maintenance of regulations is most conducive to
19. Since the deposit rate under both situations comes out identical, 
the volume of deposits is the same; but only under perfect 
competition is the reserve ratio non-zero.
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output growth.
Finally, there may well be more to intermediary behaviour (thus 
bearing on the issues of repression and liberalization) than the models 
in Courakis (op.cit.) or as illustrated in diagram 1. Assume that the 
regime is one of loan rate ceilings as well as deposit rate ceilings. 
Loan rate ceilings are decided 'first' on the basis either of a 
'subsidisation ideal' or a government revenue or a growth objective. 
Alternatively a quantity for loans could be specified and rationed 
selectively at a low loan rate, off the demand curve for loans. 
Trivially then, there is no need for imposing a deposit rate ceiling^o 
as well since the bank finds the level of the deposit rate so that 
sufficient deposits are attracted to satisfy the balance-sheet 
identity. Notice that this is a reversal of diagram 1 (and Fry 1988, 
Fig.1.4) where the rate on deposits is set first, for some reason below 
the perfectly competitive equilibrium and either an effective loan rate 
is reached to satisfy the balance sheet constraint or funds are 
otherwise rationed. It could be that we have to consider dynamic 
models to justify deposit rate ceilings (and their coexistence with 
loan rate ceilings as well as entry controls) because of concern of the 
authorities with the repercussions of aggressive competitive outbidding 
among banks (cf. Smith 1984). The destabilisation^i of the financial 
system has to be seen as a potential cost of liberalization. Indeed 
prudential considerations lie behind a number of financial regulations
20. Of course it may be thought by policy makers that a reduction of 
the variance of the return on such instruments may improve their 
attractiveness in an inflationless long run ('leaning into the 
wind' etc.).
21. Footnote on next page.
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(e.g. reserve ratios) and restrictive practices (cartelised rates, 
barriers to entry) as pointed out in Goodhart (1987, p.31) and 
specifically for financial repression in Fry (1982a, p.1052) and in Jao 
(1985, p.213)22.
Section 1.7
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
A body of theoretical and empirical work has been established which 
comes out clearly in favour of financial liberalization. It is shown 
that financial liberalization possesses a considerable potential for 
promoting investment and output growth. The key to this conclusion 
and in the analysis that precedes it, lies in the determination of 
investment by the availability of credit under rationing. Some theory 
and evidence on the complementarity of bank deposits and physical 
capital and on the adverse consequences of financial repression for 
productivity and efficiency, is also available.
21. Dooley and Mathieson (1986) also argue that financial liberalization 
is likely to give rise to many supervisory problems (esp. in 
connection with conflicts of interest due to the joint ownership
of banks and industrial borrowers, frequently encountered in 
repressed financial systems).
22. E.g. "the original impetus for deposit rate ceilings in the 
United States rested on the argument that excessive competition 
for deposits promoted instability of the banking system by 
raising the cost of funds and by encouraging banks to make 
higher-risk loans" (Taggart 1981, p.36). Beckerman (1988, e.g. 
p.234) employs similar arguments to suggest that financial 
liberalization is undesirable since it may drive the banks into 
increasingly riskier lines of business.
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Reservations have been expressed in the literature about the 
desirability of financial liberalization in connection with the general 
rise in interest rates that may accompany it. This rise would
affect intermediaries undertaking maturity transformation and firms 
borrowing from the banks or from the unofficial market (cf. new 
structuralists). In addition, financial liberalization may have a 
negative impact on government revenues and thus public investment 
programmes - a similar problem is analysed in the literature on 
inflationary finance and growth. Finally the removal of certain 
regulations on banks may, under specific conditions, lead to a smaller 
equilibrium volume of loanable funds thus defeating the purpose of 
financial liberalization. We concluded Chapter 1 by identifying 
prudential complications (cf. Smith 1984) as possible side effects of 
such financial reforms.
Further extensions of the literature could follow two directions. 
First there ought to be some modelling representation of the dilemma 
that although financial liberalization is desirable, because it enables 
an increase in private investment, it may cause a reduction in 
government revenues and thus public investment. A similar trade-off 
may exist in connection with the removal of selective credit controls 
and their replacement by fiscal schemes. Second the analysis of 
financial repression should take place on the basis of a detailed model 
for banks, (unlike the practice in most of the existing work). This 
is required since the nexus of regulations affects the economy mainly 
via the behaviour and in particular the scale of financial 
intermediaries. Courakis's (1984) model of the intermediary under 
repression could be incorporated within the macroeconomic system set
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out in Chapter 2 (in lieu of the equation for the rudimentary banking 
system) . An adaptation of this static model to the dynamic framework 
(e.g. a change from the proceeds of the reserve ratio to inflation tax 
on reserves, as the concept of government revenue) would be 
necessary. Incorporation of Courakis's model could modify our 
conclusions and perhaps reduce the critical loan rates (see Chapter 
2). This is because Courakis (op.cit.) has shown that under certain 
circumstances the removal of regulations leads to a reduction in the 
equilibrium volume of private loans and/or total loanable funds.
An intriguing, but perhaps not unexpected, feature of the repressed 
financial system is the existence of parallel (capital) markets, which 
play a crucial role in new structuralist models. Curiosity about the 
detail of their operation can never be satisfied entirely. However, 
the acquisition of indirect evidence on underground economic activity 
is not infeasible. Pavlopoulos (1987, p.120) who has undertaken a 
quantitative assessment of the black economy in Greece, states that he 
is not prepared to hazard a guess about the turnover of unofficial 
money (and foreign exchange) markets, the existence of which he 
acknowledges. At this stage we have recorded various casual references 
to these markets; obviously there is always scope for further research 
here.
One fails to find a complete explanation of the purpose of 
repressive financial regulations in the relevant literature. Policy 
errors, financial restriction (i.e. extraction of government revenue) 
or political economic motives are the reasons usually given. In 
particular, it is difficult to rationalise ceilings on deposit rates as
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instruments of financial restriction. The financial repression 
literature needs to be extended along the lines of Fry (1981a, 1981b, 
1982a), Jao (1985) in order to clarify this specific issue. The 
answer to the broader question (why repress the financial system) may 
have to be sought in political economy along the lines of Burkett 
(1987) and Hong (1985).
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CHAPTER 2




Section 2.2 begins by setting out the equations (static and dynamic) 
of the basic macroeconomic model to be extended in the course of Chapter 
2. The key equation, which links the output growth rate to the net flow 
of finance, reflecting the prevalence of loan rationing in the banking 
system, is derived in Subsection 2.2.1. Subsequently the procedure to be 
followed throughout Chapter 2 is explained: In Subsection 2.2.2, an
equation is derived for steady state growth. In Subsection 2.2.3, the 
partial derivative of the expression for steady state growth with respect 
to the deposit rate, is worked out. The comparative dynamics of a change 
in the deposit rate are explained. As discussed in Subsection 2.2.6, we 
calculate the maximum value of the real loan rate for which the partial 
derivative takes a positive sign, and therefore, for which a policy of 
increase in the administered interest rate promotes output growth. In 
Subsection 2.2.4, we discuss how, given values for the predetermined and 
the exogenous variables, the endogenous variables are determined 
recursively. In Subsection 2.2.5, we describe the short-run transmission 
of the effects of an administered increase in the deposit rate.
In Section 2.3, we discuss the inspiration for the extensions to the 
basic model which we undertake. First, in the spirit of the financial 
regression approach, we view the role of the reserve ratio to be the 
extraction of government revenue. Second, in line with the literature on 
inflationary finance and growth, we assume that the government channels 
the proceeds from such financial restriction to capital formation.
Third, following the rationale on the basis of which the basic model was
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developed as an extension of Kapur (1976), we model the impact of bank 
losses on aggregate capital formation.
Subsequently, in Section 2.4, we develop five Variants of the basic 
model. In Variant 1, we analyse the effect of directing inflation tax on 
reserves to government capital formation. In Variant 4, we examine the 
effect of bank losses. In the intervening two variants both extensions 
are considered in combination. In Variant 5, we study the effect of 
making the volume of profits, which are reinvested, depend on the real 
interest rate, as stipulated in the financial repression literature. For 
each Variant we analyse the extra complications introduced in the 
recursive structure of the model. We also examine how the extensions 
modify the conclusions of the basic model as to the impact of increases in 
deposit rates on the growth rate of the economy.
Note on presentation: Word processing difficulties have forced me to
segregate maths to Appendices A-K.
69
Section 2. 2 
The Model and the Method
The models discussed are all variants of the model used by Currie 
and Anyadike-Danes (1980) (referred to as Currie/Danes).
The equations comprising the model of Currie/Danes are (Appendix A ) :
- A Cagan-type demand for money relating desired real deposits (there is 
no currency) per unit income to the expected real deposit rate.
- A production function relating the stock of capital to output by a 
constant coefficient.
- An equation for the banking system equating the nominal loan rate to 
the administered deposit rate.
Subsequently the latter two equations are condensed in the growth equation.
The underlying dynamics (used only in the linearisation) are described
by:
- A Phillips curve relating actual inflation to the discrepancy between 
actual and demanded real money balances per unit income and expected 
inflation.
- An adaptive expectations scheme relating the rate of change of expected 
inflation to the discrepancy between actual and expected inflation.
- Use is made of an identity relating the rate of growth of actual real 
money balances per unit income to the monetary and income growth rate 
as well as the actual inflation rate.
2.2.1
The growth equation (Appendix B)
The crucial equation is similar to that of Kapur(1976) and relatés capital 
formation to the net flow of loans to the private sector, all per unit income
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and in real terms. The significant feature introduced by Currie/Danes is 
that to reach the net flow of finance, interest payments on outstanding loans 
have to be subtracted from total credit extension. Specifically, new capital 
formation (per unit income) per period is equal to the flow of profits before 
interest (per unit income) plus the real value (per unit income) of the volume 
of new loans extended per period minus the real value (per unit income) of 
the total payments of interest on outstanding loans per period. The real value 
(per unit income) of new loans is equal to the growth rate of loans multiplied 
by the real stock of loans (per unit income) whereas the real value (per unit 
income) of the interest bill is equal to the nominal loan rate multiplied by 
the real stock of outstanding loans per unit income. So capital formation (per 
unit income) per period is equal to the flow of real profits per unit income 
plus the product of the real stock of loans (per unit income) by the difference 
between the growth rate of loans and the nominal loan rate. The banking system
1. This term which is constant seems at first sight to have no function
since it does not appear in the expression for ’the partial’ and vanishes 
in the linearisation under the assumption that a is constant. However 
its omission could give rise to curiosities and be unrealistic: Say
in a situation of zero monetary growth with some loans outstanding,
neglecting profits we would conclude that the capital stock is shrinking 
at a proportionate rate equal to the nominal rate of interest.
In general loans would not be taken out at all in the absence of profitable 
opportunities. Further if additional loans are to be absorbed after the 
loan rate rises upon liberalisation it must be that before liberalisation 
the rate on loans fell short of the yield on their marginal use given a 
downward sloping marginal efficiency of investments, unless, say, expecta- 
tional mistakes on the profitability of new projects are made. This is 
quite likely because loan rates are repressed and thus bound to be below 
economy wide profit rates before liberalisation hence it would not be 
realistic to assume that recipients of loans are making zero profits. On 
the other hand, we have the familiar argument whereby under rationing the 
latter are selected to be among those undertaking less risky hence less 
profitable projects. Correspondingly even if established borrowers can 
no longer realise positive profits after loan rates rise, there is likely 
to exist a fringe of hitherto excluded borrowers with highly profitable 
projects ready to take up the newly available loans. Obviously the growth 
equation involves extreme aggregation and such redistributive implications 
of liberalisation are not uncovered. Further justifying a possible omission 
of the consideration of profits in capital formation, the realities of a
repressed economy could be well represented by assuming that a very low
proportion of profits is in fact retained due to high consumption or the 
tax regime. Also the assumption of the constancy of the share of profits is 
no less arbitrary but say presupposes a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
perfect competition.
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is subject to a reserve ratio. Since there is no currency the stock of loans 
equals the stock of money (deposits) multiplied by 1 - reserve ratio. Because 
the reserve ratio is not changing continuously over time, reserves, deposits 
and loans all grow at a common constant growth rate, the monetary growth rate.
By the specific assumption about the banking system the nominal loan rate 
equals the administered deposit rate. Thus substituting out for the real 
stock of loans per unit income the growth rate of loans and the loan rate we 
may equate capital formation per unit income to the constant flow of profits 
per unit income plus the product of the real stock of money per unit income 
by 1 - reserve ratio times the difference between the monetary growth rate and 
the administered deposit rate. Given new capital formation (per unit income) 
per period we may read-off from the production function the resultant per period 
increase in the capacity level of income of the economy (expressed per unit
income which is the income growth rate).
2 . 2. 2
Steady state growth (Appendix C)
The steady state is described by constancy of actual real money balances 
per unit income and involves fulfilment of inflationary expectations and equality 
between actual and desired money balances per unit income. Because of the 
constancy of actual real money balances per unit income over time in the steady 
state, we have that the actual rate of price inflation (and hence expected 
inflation as well) equal the difference between the monetary growth rate and 
the growth rate of income. Thus we write an expression for the steady state
(income) growth rate by substituting in the growth equation the real stock of
deposits per unit income by the demand for real deposits per unit income, the 
latter being a function of the expected real deposit rate, i.e. the administered 




The policies of liberalisation are summarised in an increase in the 
nominal rate payable on deposits and they are pronounced beneficial or harmful 
by examining the sign of the partial derivative of the expression for steady 
state growth with respect to the nominal deposit rate (*the partial*).(Appendix C)
This exercise is one of comparative statics between steady states and 
no use of the dynamic equations is made in the computation of ’the partial’. 
Intuitively the mechanisms reflected in this computation are as follows;
Between steady states a change in the administered deposit rate, changes the 
demand for real deposits (desired real money balances) per unit income both 
directly but also by affecting the steady state (income) growth rate hence 
the (expected) steady state inflation given monetary growth, thus the steady 
state (expected) real deposit rate. Therefore with a given reserve ratio, 
the real stock of loans (per unit income) in the steady state changes. Given 
the monetary growth rate, the real value (per unit income) of new loans 
extended per steady state period changes. However the change in the deposit 
rate is passed onto a change in the nominal loan rate. This, combining with 
the change in the steady state real stock of loans (per unit income), yields 
a change in the real value of interest payments (per unit income) per period 
in the steady state. Since the flow of profits (per unit income) is constant, 
the resultant change in capital formation (per unit income) and thus the change 
in steady state growth is related to the change in the real value of the steady 
state net flow of loans which can be deduced by superimposing the above two 
tendencies. This ambiguity is reflected in the computations since in general 
neither the numerator nor the denominator of the partial can be signed 
unequivocally on the basis of the conventional assumptions about the signs of 
the structural parameters involved. Thus stability has to be invoked and it 
requires, in all variants, that the sign of the denominator be positive.
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In order to reach the stability conditions the growth equation is written 
in time derivative, as well as ’level’ form. The equations of the model are 
subsequently linearised around the steady state and condensed into a system of 
two differential equations in the variables of growth and expected inflation. 
Stability imposes that the sign of the determinant of the characteristic matrix 
be positive whereas the sign of the trace be negative. The denominator of ’the 
partial’ can be signed at once on the basis of the determinental condition.(Appendix D)
2.2.4
The recursive structure of the model to be linearised (Appendix A)
To discern the recursive structure of the system of equations used in 
the stability analysis - linearisation consider the system out of the steady 
state as evolving discretely over time.
Initial values for expected inflation and actual real money balances per 
unit income are given. The reserve ratio, the monetary growth rate and the 
deposit rate are administered exogenously, while the flow of profits per unit 
income is a constant.
Given the initial value for actual real money balances per unit income, 
the growth equation determines the income growth rate within the initial 
period.
Given the initial value for expected inflation, the Cagan demand function 
determines desired real money balances per unit income in the initial period.
Having derived desired real money balances per unit income and given 
the initial values for actual real money balances per unit income as well as 
for expected inflation, the Phillips curve determines the actual rate of 
inflation within the initial period.
Having derived the actual rate of inflation and the income growth rate 
and given the exogenous monetary growth rate and the initial value for actual
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real money balances per unit income we may compute the change in actual real 
money balances per unit income over the initial period.
Having determined the actual rate of inflation in the initial period 
and given the initial value for expected inflation the adaptive expectations 
equation determines the change in expected inflation over the initial period.
Having determined the changes over the initial period in actual real 
money balances per unit income and in expected inflation we may predetermine 
their respective starting values for the next period and repeat this recursive 
procedure until a steady state is reached (if at all) .
As for algebraic manipulations, in view of the above it would be natural 
to condense the equations of the model into a system of two differential 
equations, in the variables of actual real money balances per unit income 
and expected inflation. However, Currie/Danes using the growth equation 
substitute out the level and time derivative of actual real money balances
per unit income, in terms of the level and time derivative of the growth rate,
in anticipation of their phase diagram analysis where for expositional con­
venience they would rather have the path of the growth rate represented 
directly. We stick to this convention and easily verify for VARIANT 0 that 
of course the determinental stability condition of the system in terms of 
actual real money balances per unit income and expected inflation is the same 
as that derived by Currie/Danes. (Appendix E)
2.2.5
The intuition behind the recursive structure (Appendix A)
The following is a possible intuitive account of the events that follow
a change in the administered deposit rate starting from the steady state:
The change in the deposit rate causes a step change in desired real money 
balances per unit income according to the Cagan demand function. Since in the
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steady state desired and actual real money balances per unit income are just 
equal a discrepancy opens between the two instantaneously.
As in Kapur (1976) here in the model of Currie/Danes actual real money balances 
rather than the demand for real money (deposits) per unit income determine 
the scale of the banking system and are therefore pertinent for the income 
growth rate. In turn actual real money balances per unit income depend on the 
rate of monetary growth thus could be influenced by variations in the rate of 
issue of high powered money by the monetary authority.
However, the change in the deposit rate causes a change in the real 
value per unit income of total interest payments at any given level of actual 
real money balances per unit income and thus a change in the net flow of 
finance hence a step change to growth given a constant flow of profits per 
unit income.
The opening of the discrepancy (per unit income) between actual and 
desired real money balances leads to a step divergence of the actual rate of 
inflation from its expected value. The intuition is of course that of ’hot 
potato money’ whereby the collective attempt of money holders say to accumulate 
money balances to desired levels above actual levels has as its counterpart 
a ’glut’ of goods and thus a depression in the rate of inflation from what it 
would otherwise be (by some unspecified bidding process that changes the 
underlying equilibrium goods prices combined with gradual adjustment of actual 
prices to equilibrium levels).
The change in the actual rate of inflation together with the change in 
the growth rate of income induce a gradual change in the real value of actual 
real money balances per unit income. This gradual change in actual real 
money balances per unit income implies a change in the scale of intermediation, 
thus the net flow of loans at a given deposit/loan rate hence itself gradually 
influencing the growth rate of income.
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The change in the actual rate of inflation also leads to a gradual 
adaptation of inflationary expectations and thus to a gradual change in 
desired real money balances per unit income.
Thus the width of the discrepancy per unit income between actual and 
desired real money balances which lies behind the movement of the system is 
modified and thus the stability considerations.
Also the change in expected inflation feeds back into a change in actual 
inflation.
2 . 2.6
Signing and the critical real loan rate (Appendix F)
The sign of the numerator is studied at plausible values for the semi­
elasticity of money demand and the growth rate (as well as the nominal deposit 
rate and the reserve ratio in other variants). Specifically the critical real 
loan rate is defined as that level of the loan rate which makes the numerator 
of ’the partial’ equal to zero. For any higher ’starting’ values of the real 
loan rate ’the partial’ takes a negative sign and therefore a policy of raising 
the deposit rate is harmful for growth.
All these relationships, as well as the steps undertaken in order to 
sign ’the partial’ appear in the variants we consider, which are therefore 
descendants of the Currie a^ d^ Anyadike—Danes (1980) paper and consequently of the 
Kapur (1976) article as well.
Section 2.3 
Extensions: Our Variants
Currie/Danes interpret their findings of strongly negative critical 
real loan rates as implying that in actual economies the prospect for liber­
alisation are likely to be unfavourable. Their pessimism, contrasting with 
Kapur and other liberalisation literature, is attributable to the additional
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mechanism introduced: upon a rise in the deposit rate the scale of the
banking system, hence the flow of credit increase. But because the rise in 
the deposit rate is passed onto a rise in the loan rate, at the new steady 
state, debt servicing payments are bound to increase by so much for plausible 
parameter values, that the net flow of finance to the private sector, hence 
growth, declines.
Our task lies in examining whether such pessimistic conclusions for 
liberalisation carry over when the model employed by Currie/Danes is extended 
in various directions suggested both by realism and consistency.
We make use of the idea of 'financial restriction' whereby a number of 
the regulations imposed on banks in less developed financial systems are 
motivated by the augmentation of government revenue. The realities of Greece 
in particular are best represented by attributing to the government a 
significant participation in capital formation. Although the Currie/Danes 
specification incorporates a reserve ratio, this seems to have no function:
By contrast we give a role to the reserve ratio, that of enabling the govern­
ment to raise inflation tax revenue on reserves. In turn the government 
channels its proceeds to capital formation, an idea encountered in M u n d e l l (1965) 
Therefore in our growth equation we relate the growth rate to the inflation 
tax revenue alongside the net flow of finance to the private sector - a full 
generalisation would involve inclusion of the inflation tax on currency in 
circulation.
Specifically in VARIANT 1, we write total capital formation (per unit 
income) per period to be equal to the sum of private and government capital 
formation (per unit income). Private capital formation (per unit income) is 
the same as in Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0. Government capital formation (per 
unit income) is equal to the real inflation tax revenue on reserves (per unit 
income), i.e. the monetary growth rate multiplied by the reserve ratio times
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actual real money balances per unit income. Feeding this through the
production function we get the corresponding modification of the growth
equation.
In a sense we are bringing together the literature on the short-run 
dynamics upon financial liberalisation with the literature on growth under 
inflationary finance remedying the omission of a government
sector from the former and the omission of private investment
from the latter.
Since the financial liberalisation literature concedes that the motive 
behind repression is the extraction of government revenue, it would follow 
that liberalisation (a generalised removal of repressive regulations) results 
in significant changes (indeed reductions unless restrictive measures are 
counterproductive) in government revenue. If the outcome of liberalisation 
for growth is sought, this must be taken into account since the change in 
government revenue must inevitably have an impact on government capital 
formation. Yet the attention of models of short-run dynamics is confined to 
the impact of liberalisation on the scale of financial intermediation and 
thereby private investment and growth (and Currie/Danes point out that such 
computations are incomplete).
On the other hand, we take from the literature on growth under inflationary 
finance a conveniently simplified description of what we refer to in general 
terms as financial restriction and corresponding precise government revenue 
goal: imposing a reserve ratio on banks and running monetary growth in order
to extract inflation tax. Obviously this is far from exhausting the plurality 
of regulations which allegedly accomplish financial restriction but it can be 
readily modelled.
Yet this literature neglects the main problematic of financial liber­
alisation models namely the impact of the financing efforts of the government
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on private investment. Within this literature the impact of the financing 
efforts on private behaviour is confined to the response of the equilibrium 
real money balances to increases in inflation, which ’matters’ only because 
it limits the potential for government revenue extraction thus government 
capital formation. If other adversities caused to the private sector by 
inflationary finance are analysed, these are the costs of inflation à la 
Bailey .
Analogously to this literature but rather than considering variations 
in the inflation rate, we consider the impact on growth of variations in the 
degree of financial restriction represented by the value of the administered 
deposit rate ceiling and also the existence or not of the reserve ratio (these 
imply variations in the potentialities of inflationary finance). However, 
supplementing this literature in these exercises we view the transmission of 
the effects not simply via their impact on government but also on private 
capital formation.
Although we do not actually pursue such a line, our variants could be 
suitably deployed to provide an expression for the growth maximising (or 
optimal given say a multiperiod utility function) inflation rate and carry 
out the conventional exercises with plausible parameter values etc. , once we 
take more explicitly into account the impact of inflation on the equilibrium 
of the banking system hence the net flow of finance and private capital 
formation.
Further, we attempt to complicate the banking system considered in 
Currie/Danes and examine to what extent this would modify the conclusions 
as to the favourability of liberalisation.
Currie/Danes set the nominal loan rate equal to the nominal deposit 
rate. Presumably within the general context of financial repression there 
is rationing in the banking system: the deposit rate is set administratively.
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determining the volume of deposits along the Cagan demand function. A 
fraction equal to the compulsory reserve ratio is retained as reserves and 
the residual is rationed out as loans at a nominal rate equal to the deposit 
rate. The role of the reserve ratio as introducing a wedge between the 
deposit and loan rates is ignored and as a consequence banks are making losses 
which widen as the nominal deposit rate rises upon 'liberalisation'.
Currie/Danes envisage their model as a development of the basic model 
of Kapur on the rationale that the increased costs of loan servicing upon 
liberalisation cannot be left unaccounted for but must come out of the cash 
flow of firms, otherwise financing capital formation. Consistency in this 
rationale suggests that the losses of banks must have some manifestation as 
well. Although (commercial) banks do not normally take part in capital 
formation it cannot be that they sustain losses in the steady state indefinitely. 
So it must be either that we have no losses, or in case we have losses that 
we cover them.
We therefore consider a variant whereby a sufficiently high nominal loan 
rate is administered so that given the deposit rate and the reserve ratio, 
zero profits are guaranteed to the banks. Evidently our conclusions should not 
alter qualitatively if (perhaps closer to reality) a positive target rate of 
return is guaranteed instead.
Specifically in VARIANT 2 we modify the expression for private capital 
formation of Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0 - by substituting out the loan 
rate by the deposit rate divided by 1 - reserve ratio. Feeding this 
through the production function we get the corresponding modification of the 
growth equation.
On the other hand, the government may not wish to see the substantial 
rise in the loan rate upon liberalisation, implied by the zero profit condition, 
in order to protect private investment (nourished by selective credit policies
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for years). In this case we assume that the government administers a 
nominal loan rate equal to the deposit rate but covers the consequent 
losses of banks by grants from its inflation tax revenues.
Specifically in VARIANT 3 private capital formation (per unit income) 
is the same as in Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0. However, government capital 
formation (per unit income) is equal to the real inflation tax revenue on 
reserves (per unit income) minus real banking losses (per unit income)
(the latter being the product of the administered deposit rate times the 
reserve ratio times actual real money balances (per unit income)).
Fry (1988, pp.41-43) has remarked on the simplistic nature of the 
Currie and Anyadike-Danes banking system and has suggested instead that 
the likely state of affairs in repressed financial systems is market 
clearing by effective loan rates. Here given the administered deposit 
rate the demand for deposits and the reserve ratio the volume of funds 
available for on-lending is determined. This is rationed out along the 
underlying loan demand, by price, at an effective level which exceeds what 
may be the formal ceiling for the loan rate. Importantly upon a rise in 
the deposit rate the effective loan rate has to decline so that the higher 
volume of available funds can be absorbed by borrowers. Thus the effect 
which led Currie and Anyadike-Danes to pessimistic conclusions does not 
obtain.
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Section 2. 4 
Our Results
The presentation of each of our variants goes as follows; After 
arranging the assumptions behind the variant in question the account is 
divided into two parts. The first part is the suitable adaptation of 
the verbal analysis of the Currie/Danes model. It can be skipped if
immediately obvious from the arrangement of the assumptions. The second
pa^C describes briefly our particular results mainly in connection with 
the signing of the partial and related discussion.
VARIANT : 0 : The model of Currie/Danes with s = 1, c = 1, a constant.
(Appendices A, B, C, D).
2.4.1
VARIANT : 1
Banking system : Administered deposit rate equals the nominal loan rate. 
Government : Participates in capital formation by investing the
inflation tax revenue on reserves.
Banks make losses.
Part 1: (Appendix G)
As far as the mechanisms reflected in the computation of the partial 
are concerned to those of Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0 - we add the following: 
Between steady states a change in the administered deposit rate changes the 
demand for real deposits (desired real money balances) per unit income. 
Therefore with a given reserve ratio, the real stock of reserves per unit 
income in the steady state changes. Given the monetary growth rate real 
inflation tax revenue (per unit income) extracted per steady state period, 
hence government capital formation per unit income, change and contribute to 
a change in growth.
As far as the intuition behind the recursive structure is concerned here 
in VARIANT 1 we have all the events which follow a change in the administered
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deposit rate in Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0 - and make two additional observ­
ations .
First when out of the steady state it is actual rather than desired 
real money balances per unit income which determine the volume of reserves 
on the basis of which inflation tax is extracted and are pertinent for 
government capital formation and the income growth rate.
Second here in VARIANT 1 the gradual change in actual real money balances 
per unit income driven by changes in actual inflation and growth implies a 
change in the scale of intermediation and hence not only loans and private 
capital formation per unit income but also reserves, hence real inflation tax 
revenues thus government capital formation. Thus the growth rate of income 
is influenced on two counts and in turn affects actual real money balances 
per unit income.
Part 2;
We expect that the consideration of government as a participant in 
capital formation should not only lead to a higher absolute level of growth 
compared to VARIANT 0 but also tilt the conclusions in favour of liberalisation; 
For within VARIANT 1 a rise in the deposit rate by increasing the volume of 
reserves would contribute to inflation tax revenues hence growth without 
inducing any costs (such as debt servicing) over and above those occurring in 
VARIANT 0.
Within this variant we work out 'the partial' and sign the denominator 
to be positive by stability. (Appendix G).
In order to sign the numerator/work out the critical real loan rate 
alternative plausible values are given to the following parameters: the growth
rate (0.1); the interest semielasticity of deposit demand (3, 1.5, 1, 0.5); 
the reserve ratio (0.2-0.9); the administered nominal deposit rate (0-0.5).
— 84 —
For common plausible values for the growth rate and the interest semi­
elasticity the answers for the critical rate are the same as those of 
VARIANT 0, only if we assume that the deposit rate is administered at strongly 
negative nominal levels (-0.33, -0.67, -1, -2 order corresponds to the values
for the semielasticity) or if there is a rate of deflation equal to -0 .1 .(Table 2.1) 
For any higher levels of the deposit rate or inflation irrespective of the 
assumed value for the reserve ratio the critical rates in VARIANT 1 are alge­
braically higher than those within VARIANT 0. Thus for a certain range of 
starting values for the real loan rate VARIANT 1 yields favourable predictions 
for liberalisation thus conflicting with the predictions of VARIANT 0. The 
divergence between the answers of the two variants for the critical rate is 
wider the higher the reserve ratio, the higher the deposit rate and/or the 
inflation rate and the lower the interest semielasticity (since that depresses 
the critical rate in VARIANT 0 by more). (Appendix F).
However upon working out the critical rates for VARIANT 1 it becomes 
apparent that only if the values for the semielasticity and/or (less potently) 
the reserve ratio and the administered deposit rate are towards the top of 
the plausible ranges, we get resultant critical rates that do not fall below 
what could have been observed in actual economies and possibly Greece. Once 
the implied rate of inflation is also reported we may distinguish in the 
tabulations some quadruples of values of deposit rate, inflation rate, real 
loan rate and reserve ratio which may describe the circumstances of a finan­
cially repressed economy such as Greece. (Tables 2.2-2.5).
In view of these results deposit rate ceilings may be justified as the 
necessary prerequisites of low loan rate policies which seem to be successful 
in promoting growth. By contrast from the point of view of financial restriction 
deposit rate ceilings may appear ill-thought since they hinder the realisation 
of inflation tax on reserves. On the other hand, they may be ’protecting’ the 
holdings of currency in circulation (close to 70% of Ml in
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Greece) on which inflation tax is made. In this case, assuming that government 
participates in capital formation, the role of deposit rate ceilings as a 
growth promoting policy is also reinforced.
Within VARIANT 0 it may be thought that an obvious remedy for the financial 
difficulties of firms after liberalisation is the provision of government 
grants. Within VARIANT 1 it follows quite trivially that this would make no 




Banking system ; Zero profits.
Government : Participates in capital formation by investing the
inflation tax revenue on reserves.
VARIANT ; 3
Banking system : Administered deposit rate equals the nominal loan 
rate.
Government : Participates in capital formation by investing the
inflation tax revenue on reserves, after the losses 
of banks have been covered by grants.
Part 1 : (Appendix H)
As far as the mechanisms reflected in the computation of the partial 
are concerned to those of Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0 - we add the following; 
Between steady states a change in the administered deposit rate changes the 
demand for real deposits (desired real money balances) (per unit income). 
Therefore with a given reserve ratio the real stock of reserves in the steady 
state hence real tax revenue (per unit income) change. However, the change 
in the administered deposit rate, combining also with the change in the steady
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state stock of real money balances (per unit income) yields a change in 
real banking losses (per unit income). Since the government covers real 
banking losses to reach the net change in real government revenues, thus 
change in government capital formation (per unit income) contributing to a 
change in income growth, we need add this to the change in real inflation 
tax revenue (per unit income).
As far as the intuition behind the recursive structure is concerned 
here in VARIANT 3 we have all the events that follow a change in the adminis­
tered deposit rate in Currie/Danes - VARIANT 0 - and in addition the following 
mechanisms.
A change in the deposit rate causes a change in real banking losses per 
unit income at any given level of actual real money balances per unit income 
and thus a change in net real government revenue per unit income, in government 
capital formation per unit income and thus a step change in growth. This 
together with the change in the actual rate of inflation (by the Phillips 
curve) induces a gradual change in the real value of actual real money balances 
per unit income.
This gradual change in actual real money balances per unit income implies 
a change in the scale of intermediation and hence not only private capital 
formation per unit income but also real banking losses per unit income at the 
given deposit rate and reserves thus real inflation tax revenues per unit 
income. The latter two tendencies combine to yield the change in government 
capital formation per unit income. The change in government and private capital 
formation per unit income combine and yield a gradual change in the growth rate 
of income which in turn affects actual real money balances per unit income.
Part 2:
We derive identical growth equations and 'partials' for VARIANTS 2 and 3;
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further these are equal to the corresponding expression encountered in 
VARIANT 0 multiplied by a factor equal to 1/|^-reserve rati^. We sign the 
denominator to be positive by stability. The critical real loan rates are 
the same as those under VARIANT 0. (Appendix H and Table 2.1),
It makes no difference for the growth outcome whether firms take the 
full brunt of liberalisation in the form of relatively higher loan rates 
ensuring zero profits to the banks, or whether the rise in the loan rate is 
moderated to protect firms but the government makes good the consequent losses 
of banks at the expense of its capital formation.
The expressions for growth under VARIANTS 2 and 3 could be obtained 
directly by setting a value of zero for the reserve ratio in the expression 
for growth in VARIANT 0. The government intervenes by imposing a reserve 
requirement (apart from a deposit rate ceiling) in order to channel the 
proceeds into capital formation but in the process it either raises the loan 
rate crowding out private investment (the inflation tax is paid out of the 
cash flow of firms) or it imposes equal losses on the banking system. Thus 
our attitude towards such intervention should be neutral. It seems that 
inflationary finance (in Mundell’s sense) has no potential.
2,4.3
VARIANT : 4
Banking system ; Zero profits.
No government investment.
Part 2:
Within this variant we work out 'the partial' and sign the denominator 
to be positive by stability. (Appendix I).
88
In order to sign the numerator/work out the critical real loan rate 
alternative plausible values are given to the following parameters: the
growth rate (0 ,1 ); the interest semielasticity of deposit demand 
(3,1,0.5); the reserve ratio (0.2-0.6 ). For common values of the other 
parameters and any non-zero reserve ratio, the critical rates are 
algebraically lower than those of VARIANT 0 with the divergence widening 
as the reserve ratio rises. (Appendix F and Table 2.6).
Thus Currie/Danes (i.e. VARIANT 0) do not draw out consistently the 
full implication of the rationale which they invoke to extend Kapur (i.e. 
that debt servicing payments cannot come out of nowhere). Both their 
neglect of government capital formation and the emergence of persistent 
losses to banks serve to bias their conclusions as to the favourability of 
liberalisation compared to a variant where either of these features is 
treated consistently (i.e. VARIANTS 1 and 4). But compared to a 
'complete* variant (i.e. 2 and 3) where both features coexist and are 
handled consistently the Currie/Danes predictions as to the favourability 
of liberalisation are correct, although their expressions underestimate 
the possible extent of the benefits attained by changes in the 
administered deposit rate.
For an illustration we consider the prospects for liberalization in 
Greece over the period 1973-1982 during which (excluding the observations 
for 1975, 1978 and 1980) actual real loan rates fell below zero. Over 
this same period the average growth rate was 3% and the average nominal 
loan rate was 15%. We selected the period average of the ratio of 
Reserve Money minus Currency Outside Banks over Total (i.e. Demand plus 
Time plus Savings plus Other) Deposits with Commercial Banks as the value
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for the reserve ratio. The (real) interest semielasticity of Total 
Commercial Bank Deposits was estimated (Chapter 5) to be close to 1.5. 
Accordingly we computed that the critical real loan rate for variants 0, 2 
and 3 is -64%, for variant 1 is -52% and for variant 4 is -76%. (Note 
that we substitute the average value of the nominal loan rate for Ô in the 
formulae of Appendix F.) On comparison with the real loan rate of -4% 
prevailing on average over the period we may conclude that rises in 
interest rates would have further reduced growth (with an average capital 
output ratio of 30% and real deposits per unit income equal to 35% the 




Banking system: Administered deposit rate equals the nominal loan rate.
Government: Participates in capital formation by investing the
inflation tax revenue on reserves.
Banks sustain losses.
The new feature introduced: Real profits per unit income are not constant
but a positive exponential function of the (expected) 
real deposit rate. A considerable part of the 
literature on financial repression suggests that 
aggregate profits (before interest payments) should be 
made to depend positively on the level of real interest 
rates to represent mechanisms such as the following:
When the real interest rate rises, from all projects that depend on 
loans it is those having the lowest profitability which can no longer 
break even and withdraw to be replaced by projects of necessarily higher 
profitability that were rationed out previously by means of non price 
criteria; consequently the average profitability in the pool of projects 
with access to finance rises. Assuming that on the whole projects cannot 
materialize without some accompanying bank finance the argument justifies 
a positive dependence of economy wide profitability on the level of the 
real interest rate. At the same time a rise in the real deposit rate 
discourages self financed (typically low scale) projects by rendering 
placements in deposits more attractive. In turn banks using their 
superior project evaluation expertise and capable of pooling small
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holdings, lend out those funds to finance higher yielding large-scale 
projects (in the private or via reserve asset requirements or otherwise, 
the public sector). Again a rise in the level of real interest rates is 
associated with a rise in economy wide profitability. A higher flow of 
profits creates greater opportunities for retainement and reinvestment.
The exponential form is chosen to represent this dependence because of the 
convenient interpretation of the parameter in the exponent as a 
semielasticity.
The dependence on the expected rather than the actual real deposit 
rate allows this variant to retain the recursive structure and 
linearisation procedure as in all preceding variants. It is similar to 
the specification of the dependence of the output/capital ratio on the 
expected real deposit rate by Currie and Anyadike Danes. It makes no 
essential difference since the exercise (the calculation of the ’partial' 
and related computations below) is one of comparing steady states when 
expected inflation is equal to actual inflation.
Part 1: (Appendix J)
As far as the mechanisms reflected in the computation of the partial 
are concerned to those of VARIANT 1 we add the following:
The change in the steady state expected real deposit rate changes the 
flow of real profits (per unit income) per steady state period, 
exponentially.
The resultant change in the steady state private capital formation 
(per unit income) can be deduced by adding the change in the steady state 
real flow of profits (per unit income) on the change in the steady state
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net flow of loans. Since the change in the steady state net flow of 
loans is the result of two opposing tendencies (the change in the real 
value of interest payments (per unit income) set against the change in 
real value (per unit income) of new loans) its direction is ambiguous.
As far as the recursive structure is concerned here in VARIANT 5 we 
have the following mechanisms additional to those appearing in VARIANT 
0. Given the initial value for expected inflation real profits per unit 
income in the initial period are determined. Given real profits per unit 
income in the initial period and given the initial value for actual real 
money balances per unit income, the growth equation determines the income 
growth rate within the initial period.
Part 2 :
We work out 'the partial' and sign the denominator to be positive by 
stability (Appendix J ) . We relate the critical real loan rate within 
this variant, to the critical real loan rate in VARIANT 1 (Appendix K ) .
The critical real loan rate in VARIANT 5 exceeds the critical real 
loan rate in VARIANT 1 by a (positive) term which is higher the higher the 
semielasticity of real profits per unit income w.r.t. the real deposit 
rate, the lower the interest rate semielasticity of money demand, the 
higher the (starting) steady state level of real profits per unit income 
and the lower the (starting) steady state stock of real money balances per 
unit income.
Not surprisingly incorporating the sensitivity of real profits per 
unit income to the real deposit rate inclines our conclusions in favour of 
liberalisation since it implies critical loan rates which are generally
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higher compared to those of VARIANT 1,
The question arises whether the magnitude of this effect could be such 
as to render liberalisation a commonly successful policy. For we have 
seen that within VARIANT 1 liberalisation is successful only in the 
unlikely circumstances either of the prevalence of highly negative real 
loan rates or of a highly elastic deposit demand and/or very high reserve 
ratios.
Choosing plausible values for the steady state growth rate, the 
interest semielasticity of money demand, the reserve ratio and the 
administered deposit rate we have computed the critical real loan rate 
within VARIANT 1.
Using also the plausible values suggested by Currie/Danes for the real 
stock of money balances per unit income and the level of real profits per 
unit income in the steady state and specifying a range of plausible values 
for the semielasticity of real profits per unit income w.r.t. the real 
deposit rate, we could have computed the term which we need add onto the 
critical real loan rate of VARIANT 1 in order to reach the critical real 
loan rate in VARIANT 5.
However we have no prior expectations as to the magnitude of the 
semielasticity of real profits per unit income w.r.t. the real deposit 
rate.
Instead, motivated by this difficulty, we choose to calculate what 
should be the implied value for the semielasticity of real profits per 
unit income w.r.t. the real deposit rate, for the critical real loan rate 
in VARIANT 5 to come out to be equal to zero, given assumed values for all 
other parameters. (Appendix K) .
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We select zero as a convenient baseline since it represents perhaps an 
upper limit to the level of the real loan rate that is likely to prevail 
in economies contemplating policies of financial liberalisation.
By definition of the critical real loan rate, if a rise in the nominal 
deposit rate is administered, starting from a situation characterised by a 
real loan (and deposit) rate below the critical level, then the steady 
state growth rate increases as a result.
By setting the critical real loan rate to be equal to zero we solve
for the minimum value of the semielasticity of real profits which is 
required to ensure that starting from a situation with at most a zero real
loan (and deposit) rate, liberalisation is successful.
We tabulate the implied values for the semielasticity of real profits 
per unit income w.r.t. the real deposit rate at selected plausible values 
for the steady state growth rate, the interest semielasticity of money 
demand, the reserve ratio and the administered deposit rate. (Table 2.7).
Although we have no prior expectations as to the likely magnitude of 
the semielasticity of real profits per unit income, it is easier to 
visualise limits to the width of the range over which we are prepared to 
accept that the share of profits (or for that matter reinvested profits in 
real terms and per unit income) could ever be observed to vary in actual 
economies.^
The semielasticity indicates the proportion by which real profits per 
unit income (i.e. the share of profits) increase when there is a rise in 
the real deposit rate by one unit.
2. E.g. in the period 1958-1985 in Greece the ratio of 'Income from 
Property and Entrepreneurship' (given in the OECD Surveys) to GDP 
averaged to 30% with a standard deviation of 2%. The minimum (maximum) 
value for this ratio was 25% (33%).
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Using this interpretation for concreteness we tabulate the percentage 
points by which the share of profits is meant to increase upon a rise in 
the real deposit rate by 1 0 % if the value of the semielasticity of real
profits per unit income is such as to ensure that liberalisation, starting
from a situation with at most a zero real loan (and deposit) rate, raises
the growth rate. (Table 2.7).^
Glancing at the tabulations we discover that taking the view that 
liberalisation is a favourable policy in the circumstances of negative 
real deposit/loan rates, most likely to be encountered in the economies 
where the issue arises, does not presuppose reliance on the possibility 
that the share of profits varies by unreasonably large percentages.
Note that the sensitivity of the critical real loan rate in VARIANT 1 
to the assumed value for the interest semielasticity of money demand did 
not translate into a corresponding dispersion of the implied values for 
the semielasticity of real profits per unit income. This is because to 
derive the latter we multiply the corresponding critical real loan rate in 
VARIANT 1 by a factor which is higher the lower the interest 
semielasticity of money demand and thus, in turn, the lower the critical 
real loan rate in VARIANT 1. Hence conclusions as to the favourability 
of liberalisation in VARIANT 5 do not hinge, as crucially as they did in 
VARIANT 1, on assuming a high value for the interest semielasticity of 
money demand.
Further although there is some variation in the computed implied
We treat this 10% rise as if it were a small increment, around an 
initial steady state. This is purely for presentational reasons (i.e. 
we could have tabulated the percentage points by which the share of 
profits increases upon a genuinely small increment of say 1 % and then 
multiplied by 1 0 ).
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values for the semielasticity of real profits per unit income as the 
assumed reserve ratio and deposit rate are varied at a given interest 
semielasticity of money demand there is no variation, so to speak, in the 
favourability of their implications; all corresponding percentage 
movements in the share seem plausible hence favourable for liberalisation 
whereas in VARIANT 1 critical real rates came out to be high and thus 
favourable for liberalisation only at extreme assumed values for the 
reserve ratio and the deposit rate.
In conclusion, introducing the sensitivity of profits to the real 
deposit rate at a magnitude that does not imply spectacular variations in 
the share of profits upon a standard rise in the real deposit rate, 
converts our basic model from one which conclusions contradict on the 
whole (as in VARIANTS 1-4) to one which conclusions share the optimism of 
the financial liberalisation literature as to the impact of liberalisation 
on growth.
These results contrast to Currie/Danes who, even after giving an 
expression to the same arguments that motivate us in connection with the 
improvement in the 'quality' of the activities financed upon 
liberalisation by specifying a sensitivity of the capital output ratio to 
the real deposit rate, still find the prospects for liberalisation to be 
unfavourable.^
One may find some difficulty in envisaging how the flow of real profits 
per unit income increases without any change in the ratio of output to 
capital. Such is our modelling and accordingly our calculations are 
purely illustrative. In fact as Currie/Danes show, acknowledging a 
positive dependence of the output to capital ratio to the real deposit 
rate yields higher critical real loan rates ceteris paribus thus would 
reinforce the conclusions from VARIANT 5.
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Section 2.5
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
In Chapter 2 we present a number of variants of a macroeconomic model 
which formalizes the influence of credit availability on investment and 
output growth. Attention is focused on the implications of the increase 
in the burden of interest payments on outstanding loans because of the 
generalized rise in interest rates during the course of financial 
liberalization. For plausible parameter values the impact of increased 
loan interest payments (which is contractionary for investment) is likely 
to outweigh the expansionary effect of the availability of new loans (and 
additional government net revenues) following an administered rise in 
interest rates. Therefore calculations undertaken with variants 1-4 and 
the basic model indicate that a policy of liberalization is not likely to 
promote output growth. Apart from borrowing, internal funds also may 
finance investment. The financial repression literature puts forward a 
number of arguments to justify a direct relationship between the 
profitability of the projects obtaining finance and the level of real 
interest rates. In variant 5 we show that this mechanism need only be 
capable of raising the flow of real profits per unit income (channelled to 
investment) by few percentage points, for financial liberalization to 
increase the growth rate of the economy.
The basic model was developed by Currie and Anyadike-Danes (1980). 
Before proceeding to extend this model, we gave the following discussion 
and derivations (which cannot be found in the original):
i) detailed derivation of the partial; linearization of the system around 
the steady state; condensation of the system in two differential
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equations in actual real money balances per unit income and expected 
inflation; demonstration that the stability condition for these 
differential equations coincides with that given in Currie and 
Anyadike-Danes (op.cit.),
ii) detailed verbal exposition of the workings (i.e. the recursive 
structure) of the model.
Subsequently we added onto the basic model the following mechanisms: 
a) the government extracts inflation tax on bank reserves, b) the 
government finances bank losses from such revenue and channels any 
residual to capital formation. We showed that when both these 
modifications are incorporated, the critical real loan rates are not 
altered. Therefore the precise conclusions of Currie and Anyadike-Danes 
as to the favourability of financial liberalization carry over on this 
particular set of adjusted assumptions. Furthermore, we demonstrate that 
the growth outcome is the same, whether no reserve requirement is imposed, 
whether a wedge between deposit and loan rates guarantees zero profits to 
banks in the presence of a reserve requirement, or whether bank losses are 
covered by grants that would have otherwise financed government investment,
If no government investment is introduced, but it is acknowledged that 
a competitive relationship must be established between deposit and loan 
rates in order for banks not to realize losses, the conclusions as to the 
prospects of financial deregulation become even more pessimistic than in 
Currie and Anyadike-Danes (1980). If the existence of bank losses is 
ignored and it is assumed that the proceeds from the inflation tax on 
reserves are invested by the government, the conclusions as to the
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prospects of liberalization become more optimistic compared to the basic 
model.
It has been suggested that, typically under financial repression, 
while deposit rates are administered, the effective level of the loan rate 
(the official ceiling plus indirect charges for banking services) rises to 
clear the loan market. Accordingly, a possible extension would be to 
devise a variant where interest payments of firms (entering the growth 
equation) are calculated on the basis of a market clearing effective 
rate. Upon liberalization the effective rate would come down and 
therefore one would expect this variant to indicate that investment and 
growth would increase unequivocally. The main difficulty with modelling 
this within our framework relates to the fact that we set the volume of 
loans to be equal to a fraction of the supply of high powered money by the 
authorities. The model does not incorporate a demand for loans and it is 
acknowledged that a discrepancy must be sustained between the supply and 
the demand for money outside the steady state. But it would be necessary 
to write down a demand for loans in order for an effective loan rate to be 
defined at its intersection with the demand for deposits. In order to 
retain the present framework it would have to be conceded that, while the 
price of loans is determined by the demands for deposits and loans, the 
actual quantity of loans depends on the creation of high powered money 
(which actual stock in real terms is not equal to its desired levels). 
Similar difficulties would be encountered if attempting to incorporate 
intermediaries of the type analysed by Courakis (1984) where again loan 
and deposit volumes and rates are determined by equilibrium-market 
clearing. A way out is suggested in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who
construct a model involving both a money and a credit market.
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Table 2.1
VARIANT 0 ; Tabulation of critical real loan rates given; = o.l













VARIANT 1 ; Tabulation of critical real loan rates given; 
= 0.1, a = 3
k = 0.2
k = 0.5
k = 0 . 6
k = 0.7
6 = 0 . 0 -0.16 +0.16
6 = 0.1 -0.14 +0.24
Ô = 0.2 -0.12 +0.32
6 = 0.3 -0.10 +0.40
Ô = 0.4 -0.08 +0.48
Ô = 0 . 0  -0.06 +0.06
6 =  0.1 - 0.01 + 0.11
6 = 0.2 +0.03 +0.17
6 = 0.3 +0.09 +0.21
6 = 0.4 +0.14 +0.26
6 = 0.0 -0.03 +0.03
6 = 0.1 +0.03 +0.07
6 = 0.2 +0.09 +0.11
6 = 0.3 +0.15 +0.15
6 = 0.4 +0.21 +0.19
6 = 0.0 +0.00 +0.00
6 = 0 . 1  +0.07 +0.00
Ô = 0.2 +0.14 +0.10
(S = 0 . 3  +0 . 2 1 +0 . 1 0
6 = 0 . 4 +0.28 +0 . 1 2
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Table 2.3
VARIANT 1 : Tabulation of critical real loan rates given:
Y ^ = 0 . 1 ,  a = 1 . 5
k = 0.2
k = 0.5
k = 0 . 6
k = 0.7
ri "i = a - r^
6 = 0 . 0  -0.43 +0.43
6 = 0.1 -0.41 +0.51
Ô = 0.2 -0.40 +0.60
6 = 0.3 -0.28 +0.58
6 = 0.4 -0.14 +0.54
Ô = 0.0 -0.23 +0.23
6 = 0 . 1 -0.18 +0.28
6 = 0.2 -0.13 +0.33
Ô = 0.3 -0.08 +0.38
6 = 0.4 -0.03 +0.42
6 = 0.0 -0.17 +0.17
Ô = 0.1 -0.11 +0.21
6 = 0.2 -0.05 +0.25
6 = 0.3 +0.01 +0.29
6 = 0.4 +0.07 +0.33
6 =  0.0 - 0.10 + 0.10
Ô = 0.1 -0.03 +0.13
6 = 0.2 +0.04 +0.16
6 = 0.3 +0.11 +0.19
6 = 0.4 +0.18 +0.22
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Table 2.4
VARIANT 1 ; Tabulation of critical real loan rates given
e





ri = 5 -
6 — 0 . 0  —0.70 +0.70
6 = 0.1 -0.68 +0.78
6 =  0.2 — 0.66 + 0.86
6 = 0.3 -0.64 +0.94
6 = 0.4 -0.62 +1.02
Ô = 0 . 0  -0,40 '+0.40
6 = 0.1 -0.35 +0.45
Ô = 0.2 -0.30 +0.50
Ô = 0.3 -0.25 +0.55
6 = 0.4 -0.20 +0.60
6 = 0.0 -0.30 +0.30
Ô = 0.1 -0.24 +0.34
6 = 0.2 -0.18 +0.38
6 = 0.3 -0.12 +0.42
Ô = 0 . 4  —0.06 +0.46
6 = 0 . 0  -0 . 2 0  +0 . 2 0
6 = 0.1 -0.13 +0.23
6 = 0 . 2  -0.06 +0.26
Ô = 0.3 +0.01 +0.29
Ô = 0.4 +0.08 +0.32
105
Table 2.5
VARIANT 1 ; Tabulation of critical real loan rates given: 
Y ^=0.1, a =0.5
ri = Ô - r^
k = 0.2
6 = 0.0 -1.50 +1.50
6 = 0.1 -1.48 +1.58
<S = 0.2 -1.46 +1.66
<5 = 0.3 —1.44 +1.74
Ô = 0.4 -1.42 +1.82
Ô = 0.4 -1.40 +1.9
k = 0.5
6 = 0.0 -0.90 +0.90
6 = 0.1 -0.85 +0.95
6 = 0 . 2 -0.80 +1 . 0
6 = 0.3 -0.75 +1.05
6 = 0.4 -0.70 + 1.1
6 = 0.5 -0.65 +1.15
k = 0.6
6 = 0.0 -0.70 +0.70
6 = 0.1 -0.64 +0.74
6 = 0.2 -0.58 +0.78
6 = 0.3 -0.52 +0.82
Ô = 0.4 -0.46 +0 . 8 6
6 = 0.5 -0.40 +0.90
k = 0.7
6 = 0.0 -0.50 +0.50
Ô = 0 . 1 -0.43 +0.53
Ô = 0.2 -0.36 +0.56
Ô = 0.3 -0.29 +0.59
Ô = 0.4 -0 . 2 2  +0.62
Ô = 0.5 -0.15 +0.65
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Table 2.5 - continued
k = 0.80
TTi = S - ri
k = 0.75
ô = 0 . 0  -0.40 +0.40
ô = 0 . 1 -0.33 +0.43
ô = 0.2 -0.25 +0.45
ô = 0.3 -0.18 +0.48
ô = 0.4 -0.10 +0.50
ô = 0.5 -0.03 +0.53
6 = 0 . 0 -0.30 +0.30
ô = 0.05 -0.26 +0.31
ô = 0.1 -0.22 +0.32
ô = 0.15 -0.18 +0.33
6 = 0.2 -0.14 +0.34
6 = 0.25 -0.10 +0.35
6 = 0.3 -0.06 +0.36
ô = 0.35 -0.02 +0.37
ô = 0.4 +0.02 +0.38
ô = 0.45 +0.06 +0.39
ô = 0.5 +0.10 +0.40
k = 0.85
ô = 0 . 0 -0 . 2 0 +0 . 2 0
ô = 0.05 -0.16 +0.21
ô = 0 . 1 -0 . 1 2 +0 . 2 2
ô = 0.15 -0.07 +0.22
ô = 0.2 -0.03 +0.23
ô = 0.25 +0 . 0 1 +0.26
ô = 0.3 +0.06 +0.36
ô = 0.35 +0.10 +0.45
<S = 0.4 +0.14 +0.54
6 = 0.45 +0.18 +0.63
6 = 0.5 +0.22 +0.72
k = 0.90
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Table 2.5 - continued
ri = a - ?!
ô = 0 . 0 -0 . 1 0 +0 . 1 0
ô = 0.05 -0.06 +0 . 1 1
ô = 0 . 1 -0 . 0 1 +0 . 1 1
6 = 0.15 +0.04 +0 . 1 2
6 = 0 . 2 +0.08 +0 . 1 2
ô = 0.25 +0.13 +0.13
ô = 0.3 +0.17 +0.13
6 = 0.35 +0 . 2 2 +0.14
ô = 0.4 +0.26 +0.14
5 = 0.45 +0.30 +0.15
ô = 0.5 +0.35 +0.15
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Table 2.6
VARIANT 4 : Tabulation of critical real loan rate given: = 0.1
a = 3 a = 1.5 a = 1 a = 0.5
k = 0 . 2 -0.32 -0.74 -1.2 -2.4
k = 0.5 -0.57 -1.24 -1.9 -3.9
k = 0 . 6 -0.73 -1.57 -2.4 -4.0
N.B. For all tabulations it has been checked that the stability 




Tabulation of implied value for semielasticity of profits 
and for final share of profits
Implied value for semielasticity of real profits per unit income 
w.r.t. real deposit rate.
New share of profits after 10% rise in real deposit rate, given 
beginning share of and semielasticity f.
AT a = 3 X® = 10% m® = 0.2
X® = 1 0% X® = 2 0 % X® = 30% X® = 40%
f X in % f X in % f X in % f X in %
K = 0.2
6 = 0 . 0 0.96 11 0.48 21 0.32 31 0.24 41
6 = 1 0% 0.84 1 0 . 8 0.42 2 0 . 8 0.28 30.8 0.21 40.8
6 = 30% 0.60 10 . 6 0.3 2 0 . 6 0 . 2 0 30.6 0.15 40.6
K = 0.5
6 = 0 . 0 0.36 10.4 0.18 20.4 0 . 1 2 30.4 0.09 30.4
6 = 1 0% 0.06 10.1 0.03 2 0 . 1 0 . 0 2 30.1 0.015 30.1




Table 2.7 - continued
AT a = 0 .5; X® = 1 0%; = 0 . 2
X® = 1 0% X® = 2 0% X® = 30% X® = 40%
f X in % f X in % f X in % f X in %
K = 0 . 2
Ô = 0 % 1.50 11.5 0.75 21.5 0.5 31.5 0.38 41.5
6 = 30% 1.44 11.4 0.72 21.4 0.48 31.4 0.36 41.4
Ô = 50% 1.40 11.4 0.70 21.4 0.46 31.4 0.35 41.4
K = 0.5
6 = 0 % 0.90 10.9 0.45 20.9 0.30 30.9 0.23 40.9
6 = 30% 0.75 1 0 . 8 0.38 2 0 . 8 0.25 30.8 0.19 40.8
6 = 50% 0.65 10.7 0.33 20.7 0 . 2 1 30.7 0.16 40.7
K = 0 . 6
6 = 0 % 0.70 10.7 0.35 20.7 0.23 30.7 0.18 40.7
6 = 30% 0.52 10.5 0.26 20.5 0.17 30.5 0.13 40.5
(5 = 50% 0.40 10.4 0 . 2 0 20.4 0.13 30.4 0.1 40.4
K = 0 . 8
6 = 0 % 0.30 10.3 0.15 20.3 0 . 1 0 30.3 0.08 40.3
6 = 30% 0.06 10.1 0.03 2 0.1 0 . 0 2 30.1 0 . 0 2 40.1
6 = 50% - - - - - - - -
m : By (14)
dX
r  '
fd(6 - / )
Let d(ô - IT ) = 10% = 0.1
Then X = X®(1 + = A®(1 + O.lf)
Ill
APPENDICES A-K
MATHEMATICAL APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2




Growth equation: Y = o[ (1 - k)m(y - ô) +À] (1)
Cagan deposit demand 
function: m* = expa(6 - tt*) a > 0 (2)
Banking system: Ô = r + IT = p (3)
Identity : (4)
Phillips curve: IT = h(m-m*) + 7T* h > 0 (5)
Adaptive expectations: = g(w - %*) 3 > 0 (6)
Production function: Y = ax (7)
Notation : Y : output 
K : capital stock
Y = Y  (output) growth rate
M
m = actual real money (deposit) balances per unit income
IT
* * desired real money (deposit^ balances per unit income 
monetary growth rate 
nominal deposit rate 
real loan rate 
nominal loan rate 
actual inflation rate 
expected inflation rateÏÏ*
A flow of profits before interest payments per unit 
income (share)
The notation has been selected to be as similar as possible to Currie/Danes
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APPENDIX B
VARIANT 0 : Development of the growth equation
Net flow of finance to private sector = New credit extended - interest 
charges on outstanding loans
therefore L - (r+'iï)L (i)
where L : volume of loans
- Capital formation per unit income
K _ L - (r + it)L _ L 
Y PY PY
—  - (r + tt)
1
(ii)
- Reserve requirement; L = (l-k)M (iii)
- Monetary growth :
M L (iv)
- By (3) and (iii) and (iv) into (ii)
^  = (1 -k) (y - 6) + A (v)
- Production function:
Ÿ K 
Y = qK => -  = a Ÿ (vi)
- By (v) into (vi) :
Y = a (1 - k ) ^ ( y  - 6) + A
= a (1 -k)m(y - 6)
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APPENDIX C
VARIANT 0 ; Steady state
The ’e ’ superscript denotes steady state equilibrium values.
Assumptions : tt =  i r *  =  tt ( s p
m = m* = m (Sg)
m = 0 (S^)
By (4) and (S^) y = tt^  + (S4)
Steady state growth; By (2) and (S^) and (S^) into (1) :
= (1 - k)[expa(6 - y + Y^)](y ” 5) + X (S5)
Partial /96
M  = c(l-k) expa(S - p +■ Y^)J (u ■ S) + a(l-k)expa(6 - y+Y^)
= a(l - k)expa(6 - y + Y ) 1 jj - a (I -k)expa(6 - y + y^)
therefore
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- o(I-k)m ( l - a ( y - 6 )) 




VARIANT 0; Linearization around the steady state
From (1): dy = o(l - k ) ( y -  6 )dm
From (1): dy = a(l - k)(y - ô)dm
* e *
From (2): dm = -am dir





and (S^) and (S^)
* *
From (5) : dir = hdm - hdm + dir
.  ^ . * *
From (6 ): dir = gdir - gdw








By (5 ) and (4’) into (1")
dy = [m^h + a(l-k)(y-6)m^]dy - a(l-k)(y-6 )m^(ham^ + l)dn (L^)








(m^h + a(1-k)(y-6)m^) 
Bh
__ G ( 1-k) (y-6 )




det > 0 => Bhm® [1 - aa(l-k)m®(y-6)] > 0 (SC )




Linearized VARIANT 0 condensed in a system of 2 differential 
equations in m and tt
By (2') and (5') into (6 ')
dfr = 3hdm + Bham dir (L,)'
By (5’) and (1’) and (2’) into (4’)
dm = - m [h + a (1-k)(y-6)]dm




— m [h + a(l—k)(y— 6) 
3h








VARIANT 0: Critical Rates
By (Pq ) we require l-a(y-ô) = 0
By (S^) and (3) . (Cp
VARIANT 1: Critical Rates
By (Pp we require: 1 - a ( y ^  - 6 ) = 0
By (S^) and (3) ~ ^ (1 + a6 )
= r + — (1 + a 6) (Cg)
o a Z
Conditions for equality r^ = r  ^
By (C^) 6 = -
o-
1
By (Cg) TT = - Y
VARIANT 4: Critical Rates
By (P^) we require 1 - a(l-k)(y - = 0




Growth equation; y = o [ ( l-WinCy^^ - 6) + À] (8)
All other equations as in Variant 0.
Development of the growth equation
Real inflation tax revenue on reserves per unit income
(vii)
Total capital formation per unit income: 
By (v) and (vii)
I = (1-k) ^  (y-<S) + ^  y + X = (1-k) H  ( j ^  - 6) + X (viii) 
By (viii) into (vi) y = o[ (l-k)m(-j^ - 6) + X] (ix)
Steady state growth By (S^) and (S^) and (2) into (8 )






expa(6-y+Y ) ( ^ ^  - 6) + a(l-k)expa(6-y+Y®) (y^ -  «)]
= a(l-k)expa(6-y+Y ) ( y ^  - 6) - a(l-k)expa(6-y+Y^)
” a(l-k)m^[l - ^ ( y ^  - 6)] 
1 - aa(l-k)m®(y^ - 6)
(PI)
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APPENDIX G - continued
VARIANT 1 : Linearization around the steady state
From (8 ) dy = o (1 - k ) - 6)dm
From (8 ) dy = a (1-k) ("j^ - 6) dm
(8')
(8")
By (8 ’) and (2') into (5’) 
hdïï = dy + (ham + l)dm
G (1-k)(y!^ - 6) 
.II,
(5^1)
By (5 ) and (4') into (8 "):
dy = - [m^h + m^a( 1-k) ( j ^  - 6)]dy - m^o( 1-k) ( j ^  - 6 ) (ham^ + l)dir (L^ )
By (5^^) into (6 ');
dw = 3h
a ( l - k ) ( ^  - 6)
e * 




[m^h + m^o(l-k)( ^
1-k - Ô)]
Bh
^  a(l-k) ( y ^  - 5)




det > 0 => Bham^[l - aa(l-k)m®(j^ - 6)] > 0 (SC^




Growth equation y = a[m(ii-6) + X] (9)
Banking system 6 = (l-k)(r+m) = (l-k)p (10)
All other equations as in variant 0.
Development of the growth equation
- Net flow of finance to the private sector per unit income. By (10), 
and (iii) and (iv) into (ii):
(1-k) ^  (P - (x)
- Total capital formation per unit income: By (x) and (/ ii)
I = k y + (1-k) ^  (y - Y ^ )  + X = ^  (y-6) + X (xi)
By (xi) into (vi)
Y = a[m(y-6) + X]
Steady state growth: By (2) and (S^) and (S^) into (9)
y® = ajjexp a(6-y+y®) ] (y-6 ) + X^  (S^)
Partial
l ô ~  ^ a(6-y+y®)](y-6) +  a exp a (6-y+y®) (p-6)
e
= 0 a exp a(6-y+y^) 1 + (y-6) - a exp a(6-y+y^)
= -gm^[l - a(y-6)] , .
36 . e, _ ^2^
1 - aam (y-6)
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APPENDIX H - continued
VARIANT 3: Development of the growth equation.
- Net flow of finance to the private sector per unit income
By (3) and (iii) and (iv) into (ii)
(1-k) ^  (u-6) (xi-a)
- Banking losses: Outlay on deposits - interest receipts on loans
6M - 6 (l-k)M = 6kM (xi-b)
- Real inflation tax revenue less grants to cover banking losses per
unit income
By (vii) and (xi-b)
I  = k (y-6) (xi-c)
- Total capital formation per unit income
By (xi-c) and (xi-a)
Y = (1-k) ^  (y-6 ) + k ^  (y-6) + X = ^  (y-6 ) + X (xi-d)
By (xi-d) into (vi)
Y = a[m(y-6) + X]
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APPENDIX H - continued
VARIANT 2: Linearization around the steady state
From (9); dy = a(y-ô)dm
From (9): dy = a(|i-ô)dm
(9')
(9")
By (9') and (2') into (5’)
diT = — ,— pr dy + (ham + l)dn 
a(y-o)
By (5^^^) and (4') into (9")
dÿ = -[m^h + m^a(y-ô)]dy - m^a(y-ô) (ham^ + l)diT (L5 )








- (m^h + o(y-ô)m^)
3h/a(y-ô)




det > 0 ;3hm^ (1 - aam^(y-ô)) > 0




Growth equation; y = a[(l-k)in(y - + (12)
Banking system: 6 = (l-k)(r+Tr) = (l-k)p (13)
All other equations as in variant 0.
Development of the growth equation
By (iii) and (iv) and (13) into (ii)
I = (1-k) (P -  ^ (xii)
By (vi) into (xii)
Y = a[(l-k)m(u - y ^ )  + X]
Steady state growth:
By (2) and (S^) and (S^) into (12)
Y® = a[(l-k)[exp a(ô-y+Y^)](y - j ^ )  + X] (Sg)
Partial
lï! -
36 = a(l-k)jj^ exp a(ô-y+Y^) (y - y ^ )  +  a(l-k)exp a(ô-y+Y^) j ^ ( y  - y ^ ) ^
= o(l-k)exp a(ô-y+Y^)a(l +  | ^ )  (y - y ^ )  - a exp a(ô-y+Y^)
r, e - am^[l - a(l-k)(y - yy:) ]
1 - aa(l-k)»^, - ^ )
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APPENDIX I - continued 
VARIANT 4: Linearization around the steady state
From (12): dy = a(l-k)(y - j ^ ) d m
From (12): dy = a(l-k)(y - YZk)dm
(12')
( 12")
By (12') and (2') into (5') 
h
dïï = dy + (ham + l)dïï
a(l-k)(y -
By (4') and (5^^) into (12")
(5^V)
y = |mdÿ j ^h + a(l-k)(y - dy - a(l-k)(y - y ^ ) m ^ ( h a m ^  +  l)dïï (Ly)









- [m h + a(l-k)(y - — 7^) ]
1-k/
6h/a(l-k) (y - j ^ )





det > o => 3hm^ [ 1 - ao(l-k)m^(y - y ^ )  ] > 0 SC.




Dependence of real profits per unit income X = 
JAll other equations as in VARIANT 1 
e






-gg expa(6 - y + Y ) y - (1 - k)ô + a expa(ô - y + Y ) (y - (1 - k)ô)
+ o X expfCô - y + Y^)
= a expa(ô - y + Y ) a d  + [y - (1 - k)6 ] - a(l - k) expa(6 - y + y )
+ a X^ expf(ô - y + Y ) + i% r)
- - g m^[l - k - a(y - (1 - k)6 )] + a f X^
36 1 — a o m [y — (1 — k)6 ] — o f X
(P5)
Where : = expa(6 - y + Y^)
X^ = X^ expf(ô - y + Y^)
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APPENDIX J - continued
VARIANT 5
Linearization around the steady state
From (8 ) 
From (2)
dy = a[ii-(l-k)ô]dm + adX




and (S2) and (S4)
dm = - m^diT - m^dy (4')
From (5) 
From (6 ) 
From (14)
dw = hdm - hdm* + dir*
dïï* = 3dïï - Bdïï*




By (2') and (5') into (6 ')
dïï* = ghdm + gham dïï* (L9)
By (S') and (14') and (2') and (5') into (4')




- m [h + a(y - (1 - k)6 )] 
gh
- m^[ham^ + 1 - afX^] dm
gham dïï*
det > 0 => ghm^[l - aam^(y - (1 - k ) 6 ) - afX^] > 0 (SC5)
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APPENDIX K
VARIANT 5: Critical Real Loan Rate
By (P5) we require:
fX^ - m^[l - k - a(y - (1 - k)6 )] = 0
By (S4) and (3):
r = kô + Y® - — --- —  + —  (C6 )D a e
am
= r + —  (C7)
I e
am
Implied Value for the semielasticity of real profits per unit income w.r.t. the 
real deposit rate
By (C7) we require:
f ^
0 =  —
am








In Section 3.2 we introduce the literature on investment under 
financial repression. We distinguish two general tendencies in this 
literature: i.e. the neoclassical and the ad hoc approach. We indicate
the reasons for choosing to follow the neoclassical approach (and to 
disregard Q models). We discuss some criticisms against the chosen 
approach, especially in connection with the way costs of adjustment are 
taken into account.
The main characteristic, which distinguishes our work from the 
estimation of a standard neoclassical investment function, is that we 
focus attention on the role of credit variables. Hence we discuss 
extensively the rationale on which a variable measuring the availability 
of finance is introduced in the investment equation. We distinguish 
between such rationalizations invoked for developed capital markets and 
the rationalization under financial repression. The latter is analysed 
in Section 3.3. Heavy dependence on bank credit, combined with 
disequilibrium rationing of loans, implies that investment is constrained 
by the availability of bank finance. At this point we resolve an issue 
which is not dealt with in the literature: Can there be a justification
for investment equations with output and the user cost as explanatory 
variables, if investment is determined by the availability of bank 
finance? The existing literature postulates that the speed of adjustment 
is influenced by credit availability while the long run capital stock is 
determined by neoclassical mechanisms. We examine whether, even under 
financial repression, some borrowers, at least during certain time
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periods, are not rationed. In this case, at least part of aggregate 
investment would be determined by its demand, bence the appearance of 
income and user cost. Another possibility which we explore is the 
following: Income and the user cost may proxy for the effect (on
investment) of changes in the availability of (internal) finance. Such 
changes may be induced by economywide movements in retained profits and/or 
in the interest burden on outstanding loans. This possibility is quite 
consistent with the arguments, in the financial repression literature, 
that economywide profitability depends on the level of real interest 
rates.
Having chosen, in Section 3.2, the neoclassical approach, and having 
reconciled this approach with the mainstream financial repression analysis 
in Section 3.3, and Section 3.4, we are now ready to implement it: In
Section 3.5 we derive an expression for the optimal capital stock in terms 
of its determinants. We spell out a number of assumptions involved in 
this exercise. Section 3.6 begins with an enumeration of the sources of 
sluggishness in the investment process. Thus, using also the expressions 
derived in Section 3.5, we obtain our first estimating equation where 
investment is written as a distributed lag of changes in the optimal level 
of the capital stock. The coefficients in such investment functions are 
convolutions of all the factors which contribute to sluggish adjustment.
In Subsection 3.6.1, we rationalize consistently the introduction of a 
number of credit variables in the distributed lag structure. We provide 
also a discussion about the sign to be expected on these credit lags.
In Subsection 3.6.2, we present a slightly different approach: Here
the distributed lag, in the optimal capital stock, is condensed, under
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certain assumptions, in the simple form of a partial adjustment scheme. 
Thus, another two distinct estimating equations are derived according as 
the actual capital stock is substituted out by the perpetual inventory 
model or not. The fourth estimating equation is obtained by writing a 
partial adjustment to the discrepancy of gross investment (rather than 
capital stock) from its optimal level. In Section 3.7, additional 
distributed lags are introduced into the partial adjustment schemes in 
order to represent expectations. These expectations concern the optimal 
value of the capital stock one or more periods ahead. Finally, we 
enumerate various alternative approaches to the generation of 
expectations, which have appeared in the literature on investment 
functions. We also discuss the difficulties in incorporating 
expectations in an empirical investment function so as to accord precisely 
to the stipulations of theory.
Having written and motivated four estimating equations for investment, 
in Section 3,8, we examine the data to be used in the estimations. We 
indicate our data sources and discuss the selection of sample period. We 
justify our decision to work with a very broad investment aggregate that 
excludes, however, expenditures by the public sector. We point out that 
the availability of data constrains our choice of series for output and 
the discount rate. We discuss some criticisms of the latter choice given 
the particular features of the Greek financial system. Apart from a 
selection from the existing series, our study of investment requires also 
the construction of new series mostly from published data. We begin with 
the construction of a measure for the net flow of finance. The sources 
of imprecision in this measure are also noted at this point. The 
construction of series continues with the decomposition of total
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depreciation to a private and a public component. The assumptions made 
in this exercise are explained. Direct and indirect checks of the 
plausibility of our method of decomposition are provided. Having 
constructed a series for private depreciation we are able to construct a 
series for net private investment. This will serve as dependent variable 
in some of our investment equations. It can be cumulated to yield a 
measure for the net private capital stock, to be included as an 
independent variable in other investment equations. Finally, the series 
for private depreciation, together with the series for the net capital 
stock of the private sector, enable us to compute a figure for the rate of 
depreciation of the latter. This figure is required to compute the user 
cost and to construct the weighted differences of income, user cost and 
credit availability which are used as regressors in three out of our four 
estimating equations.
Section 3.2
The Literature on the Impact of Financial Repression 
on Investment Expenditures
Part of the literature seeks empirical confirmation for the analysis 
of the determination of the volume of investment under financial 
repression in regressions of the output growth rate on the real deposit 
rate or regressions of the volume of investment on some measure of credit 
or the money supply (the latter aiming specifically to test McKinnon’s 
complementarity view). Usually these regressions are carried out in 
pooled samples. They are extensively surveyed in Fry (1988).
Another part of the literature envisages that the impact of credit
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controls on the volume of investment takes place on the demand side 
through the speed of adjustment within the context of a neoclassical 
flexible accelerator investment equation. This approach seems to be more 
sophisticated econometrically drawing on the long experience with the 
estimation of neoclassical investment functions in developed economies. 
Thus we choose to follow this approach and refer to it as 'the flexible 
accelerator cum credit variables' .
Further we choose to derive our demand for investment within the 
framework propounded by Jorgenson (e.g. 1967). Thus of the writers on 
the role of credit variables in investment functions for financially 
repressed systems we follow Sundararajan and Thakur (1980), Blejer and 
Khan (1984) and Tun Wai and Wong (1982) who ignore user cost and consider 
the optimal capital stock to be a function of some output related variable 
could be viewed as special cases of our derivation.
More specifically we consider the determination of the optimal (path 
of the) capital stock without reference to costs of adjustment, which we 
invoke, only in order to justify the assumed slow adjustment of the actual 
capital stock to its optimal level. Thus we find ourselves out of line 
with a lot of theorizing on the explicit introduction of costs of 
adjustment in the derivation of the optimal capital policy (e.g. Galleoti 
1984; Gould 1968; Lucas 1967; Steigum 1983; Treadway 1969).
Hence we come to face Gould's (op.cit., p.47) criticism that:
The shortcomings of this [i.e. ours] approach stem largely from 
the fact that K* is determined without regard to the auxiliary 
adjustment mechanism ... many of the variables used to define 
K* such as sales or profits are in fact affected by [the 
adjustment process] and hence do not reflect the 'true' desired
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capital stock at any point on the investment path before full 
equilibrium .... Stated another way, the actual investment path 
is in itself a decision which will affect profits and therefore 
should be either in the criterion function or recognised as a 
constraint on the maximization of this function.
These are Nickell's (1978) "pseudo—static' investment equations.
Nevertheless from an econometric point of view this criticism has not 
stopped Jorgenson's model from appearing as a 'contestant' in many 
relatively recent empirical papers (Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss 1988;
Bischoff 1971b; Clark 1979; Feldstein 1982; Hall 1977; Jorgenson 1971;
Loeb 1986; Wisley and Johnson 1985) and it is faced equally by all the 
aforementioned work on financially repressed systems. Indeed as Anderson 
(1981, p.88) remarks "... [the] plea for a theoretical underpinning of 
dynamic structure has yet to be acknowledged in a practical sense".
In the spirit of the general ad hocery which surrounds the slow 
adjustment of the actual capital stock to its desired/optimal level the 
speed of adjustment is made a function of credit variables. More 
particularly, in the literature on the determination of investment under 
financial repression the speed of adjustment is made to depend on some 
variable related to the change in the level of credit in real terms.
No justification is attempted but authors (Blejer and Khan 1984;
Sundararajan and Thakur 1980; Tun Wai and Wong 1982) commonly cite Coen
(1971) as a precedent to the practice of introducing some measure of fund
availability in the investment function via the speed of adjustment.
Indeed in Coen (op.cit.) and other literature not concerned with financial 
repression the speed of adjustment is made a function of some variable 
relating to corporate cash flow deflated by the implicit deflator for
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investment estimated in National Accounts. Some usual justification is 
attempted referring to Duesenberry's views to point out the possibility of 
a differential between the cost of internal and that of external 
finance. Indeed this rationale for introducing cash flow (or even a 
"stock measure of liquidity" cf. also Uri 1982) in an investment function 
(in an advanced financial system) has been recently revamped by Fazzari 
and Athey (1987) and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987; 1988a). They 
point out thatl;
Explanations why internal finance may be less costly than new 
share issues and debt finance abound. Among the most prominent 
are transactions costs, tax advantages, agency problems, costs 
of financial distress and asymmetric information. (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen 1988a, p.148).
Alternatively as Clark (1979, pp.80-81) writes "[another possible] 
theoretical justification for adding a profits or cash flow term ... to an 
investment equation ... [is that] changes in profits should convey some 
new information about the future profitability of a firm possibly 
increasing expected future output and boosting the optimal future path of 
capital stock". Having established such justifications the next step 
would be as Coen (1971, p.138) suggests "... using the analytical approach 
of Eisner and Strotz ... a sound theoretical justification [to be] laid 
for including cash flow as a determinant of the adjustment speed .... 
Unfortunately the difficulties encountered in carrying out such an
Note that such arguments could be directly adapted to justify the 
appearance of internal funds (which are likely to be sparse, see 
Dooley and Mathieson 1986, p.34) plus cheap loans from the banking 
system in the investment equation for a financially repressed 
economy. Here the relatively costlier funds could be those drawn 
from the unofficial markets. On the other hand, explanatory 
variables related to bank loans sometimes appear in investment 
equations for developed economies as well. For example Artus et al. 
(1981), who estimate an investment equation for France, explain on 
pp.15-16 that "to take into account credit rationing effects an 
additional variable is added .... constructed by extrapolating an 
(unrestricted) credit demand equation over these particular periods".
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analysis are formidable". By contrast Feldstein and Flemming (1971) 
consider fund availability to influence (by a similar mechanism) the 
optimal capital output ratio. For Nickell (1978) the availability of 
internal funds plays a major role in investment behaviour:
The higher the recent profit flow, the smaller the reliance 
which the firm has to place on borrowing from individuals 
who are bound to be more pessimistic about the firm's 
prospects and more averse to the risk inherent in the firms 
returns than the firm's owners .... [also] shareholders who 
are involved in the firm may well have considerably more 
information concerning the firm's future prospects than 
outsiders and will therefore perceive a lower risk associated 
with the prospects (pp.182-183)
Indeed we can go further and argue that the main effect of 
current profits is on this rate of adjustment and not on the 
long-run equilibrium level of the capital stock itself, for 
in the long run the firm can generate enough wealth for its 
owners to finance its fixed equilibrium level of capital stock 
without recourse to expensive borrowing ... (p.185).
In an attempt to test these views (and in particular to test whether 
financial risk is a determinant of investment) Sinai and Eckstein (1983) 
include a distributed lag of the debt service burden (the ratio of 
interest payments on outstanding corporate debt to cash flow) in their 
investment equations (for the U.S.). Similar explanatory variables are 
used by Fazzari and Athey (1987, p.482) on the rationale that "interest 
commitments influence a firm's access to credit and therefore limit 
investment". Unlike the other researchers of financial repression Tybout 
(1983) traces (at least in part) the theoretical underpinnings of his 
regressions of investment on distributed lags of output and corporate 
earnings to the model of Schworm (1980). Schworm (op.cit.) together with 
Appelbaum and Harris (1978) develop a line of work started by Arrow 
(1968). They characterize investment plans that are bounded by non 
negativity and the requirement that the investing firm does not borrow
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funds or issue new equity and also with or without the option to retain earnings 
We note that this settles the quest for a micro-justification of the role 
of the availability of funds in an investment relationship.
Finally we do not concern ourselves with the Q-theory of investment 
since this relies on the existence of a perfect market in corporate 
securities which clearly is not the case in repressed financial systems 
such as that of Greece.^
Section 3.3
Our Theoretical Framework and the Flexible 
Accelerator cum Credit Variables Specification
The flexible accelerator cum credit variables specification is 
considered in the literature as a demand for investment equation which 
differs from the conventional neoclassical model only because it 
incorporates a variable speed of adjustment.
Admittedly this interpretation differs from the view of the
For example volatility in the movements of the stock market is seen 
as subversive for the implementation of this approach even in highly 
developed capital markets. See the comments on Summers (1981) made 
by Bosworth, and Chirinko (1986,p.148). More particularly, that 
prices in the Athens Stock Exchange may not reflect 'fundamentals’ is 
argued e.g. by Papaioannou (1982). Still a compelling argument in 
favour of a Q-model is given by Dinenis (1985) who shows empirically 
that the pure accelerator (in the U.K.) is not a behavioural 
relationship but a mirage. When investment demand rises the 
production of capital goods expands in response. National accounts 
record this as an increase in output and subsequently (after some 
delivery lag during which the increment is classified as works in 
progress) as an increase in investment. Thus investment is 
correlated with output lags.
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determination of investment under financial repression conveyed by Fry* s 
(1988. p.16) diagram. Yet it is the approach of Fry's diagram which 
underlies the determination of investment in our theoretical model.
Fry's position could be summarised as follows (see Chapter 1, diagram 
1): it is a typical aspect of financial repression that there do not
exist well developed capital markets in which deficit units may bid for 
funds from surplus units. As a consequence firms planning investments in 
physical capital over and above the purchasing power of their retained 
earnings can turn only to the banking system for finance. It is another 
aspect of financial repression that deposit (and loan) interest rates are 
administered (r) below market clearing levels (r*). Therefore there 
exists an excess demand for loanable funds (AB). It is also common 
practice under financial repression that loans are generally speaking not 
granted for consumption purposes. Hence we may identify the volume of 
loans actually extended to the private sector with its investment 
expenditures (over and above retained earnings). Moreover, as Dooley and 
Mathieson (1986, p.34) suggest, "firms would find it difficult to generate 
internal funds if they are already heavily dependent on subsidized credit 
to ensure their viability" [as is the case under financial repression], 
However by the principle that under rationing the short side of the market 
determines the volume of transactions, the volume of loans actually 
extended (and thus investment) equals the volume of deposits forthcoming 
at the administered deposit rate (OA), (For precision we should allow 
also for [heavy] reserve requirements). This bears no relation to the 
demand for loans/investment evaluated at the official loan rate.
According to this view (and assuming that the loan market is not cleared 
by an effective loan rate, or even if it is, in the absence of information
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on the latter) the demand for loanable funds/investment is completely 
redundant for the determination of the actual level of loans/investment 
under conditions of financial repression.
In particular within Fry’s framework it may appear that once credit 
variables are included directly in a regression equation explaining 
investment, the real interest rate and income have no place since 
according to this view they influence investment not directly but by 
affecting the equilibrium stock of real money/deposit balances and thereby 
the availability of loans. By contrast if variables relating to the real 
interest rate and income show up independently from the credit variables 
this would seem to suggest that neoclassical demand side influences 
contribute to the determination of the volume of investment.3
The literature has not discussed how investment equations which 
include both user cost and income as explanatory variables can be 
reconciled with a rationing determination of investment. However, 
frequently, accelerator formulations are viewed as compatible with 
rationing. Blejer and Khan (1984, p.386) appear to be attempting to 
reconcile the approach of Fry's diagram with an (flexible) accelerator 
cum credit variables specification by not including a user cost 
variable in the latter: "A clear consensus has emerged in recent
years that in contrast to developed countries one of the principal 
constraints on investment in developing countries is the quantity 
rather than the cost of financial resources. The rates of return on 
investment in these countries typically tend to be quite high, whereas 
real interest rates on loanable funds are kept low by governments for 
a variety of reasons. In such circumstances the investor cannot be 
expected to equate the current marginal product of capital to its 
service cost. Indeed because the total amount of financing is limited 
and the price mechanism is not allowed to operate smoothly it would 
seem legitimate to hypothesize that the private investor in a 
developing country is restricted by the level of available bank 
financing". Similarly, Blinder (commenting on Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen 1988a, p.197) attributes the stylized fact that "you have to 
torture the data pretty ruthlessly before they confess to an interest 





We discuss one possible reconciliation between the interpretation of 
the flexible accelerator cum credit variables found in the literature and 
Fry's position on the determination of the volume of investment under 
financial repression.
Casual empiricism suggests that the prevalence of excess demand may 
not correspond exactly to reality in the Greek financial system at least 
as far as particular loan categories are concerned. For example Courakis 
(1981a) , OECD (1986) , and more recently the Governor of the National Bank 
of Greece (in his Annual Reports for 1986 and 1987) pointed out that over 
a long period of time commercial banks have not managed to come across 
(sufficiently creditworthy) borrowers that would have enabled them to lend 
out the entire amount of funds which selective credit regulations require 
them to put aside for long term loans to enterprises engaged in 
manufacture or handicraft.
This evidence implying some segmentation of the capital market 
(characteristic of financial repression cf. Cho 1988) suggests that only 
some components of aggregate investment may be constrained by the 
availability of f i n a n c e . ^ Therefore an equation explaining investment
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987; 1988a) identify this situation in 
highly developed capital markets as well and attribute it to "firm 
heterogeneity". Similarly, Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) suggest that 
small (and/or new) firms are likely to be rationed in all capital 
markets. Stegman (1982) envisages alternating regimes over time:
"The investment hypothesis suggested here .,, sees investment 
expenditure as accelerator-determined only when firms have sufficient 
profits to undertake all desired investment. When their level of 
profitability is insufficient to undertake all desired investment, 
firms invest only up to the maximum amount of expenditure consistent 
with their liquidity and debt limits", (p.381)
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should reveal both the importance of the volume of new credit and of the 
conventional neoclassical variables. Yet this is precisely the form of 
the flexible accelerator cum credit variables specification.
Hence it may be correct to interpret the flexible accelerator cum 
credit variables not as a structural equation but rather as a mixture of 
two other structural equations, one neoclassical, the other representing 
Fry's position, reflecting that part of aggregate investment is determined 
by the supply of loanable funds while another part is determined by its 
demand which is characterised by neoclassical theory.
We argue here that it is also quite possible to interpret the flexible 
accelerator cum credit variables specification as a structural equation 
reflecting precisely our theoretical view of the determination of 
investment under financial repression (which represents a slight 
refinement of Fry's position).
The discrete time, levels-of-variables version of the investment 
relationship developed in Chapter 2 setting out our theoretical framework 
is :








real value of new loans 
nominal loan rate 
reserve ratio
aggregate retained profits in real terms 
real money demand
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Y : real income
ô— 7T* : real deposit rate
(We have substituted the demand for real money balances for the real value 
of the money supply under the assumption of a steady state),
This relationship says that in a financially repressed system the 
volume of investment is not determined by its demand but by the supply of 
loanable funds. Further it incorporates the insight of Currie and 
Anyadike-Danes (1980) whereby the relevant measure of the supply of 
loanable funds is that of the net flow of finance. To reach this measure 
the real value of interest payments due on outstanding loans must be 
subtracted from the real value of new loans. In addition the flow of 
aggregate retained profits is acknowledged as a component of the funds 
available for investment.
Quite plausibly aggregate profits are modelled as depending on the 
level of economic activity. A considerable part of the literature on 
financial repression suggests that aggregate profits (before interest 
payments) should be made to depend positively on the level of real 
interest rates to represent mechanisms such as the following:
When the real interest rate rises, from all projects that depend on 
loans it is those having the lowest profitability which can no longer 
break even and withdraw to be replaced by projects of necessarily higher 
profitability that were rationed out previously by means of non price 
criteria; consequently the average profitability in the pool of projects 
with access to finance rises. Assuming that on the whole projects cannot
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materialize without some accompanying bank finance the argument justifies 
a positive dependence of economy wide profitability on the level of the 
real interest rate. At the same time a rise in the real deposit rate 
discourages self financed (typically low scale) projects by rendering 
placements in deposits more attractive. In turn banks using their 
superior project evaluation expertise and capable of pooling small 
holdings, lend out those funds to finance higher yielding large-scale 
projects (in the private or via reserve asset requirements or otherwise, 
the public sector). Again a rise in the level of real interest rates is 
associated with a rise in economy wide profitability. A higher flow of 
profits creates greater opportunities for retainement and reinvestment. 
However there are difficulties with the econometric detection of this 
dependence. It is quite apparent in the argument above that changes in 
the interest rate will affect investment via this channel with probably 
long lags, due to the time it takes for internal resources to 
accumulate. On more general grounds we should expect to see a change in 
economy wide profitability (comparable to the cyclical fluctuation) to 
be associated with a regime change from repression to liberalization 
rather than a marginal rise in the administered interest rate.
Although the theoretical relationship (A) seems to translate into a 
regression equation involving a unitary coefficient on the real value of 
new loans (or even the net flow of finance) and aggregate retained profits 
obviously such restrictions cannot be maintained in practice since neither 
the entire flow of loans nor the entire flow of retained profits go for 
current investment expenditures. Similarly not all outstanding loans are 
drawn on investing firms or bear the average rate and thus the measure of 
the net flow of finance that would be entered in a regression would not
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correspond exactly to the theoretical relationship.
On the other hand, the flexible accelerator cum credit variables 
specification is in summary form:
I - G[CR, Y, C] (B)
where
CR : measure of credit availability in real terms
Y : real income
C : real user cost.
Firstly we observe that a regression equation descending from the 
flexible accelerator cum credit variables specification contains the same 
variables that would appear in a regression corresponding to our 
theoretical relationship (A).
Specifically in (B) we write investment to depend on some measure 
of credit availability in real terms, real income and the real user cost 
of capital. All these variables appear in (A) as well since the user 
cost is the real interest rate plus a constant rate of depreciation.
Would then some variables show up as significant regressors if (A) and 
our theoretical framework were the true model but not so if the demand 
side interpretation of (B) were the case? A significant negative 
dependence of investment on the stock of outstanding loans or the nominal 
loan rate would not be an indication in favour of our theoretical 
framework. This dependence could occur equally well in the context of 
the interpretation given in the literature if the speed of adjustment
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depends on the net flow of finance in the true (yet demand side) model 
while the regression equation that is estimated includes only the real 
value of new loans in its measure of credit availability. We saw above 
that the literature offers no theoretical grounds for and does not 
actually articulate any preconception as to the precise measure of credit 
availability to be employed and various alternative measures have been 
tried by different researchers.
Secondly, we consider whether the interpretation current in the 
literature leads to prior expectations as to the signs of the coefficients 
on the real interest rate and real income in a regression explaining 
investment that differ from the prior expectations on the signs deduced on 
the basis of the interpretation given by our theoretical framework (i.e. 
determination of investment by the supply of loanable funds as in [A]). 
Throughout this discussion we assume that the true model (whether demand 
side or not) involves the net flow of finance as the proper measure of 
credit availability.
Consider the regression equation:
I = A
where p is the real value of outstanding loans
According to the interpretation in the literature once the regression 
equation contains the net flow of finance as the credit availability 
measure all dependence on income and the interest rate should come through 
the neoclassical mechanisms in connection with the determination of the 
optimal level for the capital stock. In particular the neoclassical
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theory would predict a positive response of investment to real income and 
a negative response to the real interest rate (user cost).
Consider now the interpretation given by our theoretical framework to 
a regression equation consolidating the first two terms in (A) into a 
single independent variable. After the influence of the net flow of 
finance has been allowed for our theoretical framework would acknowledge a 
positive dependence of investment on income through the term in retained 
profits. On the other hand our framework leads to the expectation of a 
positive dependence of investment on the real interest rate again through 
the response of retained profits. Hence a finding of a positive sign on 
the user cost is evidence in favour of our theoretical framework and 
against the interpretation of the flexible accelerator cum credit 
variables specification that can be found in the literature. However 
such a finding seems quite unlikely in view of the reservations expressed 
in connection with the dependence of aggregate profits on the real 
interest rate. Indeed if this 'profits effect' of the real interest rate 
is not operational in principle (or for that matter operative in our 
sample) then the argument is restored that the real interest rate (but not 
so for the level of income) should have no place in a regression alongside 
credit availability unless neoclassical demand side influences are being 
picked up.
Consider now the regression equation:
I = A . ^  + B.Y + r . ( g - T * )
This regression equation does not contain the appropriate credit 
availability variable but only the real value of new loans. Then the
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prior expectations as to the signs that the interpretation current in the 
literature leads to are as follows: A rise in the real interest rate is
contractionary for investment through the neoclassical channel (i.e. 
reduces the gap between the optimal and the actual level of the capital 
stock) but also because it results in a larger flow of interest payments 
given new loans (assuming it is associated with a rise in the nominal 
interest rate and/or by raising the equilibrium real size of the banks 
balance sheet) thus reducing the appropriate measure of credit 
availability and the variable speed at which any given gap between optimal 
and actual capital stock could be closed. A rise in income is 
expansionary for investment through the neoclassical channel (but tends to 
reduce the speed of adjustment and investment by increasing the real stock 
of deposits hence outstanding loans thus interest charges and reducing the 
net flow of finance). Thus income has in principle an ambiguous sign 
(with a presumption in favour of a positive sign reflecting the 
accelerator mechanism). (It is assumed, in this argument, that profits do 
not affect investment, independently from income, within a neoclassical 
framework).
Our theoretical framework does not have definite predictions about the 
sign on the real interest or the income variable. A rise in the real 
interest rate reduces the net flow of finance. On the other hand it may 
generate an increase in the flow of aggregate profits thus making 
investment subject to two opposing tendencies. Admittedly as we have 
shown in Chapter 2 a reasonable response of profits to the rise in the 
real interest rate would ensure easily that the overall effect on 
investment is positive. An exactly similar argument suggests that the 
direction of the response to a rise in income is ambiguous as well.
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Hence in the case that the measure of credit availability entered in 
the regression is the real value of new loans, the only indication 
enabling us to distinguish between the two interpretations would be the 
appearance of a positive sign on the user cost variable, which would point 
in favour of our theoretical framework.
Section 3.5
Flexible Accelerator cum Credit Variables: The
Derivation of the Optimal Capital Stock
The objective of the choices of the firm is to maximize^ its net worth 
W, i.e. the present discounted value of the infinite stream of cash flow 
from its activities (i.e. the difference of revenue and costs both on 
current account [labour costs] and on capital account [costs of purchasing 
capital goods to add to the stock that is already owned]) after all 
implications of the tax regulations have been taken into account. The 
objects of the choices of the firm are the level of employment of labour L 
and the level of the capital stock K.
In the absence of taxation we have:
fOO
W = [exp(-rt) ] . [ p . Y - w . L - q . I  ]dt (1)
o
p : output price
Y : output
5. An investment function involving all the conventional neoclassical 
dependences could be arrived at by assuming alternatively a firm 
objective of minimization of the present discounted value of the 
infinite stream of total (i.e. including investment) costs. 
Consequently the assumption of perfect competition in output 
markets is also dispensable (cf. Galleoti 1984, p.394 n6).
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nominal wage
price of capital goods
investment
All variables apart from the discount rate r to be thought of as 
functions of time.
Perfect foresight is assumed. Some derivations consider constant, 
others growing nominal prices.
Conventionally two constraints are acknowledged in this maximization 
exercise. Firstly, that of the production function whereby the flow of 
output produced is determined uniquely by the flow of the labour input and 
the flow of capital services:
Y = F(L,K) (2)
More particularly in the words of Jorgenson (1967, p.139) it is assumed 
"... that the services of investment goods acquired at different points of 
time are perfect substitutes in production. Accordingly the flow of 
capital services from each investment good is proportional to the stock 
of capital that may be obtained by simply adding together all past 
acquisitions less replacements". Thus the (net) capital stock appears in 
the production function.
The second constraint stipulates that current gross investment raises 
the capital stock one for one, as a matter of definition. However, to 
arrive at the end of period capital stock, we need also subtract that part 
of the capital stock at the beginning of the period which is assumed to
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have decayed: i.e. to have lost the property of yielding capital
services. Furthermore it is assumed that capital goods decay 
exponentially at a constant rate so that the flow of replacement 
investment, that would be required to maintain the capital stock so as to 
yield an unchanged level of capital services, is proportional to the 
existing capital stock. In particular depreciation does not relate to 
economic considerations such as the intensity of use of the capital goods.
k = I - s.K (3)
s : constant rate of replacement/depreciation
The logic of the maximization is brought out (in continuous time) by 
means of the Euler conditions which are the analogues of first order 
conditions in the case that the rate of change of the choice variable 
appears in the objective function. It turns out that at the optimal 
level of employment the marginal product of the current input is set equal 
to its relative price (whence the familiar marginal productivity condition 
for labour is obtained for every point in time) and the marginal product 
of capital is set equal to a quantity interpreted as its real user cost.
^  = [q. (r+s) - q]/p (4)
Subsequently we may specify a Cobb-Douglas production function (say 
Y = Ahl"&K&). Apart from the independent empirical support for this 
formulation and its frequent use by Jorgenson in his empirical work. Hall 
(1977) suggests the additional advantage that it leads to the 
specification of an investment equation less likely to be suffering from 
simultaneity bias essentially because of the appearance of output and user 
cost combined in ratio form rather than separately. Although we write 
the theoretical equations below under the assumption of such a production
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function, in the empirical part we consider also a real output variable 
separately from real user cost. (For recent examples of this procedure 
see Chirinko 1986; Chirinko and Eisner 1983),
If then the production function is Cobb-Douglas we may solve out for 
the optimal capital stock from the marginal productivity condition given 
above.
K* = a . ^  (5)
c = q,(r+s) - q : nominal user cost
a : elasticity of output with respect to the capital input.
We refer to PY/c as the composite and denote it by J.
Section 3.6
The Specification of the Investment Equation
We assume that starting from a situation of equilibrium and given a 
change in the determinants of the optimal capital stock the actual capital 
stock is not adjusted immediately to the new optimal level. The 
sluggishness in the adjustment enables the definition of a continuous 
investment function. Conventionally it is attributed (i) to the fact 
that the procedures involved in planning, designing, manufacturing and 
installing new capital cannot take place instantaneously upon the change 
in the determinants of the optimal capital stock, (ii) A less mechanistic 
rationalization (alternative to the former which is preferred by Hall) is 
provided by the authors who, as noted above, deduce that the costs
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involved in the investment process (i.e. "purchases costs [with either 
perfect or imperfect factor markets] and installation costs which are 
internal to the firm" Lucas 1967, p.80) imply the optimality of a slow 
adjustment. Sargent (1979) stresses the modelling importance of the 
assumption that these costs increase at an increasing rate with the 
absolute value of investment (gross or net);^ (iii) to the lags involved 
in the formation of expectations on the determinants of the optimal 
capital stock; (iv) to price rigidities, failure of the market for 
investment goods to clear (Quandt and Rosen 1982); (v) even outside the 
flexible accelerator approach and well into the mainstream of the 
financial repression literature we find reasons for the introduction of 
distributed lags in the investment function. For example, Molho (1986a, 
p.115) concludes, within a model of portfolio choice attempting to provide 
a microjustification of the McKinnon complementarity view, that "... 
interest rates affect expenditure-saving decisions through a complex and 
possibly very long lag. Moreover, in the presence of inflationary 
uncertainty, the ex ante current real deposit rate may be a function of ex 
post rates, further complicating this lag structure".
Hence a change in the optimal capital stock does not result in a once 
off discontinuous step in investment but gives rise to a flow of (net) 
investment for a number of periods in the future. Seen differently the 
(net) investment observed at any given period t is motivated by changes in
Nickell (1978, p.262) argues that "... there does not seem to be a 
very strong case for strict convexity of adjustment costs internal 
to the firm ... one particular type of cost ... could well save the 
day .... there are good a priori grounds for thinking that the cost 
of capital is upward sloping in the level of investment at an ever 
increasing rate". (Cf. also Steigum 1983).
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the optimal capital stock which took place in the past as well.7 
We therefore write:
“  *  *
It “ = L ®i*[^t—i ~ ^t—i—1Î (^)
i=0
is the proportion of investment plans initiated in period t-i that can 
be completed only in period t. We refer to as the (original) lag 
coefficients.
Hall and Jorgenson (1971) estimate (6) by expressing the optimal 
levels for the capital stock in terms of the corresponding contemporaneous 
actual values for the composite. This is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the practice of other researchers explained below who consider the 
target for the capital stock to depend on the expected or permanent value 
of its determinant J and then provide expressions for the expectations in 
terms of actual values. For example, the procedure of Hall and Jorgenson 
could be justified by an assumption of static expectations, i.e. the 
anticipation that current values of the variables will be maintained in 
the future (rational if the composite follows a random walk process). 
Another possibility is offered by Hall (1977) and Chirinko (1986). They 
warn us that the coefficients estimated on equations derived from (6)
As Brainard points out in his comment on Hall (1977, p.114) this kind 
of modelling appears somewhat odd "... why doesn't the Jorgenson-Hall 
firm manipulate orders to keep capital precisely on target (assuming 
that some capital is delivered in the period orders are placed) .... 
Hall gets out of that bind by assuming that capital with short 
delivery lags cannot substitute for capital with longer delivery lags 
.... How is it that capital goods that cannot substitute for each 
other during the investment process end up as homogeneous capital in a 
Cobb-Douglas production function?" Hall and Jorgenson (1971, p.22) 
seem to hedge against such a criticism by saying that the equation 
given in the text above implies that "new projects are held to be 
initiated in each period until the backlog of uncompleted projects is 
equal to the difference between desired and actual capital".
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(such as the ones given below) should not be interpreted simply as a 
representation of the technological delays discussed above but as a 
convolution of the former with the sluggishness intrinsic in the process 
of expectations formation. The original lag coefficients are not purely 
structural and therefore may not be stable in the face of changes in the 
environment in which expectations are formed (say changes in the mode of 
announcement of policy induced alterations to the determinants of the 
optimal capital stock). Still Chirinko (1988) finds no evidence of 
instability of the investment function (attributable to this Lucas 
critique) in the U.S.
Anyhow we leave this theme and substitute (5) into (6) and truncate 
(at a point to be determined by experimentation below) to obtain the 
regression equation:
n—1
- s.Kt_i = a . I ®i-^t-i (7)
i=0
where ^t—i ^t—i ^t—i—1-
3.6.1
Introduction of credit variables
Following the approach of Blejer and Khan (1984), Sundararajan and 
Thakur (1980), Tun Wai and Wong (1982), we extend Hall and Jorgenson 
(1971) by making the lag coefficients in specification (6) a function of 
credit variables. We assume that the proportion of investment projects 
initiated in period t-i that will have been completed by period t, depends 
on the availability of credit relative to the magnitude of the required
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investment at least throughout the duration of this time interval from
initiation to completion. Hence we write (cf. Artus et al. 1981):
I ^ i t ^ t ’^ t — 1  • • •  ^ t — i ]
Bi - Bi + — 5------ J----------- (8)
K^_i -
It is assumed the denominator is not equal to 0. is some measure of
the real value of loans extended in period t.
Linearizing (8) and substituting into (6) we obtain after truncation 
the regression equation:
n-1 , n-1
a . E + E b^.L^-î (9)
i=0 i=0
where D^— ^ = ^t-i “ ^t-i-l-
bj^  gives the change in current net investment if credit extended in period 
t-i rises by one unit. In general its sign is ambiguous. (Cf. Gardner 
and Sheldon 1975). If credit were tight in t-i then a smaller proportion 
of projects initiated in even earlier periods than t-i would have been 
completed by t-i than otherwise. Consequently a larger proportion of 
projects would have been carried forward towards the present 
to be completed in the current period thus tending to increase current net
investment. Alternatively as Coen (1971) has suggested if credit seems
relatively ample in t-i then overinvestment may take place in t-i in 
anticipation of credit shortages in the future: this also would work
towards a negative sign on b^. On the other hand loans extended in t-i 
may not have been wholly used for productive purposes in the past (say 
because of binding technological constraints on the delivery of capital 
goods) but may lay idle in the bank accounts of the debtors. Hence past 
loans may be carried forward to add to the aggregate credit availability
156
of the present thus tending to contribute (unambiguously by enabling say a 
larger response to a change in the determinants of the optimal capital 
stock that has taken place since last period) to an increase in current 
net investment.
Hall and Jorgenson (1971) who employ specification (7) assume that the 
original lag coefficients follow a rational lag distribution. As a
consequence they sum to 1 and this restriction enables the exact 
identification of the original lag coefficients separately from a. An 
alternative would be to employ an extraneous estimate for a from the 
studies of the production function. In any case the priority of our 
study is to detect the influence of credit conditions on investment and 
also to demonstrate the superiority of a specification that includes 
credit variables compared to one that does not. This is accomplished 
quite satisfactorily below and the detailed assessment of the impact of 
neoclassical variables could perhaps be left into the background.
Alternatively and for comparability with the specifications to follow 
we may assume that the availability of credit only in period t-j matters 
for investment in period t. (j is to be determined by experimentation; 
in theoretical derivations it is usually set equal to zero).
We therefore write:
Bi = Bi + hi . — --- --------  (10)
^t-i “ ^t-i-1
the coefficient b^ reflects also some allocation of the loans extended in 
the period over the variety of projects each of which was initiated at 
a different point in the past.
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Substituting into (6) and truncating we obtain the regression equation:
n-1 , n-1
- s.Kt_i = a , I Bi-Dt-i + ^ (11)
i=0 1=0
where 0 ^ - 1  = J f i  “ ^t-i-l*
Since ^ - K^-i-l]) “ bj^  under the assumption that credit 
t-j
variables do not affect the optimal level for the capital stock we may sum 
over all lags to obtain:
n-1
% bi = • [^t - s.Kc_i:
i=0 ^ t-j
Therefore the interpretation of the coefficient on Lt_j in this 
specification is the same as the interpretation of b^ in all the 
specifications below, i.e. it gives the absolute amount by which net 
investment rises when real credit availability is increased by one unit. 
Here it becomes transparent that net investment rises because a larger 
proportion of at least some of the various projects initiated at different 
points in the past can be completed within the current period.
3.6.2
Specifications involving partial adjustment mechanisms
Under the assumption the lag coefficients in (6) make up a Koyck 
distribution, i.e. = b(l-b)i then (6) can be written in the form of a 
partial adjustment scheme with speed of adjustment b. Because of the 
aforementioned technological obstacles to immediate adjustment, each 
period investment suffices to cover, apart from replacement, only a 
fraction b of the gap between the actual capital stock and its optimal
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level. In fact this could be seen as optimal behaviour in response to a 
particular type of costs of adjustment under certain conditions.& We 
therefore have :
^t =" + s.K^-i (12)
Further the speed of adjustment is not a constant completely determined by 
technology but is made to depend on some measure of the availability of 
credit in real terms relative to the total real amount of funds needed to 
finance the expansion from the actual to the optimal level of the capital 
stock. Coen (1971) draws our attention to the plausibility of not 
including credit availability in absolute terms (which could be made 
practicable by say an exponential function) but relative to what he calls 
the 'investment chore'. Thus we may write a variable speed of adjustment 
as :
V i
bp = bo + bi .   (13)
Kt - Kt-1
where we assume the denominator is not equal to zero.^
8. Typically a partial adjustment scheme is derived by minimization of a 
cost function equal to the weighted sum of two quadratic terms, one 
representing the costs of being away from the optimal level, the other 
representing the costs of making an adjustment. This exercise is 
myopic (one period horizon) and implies continuous undershooting of a 
growing optimal level, a matter which the alternative of an error 
correction mechanism would take care of (cf. Hendry and von Ungern- 
Sternberg 1980, p.240).
9. Coen following Hochman (1966), suggests also an alternative expression 
for the speed of adjustment where it is made to depend on real credit 
still available after replacement investment has been financed, 
relative to the gap between the optimal and the actual capital stock. 
Thus alternatively we could write the variable speed of adjustment as
Lt_j-s
bt = bo + bi . — ^--------
Kt - Kt_i
where we assume the denominator is not equal to zero. Of course this 
form of the speed of adjustment does not imply the introduction of any 
continued/....
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Substituting (13) in the partial adjustment scheme we obtain the 
specification:
It = bg.Kc + h^.L^-j + (s-bo).Kt-i (14)
This specification is similar to those employed by Sundararajan and Thakur 
(1980) and requires data on the capital stock.
The need to construct a series for the capital stock can be obviated 
if we substitute out the actual capital stock by its expression as the 
infinite sum of all past net investments according to the perpetual 
inventory model:
Kc_l = I (l-s)i.Ic_i_i (15)
i=0
Substituting (15) into the specification (14) and after some manipulations 
(carried out conveniently by writing the perpetual inventory model in 
terms of the lag operator) we obtain the specification:
It bo-[^t ~ (l-s).Kt-i] + b]^.[L^_j - (1-s) ]
+ (l-bo).Ic-l (16)
This specification is similar to those employed by Coen (1971) and its 
main feature is that it involves essentially differencing of the credit 
variables,
continued/...
variable in the regressions additional to those occuring under (13) 
but only a different interpretation on the coefficient of (or
It_i). Note that for consistency and comparing with this 
specification of a variable speed of adjustment, credit availability 
should be reckoned relative to the requirement for gross investment in 
(13), i.e. the denominator of the former expression should include 
also a term representing replacement investment. Following Blejer 
and Khan (1984) and Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) we avoid this minor 
complication.
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Instead of writing net investment as a partial adjustment to the gap 
between the actual and the optimal level for the capital stock Blejer and 
Khan (1984) set the change in actual gross investment in the current 
period to be equal to a fraction b of the difference between optimal and 
actual gross investment in the previous period:
It “ It-1 “ - Ip-l] (17)
In turn optimal gross investment is defined for the steady state as that 
level of investment required to maintain the capital stock at the optimal 
level unchanged in the face of depreciation and also to bring about any 
adjustment in the optimal level in response to changes in its determinants:
* * * *
It = - Kt_i + s.Kt_i (18)
The adjustment speed is made to depend as before on some measure of 
credit availability in real terms but this time relative to the size of 
the discrepancy between optimal and actual investment (cf. also Fry 1988, 
p.54):
^t-j
bt = bo + bi . — ---------------------  (19)
It - lt-1
Substituting (19) and (18) into (17) we obtain the specification:
It “ bo.[K^ - (l-s).Kc-i] + b^.L^-j + (l-bo).I^_]^ (20)
The justification for this alternative approach (which is only hinted in 
Blejer and Khan 1984) is that both (17) combined with (18) and the partial 
adjustment scheme for the capital stock combined with the perpetual 
inventory model lead to the same specification for the investment equation 
under the assumption of a constant speed of adjustment. When however the 
speed of adjustment is made to be variable
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the approach of Blejer and Khan leads to specification (20) which unlike 
specification (16) (arrived at from the partial adjustment scheme for the 
capital stock) does not introduce the credit variable in difference 
form. This is because the appearance of the actual capital stock is 
avoided completely in the relationships of Blejer and Khan and 
consequently the application of the perpetual inventory transformation 
that is causing the differencing is not required. For our purposes this 
may be an advantageous feature of the specification of Blejer and Khan 
since it is bound to show-up greater explanatory power for the credit 
variable. Specification (20) is also preferable in its stochastic form 
since the perpetual inventory transformation results in a first order 
moving average error process being tagged onto equation (16), assuming the 
underlying model (14) has a white noise error.
Section 3.7
The Expected Value of the Composite and 
our Regression Equations
In Blejer and Khan (1984), Coen (1971) and Sundararajan and Thakur 
(1980) the current optimal capital stock is viewed as a function of the 
expected or permanent, rather than the actual, values of its determinants 
(i.e. in our case the expected value of the composite variable).
K* = a.je (21)
Various procedures are proposed for the generation of this unobservable 
variable from current and past actual values of the composite. Thus lags 
are introduced in the corresponding specifications. These lags could be 
viewed as of purely expectational provenance since they are brought in on
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top of the partial adjustment scheme which is assumed to (but may not in 
reality) capture all the technological delays.
In Sundararajan and Thakur (op.cit.) the expected value of the 
composite is expressed as an unrestricted finite distributed lag of the 
actual value containing also the current v a l u e . 10 Indeed, Chirinko 
(1986) views such representations of "extrapolative expectations" as being 
invariably associated with neoclassical (as opposed to 'q') models of 
investment.
Truncating at a lag length to be determined by experimentation with 
the full investment equation we have: 
m—1
je = I (22)
i=0
Substituting into our specification we obtain the following equations to 
be estimated:
m-1
It = a.bo . I ^i-'^t-i ^l'I-t-i + (s“l>o)-^t-l (23)
i=0
m-1
It a.bg . I + bl DLt_4 + (l-bo).It-l (24)
i=0
m-1
It = a.bo • Z d^.Dt-i + b^.L^-i + (l-bo).It-l (25)
i=0
where Dt_i = Jt-i ~ (l-s).Jt_i_i
10. Unless an extra assumption is made the coefficients of the
expectational distributed lag cannot be exactly identified separately 
from a. Sundararajan and Thakur (op.cit.) do not concern themselves 
with this difficulty. Note that Helliwell and Glorieux (1970) 
demonstrate (by means of some recursion) that such distributed lags 
may proxy expectations (containing "extrapolative, regressive and 
trend growth elements") about a point in the future that is further 
than one period ahead.
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DL(. = Lt - (l-s).Lt-i
It is common practice in the literature to employ an independent 
estimate (possibly from extraneous sources) for the rate of replacement on 
the basis of which the series are to be transformed before being entered 
as regressors. Sundararajan and Thakur estimate themselves the 
replacement rate but separately from the investment equation. Below we 
explain how we arrive at such an estimate ourselves.
An alternative rationalization for the distributed lags is provided by 
Coen (1971, p.165): "It is assumed that the firm bases its decisions on
the permanent components only and that the permanent components of each 
variable can be approximated by a weighted average of current and past 
values of the variable". A different assumption could be that 
expectations on the composite are formed rationally and with full 
information and therefore do not differ from the actualized value but for 
a white noise error. (Cf. McCallum 1976 who provides the basis for the 
representation of expectations [in the context of investment] in Abel 
1980). Alternatively and following Blejer and Khan (1984) we could have 
considered the expected value for the composite to be generated by an 
adaptive expectations scheme whereby the revision in the expectations 
concerning the current period is a fraction of the expectational error 
recorded last period. Yet another approach to the generation of the 
unobservable expected value for the composite that determines the 
currently optimal capital stock involves estimating independently a 
regression of its current value on a number of its past values and/or 
other relevant variables. The fitted value from this regression is taken 
as the expected value for the composite and is inserted in the investment 
equation. The number of lags to be included in this independent 
regression is to be determined by experimentation (cf. Barro 1977). A
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special case of this approach appears in Hall (1977) who fits a first
order autoregressive scheme for the composite variable. Similarly
Farimani, Buongiorno and Thomson (1988) employ in their equations (many
periods ahead) forecasts of the determinants of investment generated by
ARIMA models. Compare also Birch and Siebert (1976) and Schiantarelli
(1983) who work though with a lag structure depicting that expectations
held at various different points in the past all concerning the present
period are the determinants of current investment. Additionally Nickell
(1978, pp.245-247) mentions the following procedures: "... suppose that
the variable will continue to grow or decline as it has been doing in the
past. Thus a variable of the type x(t,t+m) [expectation about value in
t+m held in period t] is replaced either by x(t).(l+g)“ where g is a trend
m
rate of growth or by x(t) IT (1+gt-i)^^ where g^-i is the rate of growth in
i=0
period t-i and are exponents to be estimated ... [or] proxy the 
expected future variable by some other completely different variable which 
hopefully incorporates some expectational elements". (For example, 
Lawrence and Slow (1985, p.374) attribute any association between 
investment and nominal interest rates to the latter's role as "powerful 
predictors of GNP").
There is little doubt that "the essential characteristic of investment 
decisions is that they are inherently forward-looking as they depend upon 
the expectations of future values of the relevant variables"
(Schiantarelli 1983, p.291). However situations where investment 
behaviour can be analysed validly as a 'myopic' process are not unknown. 
For example Arrow (1964) demonstrates that reversibility and exponential 
depreciation are sufficient conditions for it to be the case that "... 
future movements of the profit function play no role in the determination
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of the current stock of capital and therefore of current investment"
(p.23). Then also "the investment decision at any moment of time is 
independent of the future course of the rate of interest" (p.28). Indeed 
as Feldstein and Flemming (1971) point out, it is precisely under these 
conditions that Jorgenson's formulation [i.e. (6)] making use of the 




The sample is made up of annual observations from 1958 to 1 9 8 5 . We 
took the following series from the Yearbook of International Financial 
Statistics (IFS): i) GDP in Current Prices, (employed in the construction
of the series for the composite), ii) Lending rate, iii) Domestic Credit: 
Claims on Private Sector, iv) Nominal Wages: Hourly Earnings, while from
11. On the other hand the incorporation of expectations in an empirical 
investment function, according to the stipulations of theory, is not 
without difficulties. For example as Gould (1968) puts it "the 
introduction of adjustment costs forces the firm to consider profit 
potentials over its entire horizon" (p.53). Schiantarelli (1983) 
also argues that "if investment is irreversible ... entrepreneurs will 
not adjust fully to variations in the level of output demand which are 
deemed transitory ... [hence we may] assume that firms base their 
investment decisions on a weighted average of expected output over the 
entire future" (p.295) [in all the quotations above the emphasis is 
mine]. Of course one can always think of a possible 'fix-up' in this 
respect: "to make estimation possible we shall impose that ... [the]
weights decrease geometrically as we move towards more distant 
periods" (ibid.). In fact this hardly worked as Schiantarelli found 
that all weights apart from the first one came out to be zero for his 
sample.
12. There would seem little point in extending our sample into the 
unsettled hyperinflationary early fifties. One would expect 
structural shifts to have followed the transition from hyperinflation 
to stability. Nevertheless the findings of Alogoskoufis (1985,
pp.49-50) do not seem to corroborate this view.
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the National Accounts of Greece (as reprinted in the Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin of the Bank of Greece and in Bank of Greece 1982) we took the 
series for i) GDP in Constant Prices of 1970, ii) GDP in Current Prices 
(employed in the construction of the series for the GDP deflator), iii) 
Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Current Prices, iv) Private Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation in Constant Prices of 1970.
3.8.1
The correspondence between the statistical series and the 
variables thev are intended to measure
Gross Investment: The practice in the literature is to explain
components of aggregate private investment separately. Thus Clark (1979) 
separates equipment from structures while Coen (1971) and Hall and 
Jorgenson (1971) also distinguish between manufacturing and non-farm 
non-manufacturing investment. However the main concern in our study is 
the influence of credit conditions on investment on the aggregate. It 
would have been quite difficult (and perhaps pointless in view of the 
fungibility of credit) to construct smaller credit aggregates 
corresponding exactly to the subclassifications of investment in published 
statistics. In addition, at least for Greece the breakdown of investment 
in components may not be quite reliable especially as far as the 
corresponding series in constant prices are concerned (Ward 1976).13 
Public investment as well is constrained by credit availability and indeed 
there are important issues associated with the 'competition' between the
13. Still we report some results obtained with the dependent variable 
excluding expenditures for the construction of residential 
buildings. Note also that a relationship between agricultural 
credit and investment has been recently detected on Greek data by 
Baltas (1983).
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public and the private sector for the limited amount of funds which, at 
least in connection with the investment function, provide the main focus 
of interest in Tun Wai and Wong (1982)^^. However (and notwithstanding 
the fact that the neoclassical equation can be derived from cost 
minimization alone) we thought that public investment would not 
necessarily relate to the neoclassical determinants as private investment 
does and therefore decided to exclude it.
Net Investment: Hall and Jorgenson (1971) construct net investment as
the difference between gross investment and their estimate of the net 
capital stock multiplied by the number they use for the rate of 
depreciation. We construct our series for private net fixed capital 
formation in constant prices by subtracting from the series of private 
gross fixed capital formation in constant prices the series for 
depreciation/capital consumption in constant prices attributed (below) to 
the capital stock of the private sector.
Output: Alternative measures encountered in the literature are new
orders in real terms (Coen 1971) gross value added at factor cost in 
nominal terms (Hall and Jorgenson 1971) etc. Since private investment is 
to be explained it is the output of the private sector which should enter 
the regressions. However such disaggregation is not published for Greece
14. These issues are also explored in Coats and Khathate (1978) who find 
that the implications of the financing of government debt on the part 
of commercial banks are different according as other private loans or 
rather excess reserves contract in a compensating fashion (in which 
case the money supply rises). By regressions controlling for the fact 
that excess reserves will alter as disequilibrium holdings of any 
other asset spillover, they show that the former are quite insensitive 
to changes in bank holdings of government debt for virtually all 
countries in their sample. By implication crowding-out must be 
taking place,
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and accordingly and following also Blejer and Khan (1984) and Sundararajan 
and Thakur (1980) (the latter in their regressions for Korea) we use the 
GDP of the whole economy. Blejer and Khan (op,cit.) justify this 
practice by stating that "for simplicity we assume that private sector 
output is proportional to total output ..." (p.383 in footnote). The 
series for real output that we use is from the National Accounts of Greece 
and differs from the deflated value of the nominal output series (from 
IFS) by a statistical discrepancy.
The User Cost of Capital: The formula that we employ for the
(nominal) user cost of capital i s c = q . [ r + s -  q/q]. In general this 
formula ignores taxation of the income of/from firms and particularly the 
deduction of depreciation allowances from taxable profits and tax credits 
on investment expenditures which have been documented to be potent 
investment incentives (say in the U.S.). To justify these omissions we 
can only cite the example of Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) who of all the 
literature on investment under financial repression are the only reference 
to consider a user cost and they compute it by an identical formula. In 
a subsequent chapter series for the relevant fiscal parameters are 
constructed in detail and the user cost is appropriately adjusted.
In the theoretical formulation r, the discount rate, reflects the 
opportunities of the firm to place its funds alternative to the particular 
investment in physical capital. However under financial repression "the 
rates of return on investment ... typically tend to be quite high whereas 
real interest rates on loanable funds are kept low by governments for a 
variety of reasons", Blejer and Khan (1984) suggest (p.386). It follows 
that our use of the lending rate as a measure of the discount rate is
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inappropriate unless firms perceive market loans (or bank deposits 
although the spread between deposit and lending rate has exhibited some 
variability over the years so that the latter rate does not perfectly 
proxy the former) as the main alternative to investment in physical 
capital, for some reason such as the absence of a well developed capital 
market. Indeed we have anecdotal evidence (Courakis 1981b; Halikias 
1978; OECD 1986) for the existence of an unofficial market where second 
round intermediation/relending among firms takes place yet presumably not 
at the published figures for the lending rate. Further the series that we 
use for the lending rate is not comprehensive but relates to short term 
financing (for working capital). Given a very complex system of 
selective credit controls, there exists a variety of (published) loan 
interest r a t e s . 15 One argument in favour of our choice is Hall's (1977) 
theoretical demonstration and Lawrence and Siow's (1985) empirical 
evidence (for the U.S.) that a short rate is appropriate for an investment 
equation.
To represent q we construct a series for the implicit price deflator 
of investment goods by dividing the current price series for private gross 
fixed capital formation by the constant price version of this series.
Real Credit Availability: Each regression is run for two alternative
measures of credit availability. Each time the measure of credit 
availability is adjusted onto real terms by deflation by means of the 
constructed deflator for investment goods q. Using this, rather than any
15. In the papers of Paci (1985) and Schiantarelli (1983) a loan rate 
charged by Italian special credit institutions is identified with 
the discount rate of the firm. Furthermore in view of selective 
credit controls, Schiantarelli uses a series for the subsidized 
loan rate.
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other price index, to work out a real measure of credit availability is 
the practice in most of the studies which model a variable speed of 
adjustment (Coen 1971; Sundararajan and Thakur 1980; Tun Wai and Wong 
1982). Both our measures of real credit availability are flow 
concepts. Measure L does not correct for interest payments on 
outstanding loans but is given by the deflated first difference of the 
series ’Domestic Credit: Claims on Private Sector* which is recorded in 
the IFS. This credit aggregate is equal to the sum of Claims on Business 
and Individuals plus Claims on Development Banks both held by the Bank of 
Greece plus Claims on Private Sector of Commercial Banks. The other 
measure of real credit availability, LC, represents an attempt to measure 
the net flow of finance and is constructed by subtracting from L the 
deflated product of the current value of the lending rate by the lagged 
value of the credit aggregate. It is quite obvious that this product can 
provide only a rough approximation to total interest payments flowing 
towards banks, and is also likely to be biased upwards given the almost 
uninterrupted upward trend in lending rates. Specifically the current 
short term lending rate that is employed in the calculation gives if 
anything an upper limit to the range of interest rates that the loans 
included in the credit aggregate (many of which were contracted at 
preferential long term rates or anyway at a fixed rate in the distant 
past) are likely to bear. Finally, interest payments might have been 
occasionally capitalized, thus appearing as a rise in outstanding credit.
The Net Capital Stock: Following Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) we
construct a series for the private net capital stock in constant prices in 
(end of) year t by adding private net fixed capital formation in constant
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prices from 1958 up to and including year t.l& Private net fixed capital 
formation in constant prices is equal to private gross fixed capital 
formation in constant prices minus the depreciation/capital consumption in 
constant prices that is attributed to the private capital stock.
According to Sundararajan and Thakur (1980, p.834) the absence of a 
benchmark value for the capital stock should be no cause for concern 
"since linear investment functions are used the unknown initial capital 
stock can readily be absorbed into the intercept term thus obviating the 
need for estimating the initial capital stock".
3.8.2
Attribution of depreciation construction of series for net capital stock 
of private sector and computation of rate of depreciation
A series for depreciation attributed to the capital stock of the 
private sector i.e. separately from the capital stock of the public sector 
is constructed on the following rationale: Assuming that the private net
capital stock and the public net capital stock K 2 are subject to 
exponential depreciation at the same rate s and ’DEP' is the published 
series measuring the flow of depreciation from the total capital stock we 
have :
16. This is a simplification of the perpetual inventory method. Hall and 
Jorgenson (1971) also cumulate private net investment since the 
earliest date that data are available which is of course long before 
the period covered by their regressions. A proper application of the 
perpetual inventory method would require adding cumulatively all 
investment not since 1958 but since the most distant date that given 
typical asset life (the particular type of) capital still surviving in 
t could have originated (cf. Ward 1976).
172
DEPt = s.Kl t-1 + S.K2 t-1
K
s.Ki t-1 = DEPt . [ki + KgJt-l
Hence we may derive a measure for the depreciation attributable to the 
private capital stock by multiplying each observation in the published 
series by a corresponding estimate of Ki/Ki + K2 lagged once (which could 
vary from observation to observation).
Further we take as an estimate of Ki/Ki + K 2 the ratio of the gross 
capital stock of the private sector to the total gross capital stock of 
the economy. To construct a series for the gross capital stock of the 
private sector (and also the total) we felt that we should make use of the 
p u b l i s h e d ^ ?  data for the total net capital stock based on a direct 
estimate of the capital stock for 1948, Unfortunately no disaggregation 
of the total into a private and a public component is available. We
derive a benchmark for our series for the private gross capital stock by 
multiplying the published figure for the total net capital stock for (end 
of year) 1957 by the average value of the ratio of private to total gross 
fixed capital formation in constant prices over the period 1948-1957.
Our method apportions plausibly, approximately one-third of the 1957 net 
capital stock which did not exist in 1948.18 It would be correct for the 
remaining 70% as well if the pre-1948 values of the aforementioned ratio 
were similar to the values for the period 1948-1957. For one thing
17. Ministry of National Economy, National Expenditure and Capital
Stock Division (1983), Capital stock series also in OECD Department of 
Economics and Statistics (1987).
18, Understandably the figure for the capital stock in 1948 must be 
relatively low reflecting a history of devastation in the 
immediately preceding years. A similar point is made by Vernardakis 
(1978, p.86).
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this ratio has remained relatively stable over the extended period 
1948-1985 (mean 69% standard deviation 5 percentage points). The 
observation on the private (total) capital stock in (end of) year t is 
generated by adding onto the benchmark value for the 1957 private (total) 
capital stock the cumulative sum of private (total) gross fixed capital 
formation in constant prices from 1958 up to and including year t. Note 
that our series for total gross fixed capital formation in constant prices 
is the sum of private plus public gross fixed capital formation in 
constant prices. Subsequently we generate a series for the ratio of the 
private to the total gross capital stock (constructed above) lag it and 
multiply it into the published series for depreciation in constant prices 
to obtain a series for the depreciation attributable to the private 
capital stock, in constant prices.
The following argument suggests that our method of attribution is 
appropriate: Assume that every annual observation on public gross fixed
capital formation is a constant proportion b of the corresponding annual 
observation on private gross fixed capital formation both before and 
after the benchmark year 1957. Then we show that the value of the ratio 
K^/K^ + K2 worked out for the gross capital stocks [i.e. (ii)] constructed 
as above is equal to the value if the net capital stocks were substituted 
in [i.e. (i)]. Denote the 1957 benchmark for the private (total) capital 
stock by B]^(B) and note that B = (l+b).B|^. We have :
K Z(l-s)i.I .




Elt-i + Zb.It_i + B 1+b
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therefore
Kl Elt-i + ®1
Kl + K2 ZIt-i + Zb. It—i B
Is the condition of the constancy of b fulfilled in our sample? We 
have found that over the whole period 1948-1985 b has a mean value of 45% 
with a standard deviation of 13 percentage points while somewhat more 
encouraging over the period 1958-1985 it has a mean value of 42% with a 
standard deviation of 9 percentage points. As predicted the series for 
the ratio K^/K^ + K 2 evaluated for the gross capital stocks runs very 
closely to the series for 1/1+b: The mean discrepancy between the series
over the period 1963-1982 (excluding 1971 which has a different sign) is 
5% of the corresponding value of the former ratio with a maximum 
discrepancy of 11%. As a further check, once we did come up with an 
estimate for the rate of depreciation (which is of course conditional on 
the above calculation), we generated a series for the private (public) net 
capital stocks using also the same benchmarks as above. We proceeded to 
use these to generate a series for the ratio K^/K^ + K 2 worked out for net 
capital stocks. The mean discrepancy between this series and the series 
worked out for gross capital stocks over the run 1964-1984 is 0.5% while 
the maximum observed discrepancy is 0.9% of the corresponding value of the 
ratio for gross capital stocks. Alternatively disregarding the published 
data we may set the benchmark for the private (total) net capital stock in 
1957 equal to zero and proceed to construct a series for the private 
(total) gross capital stock by cumulating private (total) gross fixed 
capital formation in constant prices. It turns out that the series for 
the ratio K^/K^ + K 2 as well as depreciation attributed to the private 
capital stock and net investment worked out by this method are remarkably 
close to the corresponding series worked out by the method
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making use of benchmarks. The mean discrepancies between corresponding 
series over the period 1958-1985 expressed as a percentage of the value 
arrived at by the method employing benchmarks are 0.9% (with a maximum of 
1.8%) for the ratio and private depreciation and 0.4% (with a maximum of 
0.9%) for net investment. Thanks to the constancy of the ratio of public 
to private gross fixed capital formation in constant prices the initial 
value for the capital stock seems to be of no consequence, assuming of 
course that the aforementioned ratio was not very different before 1948.
Following Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) we obtain an estimate for the 
rate of depreciation as the coefficient on lagged private net capital 
stock in a regression containing also a constant and having private 
depreciation in constant prices as its dependent variable




(t-statistics in parentheses: "*" denotes significance at least
at 95%)
The coefficient on is not altered if AR(1) estimation is used
instead, in order to try to eliminate first order autoregression in the 
error, which may be what the just significant D.W. is indicating. 
Furthermore an alternative estimate for the rate of depreciation obtained 
by regression of the series for private depreciation on the series for the 
private net capital stock both constructed without using benchmarks comes 
down to 0.027 when rounded. This estimate seems to be on the low side: 
it is slightly more than half the value for the rate of depreciation
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postulated by Blejer and Khan (1984), (0.05), and something less than half 
the figure employed by Hall and Jorgenson (1971) for the rate of 
depreciation of structures. Naturally our estimate is well within the 
values employed in the computation of the series for (total) depreciation 
in the National Accounts of Greece (1% - 1.5% structures, 3% - 10% 
equipment). Its relatively low magnitude is suggestive of some 
prevalence of structures (rather than equipment) in the capital stock of 
Greece which is also confirmed by the data: Indeed the ratio of (total)
structures to the (total) capital stock in constant prices in net terms 
constructed from published series over the period 1960-1985 averages to 
82% with a standard deviation of 2 percentage points.
Section 3.9
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
A large part of the financial liberalization literature relies for its 
conclusions on the positive relationship between private investment 
expenditures and bank finance. Accordingly there have been a number of 
empirical studies of the investment function under financial repression. 
They all include a measure of the flow of real loans alongside other (e.g. 
neoclassical) explanatory variables. The presence of this measure is 
commonly justified on the grounds that the speed of adjustment within a 
partial adjustment neoclassical model of investment demand, is influenced 
by fund availability. In Chapter 3 we suggest that a similar 
specification can be derived (without a partial adjustment), if the 
proportion of investment projects initiated at various points in the past 
that can be completed within the current period, is made to depend on
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credit availability. We note that more rigorous microfoundations for 
such arguments in the investment function can be found within the 
theoretical literature.
Furthermore, we conclude that these formulations do not conflict with 
the theoretical view, in the financial repression literature, that 
investment is determined exclusively by the supply of loans, while its 
notional (neoclassical) demand is irrelevant. The reason is that not all 
borrowers are rationed all the time. At any rate, on the basis of the 
equation describing investment behaviour in our theoretical macro model, 
apart from new real loans, income and the real interest rate ought also 
affect the volume of investment via their influence on retained profits. 
The rest of Chapter 3 is taken up by the presentation of four estimable 
investment equations. We follow the standard, but somewhat dubious 
approach of first -deriving an expression for the optimal capital stock and 
subsequently imposing some scheme for slow adjustment, in view of the well 
known sources of lags in the investment process. In addition, a series 
for the net investment and capital stock of the private sector and a 
figure for the rate of (physical) depreciation of capital (in Greece over 
the period 1958-1985) are all products of this chapter.
If further research with alternative models of investment is to be 
undertaken, one would contemplate the approach of Schiantarelli (1983). 
This would enable us to look at a theoretically more plausible model, 
putty clay. At the same time, such a model would allow us to incorporate 
consistently many-period-ahead rational expectations in the investment 
function. Indeed, although a lot is said about the role of expectations 
in the investment function, empirical research either ignores it in
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practice (and in the theoretical model that precedes it) or comes up 
against the usual difficulties of proxying an unobservable (to which 
mostly ad hoc solutions are available), Another direction towards which 
one could seek extra specifications of the investment equation, is that of 
error correction models. This would constitute a refinement of the 
partial adjustment scheme on which most of our equations are built. In 
addition error correction models have provided the scope for the 
application of an attractive econometric methodology. (Cf. Anderson 1981; 
Bean 1981). As far as data are concerned, there is always a wish for 
better series of capital stock (an alternative series could be constructed 
e.g. from Krengel and Mertens 1967) and more observations in general (e.g. 
quarterly). More specifically, we have noted how a series for private, 
rather than aggregate, output would have been a more appropriate 
explanatory variable for private investment. Similarly availability of 
series for private capital consumption and capital stock would have 
enabled us to avoid arbitrary procedures (attribution). Since we are 
mainly interested in the influence of the availability of finance on 
investment, alternative measures of credit ought also to be tried as well 
as measures of internal funds (e.g. the OECD gives a series for income 
from property and entrepreneurship that we could take as starting 
point). Also, a finer dissagregation of loans and corresponding interest 
rates (or direct data on the interest income of banks e.g. from cash flow 
statements) would make possible the construction of a more satisfactory 








In this Chapter we discuss how to account for the influence of tax 
and fiscal incentive policies when estimating an investment function. 
Once this issue is clarified, we proceed to construct series for the 
relevant fiscal parameters in Greece over the period 1959-1985. Thus 
we are able to construct an accurate series for the user cost of 
capital, over the same period, to be used in the regressions of Chapter 
5.
In Section 4.2, we survey some parts of the theoretical and 
empirical literature which bear on the issue. In Subsection 4.2.1 we 
state exactly how fiscal parameters should enter the user cost. We 
also note the precise assumptions of the resulting formula.
Subsequently we discuss each (fiscal parameter) component of the user 
cost in isolation. First, we comment on the choice of the post tax 
loan interest rate as discount rate. Second, in Subsection 4.2.2, we 
present opposing views in the literature about which tax rate 
(corporate, personal or both) is relevant for investment behaviour.
This tax rate should enter the user cost. Third, we present the 
formula for the present discounted value of the tax savings due to 
investment, and note the assumptions it involves.
In Subsection 4.2.3, we discuss possible refinements of the 
procedure which is actually adopted in Chapter 4. We note the 
possibility of entering fiscal parameters as separate regressors
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(independently from the user cost). We cite the few examples, in the 
literature, of calculation of the expected (as distinct from the actual) 
value of fiscal parameters. This is an important task because, we 
suggest, the anticipation of a variation in fiscal parameters may induce 
drastic changes in investment behaviour. Finally, we suggest that the 
effect of fiscal changes on investment expenditures might be transmitted 
via general equilibrium and liquidity channels. Moreover, fiscal 
incentives may influence the regional allocation, rather than the level, 
of aggregate investment.
In Subsection 4.2.4, we begin the construction (from Greek data) of 
series for the fiscal parameters which appear in the formula for the 
user cost. We adjust the published tax rate, on the undistributed 
profits of limited liability companies, for other fiscal burdens. This 
adjustment pays due attention to the legal detail and involves only 
slight imprecision (overstatement of the tax rate).
In Section 4.3, we continue the computation of the components of the 
user cost under taxation and fiscal incentives. We attempt to quantify 
investment allowances in an index. Three tasks are involved: First,
we should become familiar with the precise terms (deadlines etc.) under 
which investment allowances were granted in law. Second, we must 
define an index for the effective rate of investment allowance 
corresponding to each decree. The literature also distinguishes 
between the statutory rates and the underlying effective rates.
However, the practice in the literature, whereby total claims of 
allowances are divided by total investment in the same year, will not 
do. Rather, our index must capture this fact: Allowable deductions
182
were carried forward to be subtracted against (undistributed) profits 
frequently long after eligible investment expenditures were incurred.
Given the originality of this index we ought to substantiate the 
findings which it leads to, by argument and additional evidence.
First, we note that discrepancies, between the statutory rates and the 
computed effective rate of investment allowances, are encountered in the 
literature as well. Second, we illustrate that use of the simple index 
established in the literature would lead to findings similar to our 
index. Third, we interpret the provisions in the fiscal decrees which 
granted investment allowances. The provisions were such so as to 
effectively restrict the beneficiaries of investment allowances to 
groups whose investment expenditures were only a moderate fraction of 
total investment. In addition, effective rates of investment 
allowances were depressed because of low and undereported profits 
combined with a maximum percentage of profits not to be exceeded by the 
deduction in each period. We argue that even if claims of allowances 
could eventually be made, high inflation would have eroded their real 
value (thus lowering the corresponding effective rates). Finally, we 
identify some special factors which might have lowered the effective 
rates computed for the most recent decrees.
In Section 4.4, an examination of the detail of the legislation 
which offered investment grants, reveals that these were of restricted 
regional importance or limited to certain types of investment only. 
Therefore we may neglect them (and indeed we are compelled to do so by 
the lack of data). By contrast, we are able to compute an economywide 
rate of depreciation for tax purposes. However, the lack of data
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prevents us from accurately adjusting this rate for the proportionate 
reductions in tax lives (which were granted within the context of 
investment incentives). The coverage of such reductions was even more 
restricted than that of investment allowances. Hence we postulate that 
these measures increased the economy wide rate of tax depreciation by a 
small fraction only. We check whether this makes any difference to the 




The user cost under taxation
Consideration of the tax system requires modification of the nominal 
user cost formula which becomes:
_ q •(1-A) 
(1-
c = 7 : -^-  . [(l-r).r + s - q/q]
q : price of capital goods
s : rate of economic depreciation
T : corporate tax rate
A : present discounted value of reduction in corporate tax
liabilities consequent upon one unit value of investment.
This modification is obtained by assuming that the objective of the 
firm is the maximization of, the present discounted value over an 
infinite horizon, of the residual after taxes have been levied at a rate
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T on "accountants" (cf. Nickell 1978, p.199) profits [p.Y - w.L] minus 
investment expenditures, reduced however by the total amount claimed as 
tax depreciation and investment allowances or any tax free grants when 
applicable,
In addition the discount rate employed above is the post tax 
interest rate given full deductibility of interest payments in the Greek 
tax system. A more precise formulation (Anderson 1981) would weight t 
in the numerator by leverage which however is likely to be very high in 
view of the prevalence of bank finance in Greece. Still (presumably 
under market determination of the interest rate) the use instead of a 
discount rate which (because of tax shifting) is not sensitive to tax 
changes has also been advocated (Sumner 1976). Gardner and Sheldon 
(1975) also favour using an inflexible discount rate in view of ex post 
fixity of factor proportions and one would think irreversibility coupled 
with uncertainty (cf. Schiantarelli's 1983 use of permanent income). 
Fiscal parameters are expressed in average and effective terms (Sinai 
and Eckstein 1983) ; it is assumed that they do not vary over the period 
of definition of c. As pointed out in Bean (1981) the formula implies 
that firms realize taxable profits, as well as having no uncertainty nor 
any prospect of bankruptcy. Hulten (1984) notes the implicit 
assumptions of debt finance with borrowers and lenders (banks) in the 
same marginal tax bracket. Below we challenge the assumption of 
sufficient profits, and avoid it in part by adjusting downwards the 
effective rate of investment allowance. Finally taxation of capital 
gains on holdings of capital is ignored, as seems to be the practice in 
the empirical literature. For example Chirinko and Eisner (1983, 




The appropriate tax rate to enter the user cost
King (1972) argues analytically that the tax rate which is relevant 
for the investment decision is that imposed on retained profits 
irrespective of whether the firm is driven by managerial or other 
motives. In particular he shows that any tax rates apart from the rate 
on retained profits 'factor out' from the assumed objective of the firm 
i.e. the present discounted value of net (= after personal taxes) 
dividends to be maximized over an infinite horizon.
On the other hand the tax rate on retained profits must remain in 
the objective function since it represents the relative potential of 
firms' capital allowances to generate funds available for distributions 
ceteris paribus. In turn the amount of capital allowances that can be 
claimed against gross income depends on the path of investment.
By contrast, for example Feldstein and Flemming (1971) introduce 
personal taxes in the user cost; in part they rely on the Duesenberry 
rationale that the cost of finance depends on the availability of 
internal funds, and thus on the optimal dividend payout rate which is 
itself influenced by personal taxation. Evidence, (encompassing tests 
on alternatives etc.), that investment in physical capital is adversely 
affected by the taxation of distributions, is offered by Poterba and 
Summers (1983) from the perspective of a Q model.
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More generally, Nickell (1978, pp.212-213) sees the taxation of 
corporate earnings to be reducing resources in the hands of the more 
optimistic and/or less risk averse potential investors thus contributing 
towards a relatively higher cost of capital. Further, he suggests an 
effect of personal income and capital gains taxes via their influence on
the attractiveness of retentions relative to debt and points out that
while King's argument neglects (innocuously for our case) equity 
finance, tax induced changes in the opportunity cost of retained 
earnings in terms of net dividends have an a priori ambiguous impact on 
investment.
The present discounted value of the tax reductions consequent upon 
a Drachma of investment in physical capital (A) is calculated by the 
(discrete time) formulae given in Melliss and Richardson (1976) and in 
accordance with the Greek institutional features of tax depreciation by 
the straight line method and non deductibility of investment allowances 
from the depreciable base.
A = T.V + T.d + T.d . [ ■ 1
^(l-T).r.(l+(l-r).r)^^
V : effective rate of investment allowances
d : economywide annual rate of depreciation for tax purposes
N = 1—d/d
Again we discount by the post tax interest (loan) rate for consistency, 
but note King's (1972) conclusion about the sensitivity of the resultant 
effective price of capital to the value for this rate. Greek tax laws 
require a substantial fraction of tax liabilities to be paid effectively 
concurrently and not in arrears. Hence the additional complication
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Table 4.1
Computed present discounted value of reduction in corporate tax 



































(cf. Boatwright and Eaton 1972) of multiplying the expression above by 
an extra discount factor is neglected. Over our sample period A has 
averaged to 29% (35%) with a small standard deviation of 2(2) percentage 
points (in parentheses figures corresponding to private investment 
excluding residential buildings). Depreciation allowances are the 
dominant component - the average value of investment allowances was 1% 
(2%) with a substantial standard deviation of 0.8 (1) percentage points.
4.2.3
Other issues
It is frequently the practice (Bean 1981; Feldstein and Flemming 
1971) to introduce the tax parameters as separate regressors and not 
in combination within a user cost. This ad hoc procedure relies on 
some evidence (U.S. and U.K.) that firms may have exhibited a 
particularly delayed response to novel tax devices. Similarly, as 
Chirinko (1986) and Chirinko and Eisner (1983) argue, it may be 
inappropriate to constrain "all of the variables embedded in the user 
cost of capital to have the same set of expectations coefficients .... 
it is quite conceivable that expected interest rates follow a regressive 
pattern ... but that expected tax rates are nearly constant" (Chirinko 
1986, p.144). Separation often serves to show up a significant 
influence of tax policy on investment (despite the notorious [e.g.
Savage 1978] insensitivity of investment to interest rates). It would 
have added more generality to our approach, but only at the cost of 
further depriving us of degrees of freedom.
Typically expectations on the various fiscal parameters are taken to
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be static. Exceptions are provided by Auerbach and Hines (1988) and by 
Bernanke (1983). Bernanke uses fitted values from a one period ahead 
forecasting equation of the total "tax break" for investment in terms of 
past values of the investment subsidies and lagged investment, which 
latter "turns out to be an important and significant determinant of 
current tax laws" (p.73) (in the U.S.). A similar (but more 
sophisticated) procedure is implemented by Auerbach and Hines. Also 
King (1972) replaces some of the observations on the tax rate by widely 
held anticipated values in response to official hints. Paci (1985) 
sets the expected (present) value for investment incentives equal to a 2 
yearly moving average of past values in view of "unpredictable 
non-economic factors" (p.777) (political climate?) by which these seem 
to be governed.
Generally speaking it makes a difference for the behaviour of 
investment over time whether fiscal changes are preannounced or 
unanticipated. For example Sumner (1985) demonstrates (under a cash 
flow system without deferment of capital allowances or possibly under 
accelerated depreciation) how expenditures are postponed until an 
expected rise in the corporate tax rate and thus an increase in the 
value of tax savings due to investment has materialized. According to 
his case study subject to the flexibility of planned spending and the 
sophistication of appraisal methods and despite internal 
disruption costs, external penalties and the opposing desires of 
suppliers of investment goods, postponement could have been for as long 
as one calendar year. An exactly similar argument appears in Chirinko 
and Eisner (1983, p.143). Obversely firms may bring forward 
expenditures to take advantage of fiscal benefits announced as
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temporary. Lund (1976) quotes a similar observation of Feldstein and 
Flemming (1971) in connection with changes in allowances, but remarks 
that such phenomena pertain to a 'Grand Old Duke of York' type 
manipulation of incentives influencing the timing of investment with 
short gestation lags: this differs from the Greek case with its
framework of incentives sustained over the long run. At any rate we 
abstract from such effects with the probable consequence of leaving some 
of the observed variation of investment unexplained; in particular on 
two occasions at least there has been an extended interval (1 year) 
between passage of a law offering investment incentives and its 
provisions coming into operation.
Other complications which we do not pursue are as follows: First
allowance and tax changes work on investment through general 
equilibrium/multiplier interconnections as well. Our central concern 
with a single equation leaves such links unexplored’. Second fiscal 
changes alter the liquidity position of the firm and thereby possibly 
investment expenditures if these depend at all on the former. This was 
the main concern of Coen (1971) and more recently of Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988b). According to the argument of the latter, such 
effects must be particularly important in Greece because of the 
widespread presence of rationing constraints. Third, working with 
broad investment aggregates we cannot detect any purely reallocational 
impact (often seemingly intended) from fiscal provisions (cf. Faini and 
Schiantarelli 1987), so that our conclusion on their effectiveness is 
partial.
1 . Malcomson (1982) and Sinai and Eckstein (1983) study empirically 
such general equilibrium links. Malcomson (op.cit.) also suggests 
that fiscal incentives shorten service lives thus stimulating, or 
perhaps merely redistributing over time, replacement investment.
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4.2.4
The computation of a series for the tax rate
Throughout the sample period the Greek tax system prescribed 
proportionate taxation of the undistributed profits of corporations 
while distributed profits were taxed progressively according to the 
marginal income tax bracket of the recipient shareholders.
To arrive at a tax rate to be employed in the computation of the 
user cost we adjusted the available series for the tax rate? on the 
undistributed profits of limited liability companies by adding on a 
minor allowance for other fiscal burdens on the undistributed profits of 
such companies (substantial contributions to 'the farmers social 
insurance organization', stamp and other duties for local services, 
etc.).
In particular in each period we add onto the published series for 
the tax rate, the ratio of total payments on account of other fiscal 
burdens (OCA) to total taxable undistributed profits of limited 
liability companies. Before addition we weight this ratio by one minus 
the published rate to reflect the practice, expressly stipulated in law 
and only changed in the last year of our sample, of deducting 
contributions to the farmers' social insurance organization and other 
burdens before applying the published rate, i.e. we wish to construct an
Data source: National Statistical Service of Greece: Statistical
data on the declared income of legal entities and its taxation 
during the fiscal year ... (issues 1958-1985), The series for the 
tax rate was compiled from the Introduction to each issue while all 
other series (investment allowances, profits etc.) were compiled 
from Table 1.
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effective corporate tax rate t , while r' is the published series and Y 
undistributed profits such that:
t .Y = T ' . [Y - OGA] + OCA
=» t =  t ' + (1 - t ') .OGA/Y
There are a few elements of imprecision in this estimate. First,
for some time, industrial and mining companies with share capital traded 
in the Athens Stock Exchange have only been subject to a lower tax rate
(by 5 percentage points in 1985). Factors (information and incentive
problems) mostly associated with family ownership are typically invoked 
(Maniatis 1971; Molho 1986b)to explain the poor development of this 
capital market. Thus our series for the tax rate is not simply that on
minor firms discouraged by the indivisibilities in the costs of share
issues and other requirements. Secondly within the general framework 
of fiscal incentives companies in receipt of investment grants (and 
earlier under some other conditions) (e.g. Provopoulos 1983, p.109) 




Over the period 1955-1985 ten decrees (see Dryllerakis 1979; Totsis 
1984) were enacted granting investment allowances in the following 
form: In general they allowed a percentage of corporate expenditures on
investment goods (structures and/or equipment) to be deducted from 




Corporate tax rates 












1959 0.35 0.01 36%
1960 0.35 0.01 36%
1961 0.35 0.01 36%
1962 0.35 0.06 39%
1963 0.35 0.07 40%
1964 0.35 0.07 40%
1965 0.35 0.06 39%
1966 0.35 0.06 39%
1967 0.35 0.07 40%
1968 0.35 0.07 40%
1969 0.35 0.07 40%
1970 0.35 0.07 40%
1971 0.35 0.07 40%
1972 0.35 0.07 40%
1973 0.35 0.06 39%
1974 0.35 0.05 38%
1975 0.40 0.07 44%
1976 0.40 0.07 44%
1977 0.40 0.07 44%
1978 0.40 0.07 44%
1979 0.40 0.07 44%
1980 0.40 0.07 44%
1981 0.40 0.08 45%
1982 0.45 0.09 50%
1983 0.45 0.09 50%
1984 0.45 0.07 49%
1985 0.45 0.02 46%
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Half of the decrees stipulated that the deduction in each period 
could not exceed a specified percentage of undistributed profits in this 
same period. Importantly all the decrees (with one exception) 
specified that in case the allowable deduction exceeded the maximum 
specified percentage of undistributed profits in the year that the 
purchases of investment goods were made, then the residual could be 
carried forward and deducted from undistributed profits in subsequent 
years.
Most of these decrees did not set a unique percentage for the rate 
of investment allowance, but rather prescribed a scale. Thus the 
applicable rate would vary quite substantially mainly according to the 
region where the firm was located and/or the investment would take place 
and also according to the sector (say whether manufacturing mining or 
tourism) in which the investing firm operated. Further in two out of 
the ten decrees the periods over which investment qualified for the 
allowance granted and/or the horizon over which any residual deductions 
could continue being brought forward, also differed on the basis of 
regional considerations.
For an example consider the provisions of 1078/71 (i.e. decree 
no.1078 of 1971) in no way the most complicated of the decrees. This 
concerned 'industrial', 'handicraft' and 'mining' companies.
Qualifying firms located in 'region B ' could deduct 50% of expenditures 
on plant and equipment they incurred over the period 1973-1977 from 
their total taxable profits minus the compulsory minimum amount to be 
distributed as dividends. The rate of investment allowance for firms 
located in 'region C  and mining companies (irrespective of location)
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was 100% of the investment expenditures undertaken up to 1982. Similar 
allowances were offered to firms located in 'region A' on account of 
investment in 'regions B or C . These deductions could be carried 
forward until 1982 for firms in 'region B', while the deadline was 
extended to 1987 for firms in 'region C  and mining companies.
4.3.1
Effective rates of investment allowance in the literature
Computation of the user cost by making use of an effective rate of
investment allowances (distinct from the corresponding statutory 
percentages) is common practice in the literature. At the very least 
statutory percentages are weighted by the ratio of the volume of the 
respective eligible type of investment to total investment and added 
up. (Agarwala and Goodson 1969; Malcomson 1982). Others set, as 
Mackrell, Frisch and Roope (1971, p.11) put it, the effective rate equal 
to the "proportion of total ... investment expenditure [actually] 
claimed by taxable companies as a deduction under the investment 
allowance scheme". We adopt such a procedure and provide arguments
similar to those given by Bischoff (1971a) and restated by Chirinko
(1986, p.142) to justify a discrepancy (of a much smaller size though) 
between the computed and the statutory rates for the slightly different 
incentive scheme of the 'investment tax credit'. These are 
restrictions on the applicability to certain kinds of investment, 
differentiation of the allowable percentages by beneficiary and 
confinement of the amount of credit taken in any one year to a fraction 
of the total corporate tax liability. Relating to our discussion below 
we read (Bischoff 1971a, p.88) about the latter that "because of
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carry-back and carry-forward provisions, it seems likely that most of 
this credit could eventually be claimed, although the delay would make 
the present value of a dollar's credit amount to less than a dollar 
it is very hard to derive an expression to introduce correctly the 
portion of the tentative credit not immediately claimed".
4.3.2
The computation of a series for the economywide effective 
rate of investment allowance
In view of the somewhat limited applicability of the decrees (by 
region and by sector) compared to the coverage of our series for total 
private gross investment (with or without expenditures on residential 
buildings), and also because of the practice followed not to specify a 
unique percentage but rather a scale, we decided to compute an economy 
wide effective rate for the investment allowance as follows :
For each decree we had a series for the amount of investment 
allowances claimed in toto by all the qualifying domestic limited 
liability companies. We started with 3213/55 since this did not allow 
carrying forward of the deductions ; we worked out the ratio of the total 
investment allowances claimed by virtue of 3213/55 in every year t to 
nominal private gross investment (with and without residential 
buildings) in the same year t. For each of the two investment series 
considered we computed the average value of this ratio over the period 
1959-1970 during which the decree allowed deductions against purchases 
of investment goods. We took this average value as the effective rate 
of investment allowance granted by 3213/55 in each and every year 
between 1959 and 1970 inclusive.
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A different procedure was followed for all other decrees which 
entitled the firms to 'carrying forward'. Consider 1078/71 for 
illustration. First we worked out the real value of total deductions 
by virtue of this decree in every year t in terms of private investment 
goods prices (base 1970). Then we summed these real amounts over all 
the years that deductions were allowed by 1078/71 at least for some 
class of beneficiaries (i.e. 1973-1985). Subsequently we summed all the 
observations on total real private gross investment over all the years 
that purchases of investment goods (by at least some type of 
beneficiary) qualified for the investment allowances of 1078/71 (i.e. 
1973-1982). This latter period is shorter than the period over which 
deductions were allowed because of the right to carry the latter forward.
Then we considered the ratio of the sum of the real amounts claimed 
as investment allowance to the sum of total real private gross 
investment as the effective rate of investment allowance granted by 
1078/71 in every year of its duration (1973-1982). These calculations 
were repeated with real private gross investment excluding residential 
buildings and the corresponding deflator.
To reach a figure for the total economywide effective rate of 
investment allowance in year t as a result of the combined benefits from 
all the various decrees in operation in year t we added together the 
effective rates attributed to each one of the decrees separately, 
computed as above. E.g. in 1982 we had 0.013 (0.021) by virtue of 
1078/71, 0.001 (0.001) by virtue of 289/76, 0.009 (0.014) by virtue of 
849/78, 0.003 (0.005) by virtue of 1116/81 and 0.003 (0.003) by virtue 
of 1262/82 thus a total effective rate of investment allowance equal to
198
Table 4.3
Computed effective rate of investment allowances 
by decree for total private Investment
3213/55 4002/59 147/67 1078/71 1313/72 331/74 289/76 849/78 1116/81 1262/82 TOTAL
5 .002 0.002
3 . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
I . 0 0 2  . 012 0 . 014
I . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
3 . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
4 . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
5 . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
6 . 0 0 2  .012 0.014
7 . 0 0 2  .012 .05 0.064
8 . 0 0 2  .012 .05 0.064
9 . 0 0 2  .012 .05 0.064
0 . 0 0 2  .012 .05 0.064
1 .05 0.05
2 .05 0.05
!73 .013 .002 0.015
1174 .013 .002 .011 0.026
Iî75 .013 .002 .011 0.026
Ü78 .013 .002 0.015
1)77 .013 .002 .001 0.016
378 .013 .001 0.014
1179 .013 .001 0.014
1180 .013 .001 0.014
1181 .013 .001 .009 .003 0.026
B82 .013 .001 .009 .003 .003 0.029
1383' .001 .003 .003 0.007
1184 .001 .003 .003 0.007
1185 ; .001 .003 .003 0.007
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Table 4.4
Computed effective rate of investment allowances, by decree for
3213/55 4002/59 147/67 1078/71 1313/72 331/74 289/76 849/78 1116/81 1262/82 TOTAL
1 ,004 0.004
1 .004 .032 0.036
m .004 .032 0.036
12 .004 .032 0.036
%3 .004 .032 0.036
m .004 .032 0.036
15 .004 .032 0.036
M .004 .032 0.036
;î5] .004 .032 .087 0.123
1 .004 .032 .087 0.123
1 .004 .032 .087 0.123
















]I5 .021 .003 0.024
W .021 .003 .001 0.025
1!I8 .021 .001 0.022
«]? .021 .001 0.022
310 .021 .001 0.022
311 .021 .001 .014 .005 0.041
312 .021 .001 .014 .005 .003 0.044
13 .001 .005 .003 0.009
•H .001 .005 .003 0.009
15 .001 .005 .003 0.009
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about 3% (4%), (The figures in parentheses relate to the investment 
aggregate excluding expenditures on residential buildings).
Although our computations involve some arbitrariness (since they do 
not clarify precisely what part of the deductions recorded for t is 
carried forward on account of investment in t-j and which part is 
against investment in t) the resulting series reflects clearly the 
introduction of new investment allowances and the termination of others 
by the succession of decrees.
4.3.3
Comments on our series for the total effective rate of investment 
allowance 3
None of the computed rates for the total effective investment 
allowance comes anywhere near even the most stringent points in the 
percentage scales stipulated in the various decrees.
(i) Regional considerations: In part this must be explicable to the
extent that at least some of the decrees provided incentives for 
investment in a few specific underprivileged regions, which would not 
and it seems in fact did not attract industries even after government 
intervention. Indeed for three out of the four decrees in question the 
computed effective rate of investment allowance is below the median 
value for all decrees. In all decrees, apart from one, the most 
generous percentages applied to investment in the apparently less
3 . These comments may be read as tentative evidence against the 
aggregate importance of such incentives
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attractive regions. In the absence of any breakdown of the investment 
series by the (not quite invariable) regional classification employed in 
the decrees we cannot assess precisely the importance of this 
consideration.
(ii) Sectoral considerations: In part we can account for the shortfall
by the explicit limitations on the types of investment and industry 
qualifying for the investment allowances. A large fraction of 
investment expenditures on residential buildings 
(dwellings) was not eligible. Yet over our sample period such 
expenditures were on the average no less than 40% of total private 
investment (1970 prices). Hence we calculated effective rates by 
dividing allowances by private investment excluding residential 
buildings (transformations thereof), We note that this narrower 
investment series includes expenditures on non residential buildings and 
other structures as well as on producers' durables (vehicles, machinery 
and other equipment): in the vast majority of the decrees, eligible
firms were entitled to investment allowances against (legal definitions 
of) almost all these types of investment. Not surprisingly, the total 
effective rates computed without including expenditures on residential 
buildings are on the average twice the values for total private 
investment. Even so the effective rates of investment allowance for 
this narrower investment series still do not come reasonably close to 
the statutory rates.
According to the classification of The Greek Economy (published by 
the Bank of Greece 1982) the ratio of real private gross fixed capital 
formation in the sectors of manufacturing, mining etc. (minor
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importance) and electricity etc. (minor importance) to the total for 
real private gross fixed investment excluding residential buildings (all 
in 1970 prices), averages to 35% over the period 1958-1978. If 
agriculture (parts of which were occassional beneficiaries of the 
decrees) is included the average rises substantially to 52%. Since it 
was these sectors (tourism also) which were invariably offered 
investment allowances their moderate relative importance in private 
investment (even excluding residential buildings) should help to explain 
the small computed effective rates of investment allowance. By 
contrast the same ratio for the sector 'Other activities', which by 
necessity includes private provision of all sorts of services but 
expressly excludes the construction of residential buildings and is 
separate from the other major sector of transport, etc., averages to 
28%. In all probability services (and perhaps large parts of transport 
etc.) were generally not eligible for any of the investment allowances.
(iii) Deficient profits: Also it could be that, at least for the
recent past, aggregate profits, especially in manufacturing industry, 
were meagre and thus probably insufficient for the full amount of the 
various tax savings justified by the investment undertaken to be set off 
against, even if the allowable deductions could be carried forward.
This problem would be compounded by the provisions in half of all the 
decrees enacted that the investment allowance deductions could not 
exceed a percentage of undistributed profits in each period. The 
temporary lack of profits would only be a minor obstacle to companies 
intending to undertake investment. A high fraction of the investment 
expenditures (of those firms not rationed out) could be financed by bank 
loans. A further possibility could be that even if true profits would
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justify vigorous investment, declared figures against which tax 
deductions could be claimed would be understated. The prevalence of 
low profitability, extreme dependence on bank finance and the presence 
of tax evasion in the Greek economy are discussed at some length in say 
the two most recent OECD Surveys (OECD 1986, 1987), Pavlopoulos (1987) 
etc,
On my own calculations the average value of the ratio of the total 
investment allowances claimed in period t to the aggregate undistributed 
profits of all limited liability companies (i.e. potential claimants) in 
t, over the period 1959-1985, came to 57%. A sizeable standard 
deviation of 44 percentage points could be reflecting the succession of 
different provisions for the allowable maximum percentage of profits 
that may not be exceeded by the deduction (together with cyclical 
factors and shifts in distribution policies).
Consider an illustration of these points in connection with 3213/55 
which provided for investment allowances to 'provincial industries'. 
Since it did not allow 'carrying forward', our computations avoid the 
arbitrary summation of investment to divide an arbitrary sum of 
deductions and there is no question of the benefits being eroded by 
inflation. Although the decree provided for a 100% deduction, (but 
only up to 40% of taxable corporate profits), the effective rate we 
computed is 0.2% (0.4% excluding residential buildings) which is an 
average over time with a standard deviation of one fourth (one sixth) of 
the mean.
(iv) Inflation: High rates of inflation can also be blamed to some
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extent for the diminutive size of the computed effective rate of 
investment allowance compared to the legally stipulated percentages. 
Since the benefits to the firm from these decrees were fixed in nominal 
value to equal a percentage of the nominal investment expenditures 
undertaken at some point in time, it follows that their real value 
declined quite steeply the later the deduction from undistributed 
profits was to materialise. Nevertheless firms clearly were compelled 
by circumstances (possible temporary deficiency of profits, combined 
with the stipulation of a maximum percentage of their undistributed part 
not to be exceeded by the deduction in each period) to carry the 
deduction forward.
For example 4002/59 (which did not have a limited regional coverage) 
granted investment allowances to the tune of at least 50% of investment 
expenditures, but not exceeding 50% of in fact total taxable profits for 
each year until 1970. It transpires that companies continued to make 
deductions at least up to 1985! Making the extreme assumption that the 
sum of the deductions actually recorded between 1970 and 1985 was 
claimed against investment expenditures in 1970, then we may calculate 
that the investment allowance from 4002/59 amounted to about 20% of 
total private investment in 1970, which is close to 32% of private 
investment excluding residential buildings and about 90% of private 
investment in manufacturing, mining and electricity etc. out of which 
latter aggregate perhaps the majority of expenditures would qualify for 
the credit. Since effectively the companies were not given the right 
to make the deductions in 1970 but rather suppose in 1985, the real 
value of the benefit from the tax allowance seen from the point of view 
of a firm which has to pay 1985 prices for its investment goods must
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have been diminished by no less than ten times. Abstracting from the 
interest foregone on these funds and any other intertemporal 
considerations over the interval 1970-85, this amounted to the right to 
claim a tax allowance of no more than 2% of total private investment in 
1970 (3.2% excluding residential buildings). In fact our computations 
above, which are essentially a procedure for discounting by the rate of 
inflation, lead to a figure of 1.2% for the effective rate of investment 
allowance from 4002/59 (3.2%! if we exclude residential buildings) for 
the period 1960-1970.
Although companies were offered generous deductible percentages by 
the decrees, they probably reckoned in terms of much more stringent 
effective rates of investment allowance: they must have realized that
by the time when they would have been able to make the corresponding 
deduction the real value of benefits granted would have been much 
eroded. This is the sort of behaviour that our computation above 
attempts to simulate.
(v) Other influences : On the other hand the use of a series for the tax
credit claimed by all domestic ltd. liability companies is likely to 
lead to some overstatement of the investment allowances offered to 
private investing firms, since it includes the amounts deducted by ltd. 
liability companies in the public sector not all of which were 
indiscriminately excluded in all decrees (the omission of cooperatives 
and foreign corporations is comparatively minor).
Consider the two most recent decrees, introduced less than five 
years before the end of our sample period: First firms may have opted
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for the comprehensive investment grants and thus would be excluded from 
investment allowances. In the absence of data on accruals of grants we 
cannot assess the extent of this, still provisions were such that the 
former option must have entailed greater bureaucratic costs. Second, 
the problems with 'carrying forward' are likely to be more acute, i.e. 
the available observations on the investment allowances claimed must be 
much less than what will eventually be deducted against investment in 
the period to 1985.
Third the usual lags in the investment process mean that although 
investment decisions might have responded immediately to the 
announcement of a new package of fiscal incentives, fulfillment of 
orders and thus investment expenditures against which investment 
allowances could be claimed would come forward only after a delay. On 
top of this standard lag there is the argument (expressed in connection 
with the sluggish switching from initial to investment allowances) that 
firms fail to take advantage of beneficial policy measures 
instantaneously. However, it is unlikely that this argument is 
relevant in our case given the simplicity of the calculations still 
maybe not of the applications required in order to qualify for the 
investment allowances etc.
A rough indication, supporting our analysis, is that for the 
measures of the past two decades the real values of the recorded 
deductions reach their first local peak on the average three years after 
the investment allowance comes into operation while the global peak was 
attained on the average after three further years. It should not be 
surprising then that for the latest two decrees the available short
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series gives only the depressed first few observations for the 
investment allowance thus yielding particularly low effective rates.
Of course, the fewer the expenditures incurred the less the allowances 
that can be claimed and therefore their ratio ought to remain 
constant. However because much of investment is not eligible, an 
increase in the eligible part of investment inducing an 
equiproportionate rise in the deductions increases the ratio of the 
latter to total investment. This complication is avoided in the 
computation of effective rates for the other decrees since investment 
allowances are added together over an extended period of time.
Section 4.4 
Other Fiscal Incentives
Investment grants: Various investment grants were prescribed by law on
four occasions and subsidised investment continuously since 1972. They 
consisted of a tax free grant usually deductible from the depreciable 
base. This covered a percentage of the expenditures of the firm on 
structures in the first two decrees, plus other investment expenditures 
as well in the two more recent decrees in question. This percentage 
varied with the location of the investment and the type of industry to 
which the investing firm belonged; its level changed somewhat from 
decree to decree. In fact all these decrees, apart from the most 
recent, had a limited regional scope.
There does not seem to exist any widely circulating sufficiently 
fine disaggregation of the entries in the government budget to reveal
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the total amounts paid out in this particular form of subsidy. As a 
consequence calculation of effective economy wide rates of investment 
grants was not feasible. Given the limited regional coverage of at 
least three out of the four policy measures concerned and the 
confinement of the two earlier ones to non residential structures, 
subsuming the effect of investment grants under the residual of our 
equations is in order. The alternative of a dummy for the most recent 
decree would be a burden on our degrees of freedom and almost certain to 
pick up the particularly severe investment recession of the eighties.
Depreciation for tax purposes: Most recently in 1973, the allowable
annual percentage rates of depreciation for tax purposes and for the 
constant depreciation method (straight line formula) were specified in 
Greek law. These varied from 2-8% (12% in exceptional cases) for non 
residential structures and 10-20% (up to 35% in special circumstances) 
for equipment. We adopted the median rates of 5% for nonresidential 
buildings and 15% for equipment. Subsequently we weighted these 
percentages by the sample average value of the ratio of real private 
gross investment in nonresidential buildings (20%) and of real private 
gross investment in producers' durables (40%) to total real private 
gross investment respectively. Thus we calculated an economywide 
annual percentage rate of depreciation for tax purposes equal to 7% 
which we assume reflects the tax depreciation practices over our whole 
sample period. We repeated this calculation for the series of 
investment excluding residential buildings with weights reflecting the 
ratio of real private gross expenditures on producers' durables to real 
private gross investment excluding residential buildings (67%). Then 
the economy wide annual rate of tax depreciation comes out to be equal
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to 12%. These calculations are very close to Agarwala and Goodson 
(1969, pp.381-382), who however consider vehicles as a separate category 
as well.
Reduction in the lifetimes of new investment goods allowable for tax 
purposes: Reductions in the lifetimes allowable for tax purposes were
offered for new investment goods in many occasions over our sample 
period. Since the beginning of the seventies such reductions, by means 
of proportionate increases in the allowable rates of tax depreciation to 
be applied to most newly acquired fixed assets, were authorised by law 
four times. As with the investment allowances and grants, the benefits 
were targetted to certain broad sectors and varied according to the 
region where the firm and/or the fixed assets were located and the 
intensity of their use, in terms of the number of daily shifts of 
workers involved in the productive process.
We found no published or otherwise readily available data on the 
amounts by which accruals of depreciation allowances increased on the 
aggregate as a result of these measures. Nor did we have any detailed 
information on their likely coverage, other than that the criteria for 
eligibility were similar to those for investment allowances over the 
period with the additional complication of the number of shifts. If 
the provisions in the latest four decrees are compared, it turns out 
that reductions of tax lifetimes have been offered to more or less the 
same beneficiaries continuously since 1973. The first three of them 
specified roughly the same scale of proportionate increases while the 
last one was somewhat less generous in the percentages but relaxed
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eligibility requirements. In general a 20-25% increase in tax 
depreciation rates was offered to firms in the prosperous 'region A' 
employing at least two shifts of workers and the scale went up to 
150-200% for firms operating in 'region C  with three shifts. It is 
more difficult to assess the position with these incentives before the 
seventies, and the impression one gets (cf. KEPE 1967) is that mostly 
less generous increases were offered, usually on the basis of a less 
fine regional classification, and seldom across the board. Overall it 
may be quite plausible to conclude that the succession of measures 
ensured the depreciation rate for tax purposes was kept somewhat over 
the basic levels given above. Anyway our experience with the slight 
economywide importance of investment allowances suggests that the 
situation with the increases in tax depreciation rates cannot be much 
different given that the limitations on eligibility are most probably 
stricter (shifts etc.) in the latter case.
Still we decided to hazard a guess and thus postulated that the 
economywide rate of tax depreciation for new private investment went up 
by a factor of 10% to something less than 8% as a result of the string 
of measures continuously on offer since 1973. Concentrating our 
attention in the post 1973 period enables us to capture the effect of 
investment grants, as well, in the assumed reduction in the user cost.
It turned out that this hardly changed the values and significance of 
the coefficients and other statistics in our equations; in view of the 
arbitrariness involved we decided not to pursue the exercise any further
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Section 4.5
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
The following are products of Chapter 4:
i) a survey of the literature on the appropriate expression for the
user cost under taxation. In particular, we examine the issue of 
which tax rate and which discount rate are to be introduced in the 
user cost, what are the assumptions behind the expression employed 
for the latter, and how the present discounted value of the tax 
savings consequent upon one Drachma of investment is to be worked 
out. We also discuss the possibility of breaking up the user cost 
into many separate regressors, the importance of anticipations of 
future tax changes, the possibility of general equilibrium, regional 
reallocation and cash flow effects on investment due to tax changes 
and the practice with the computation of effective rates for 
investment allowances.
ii) a survey of the numerous provisions of Greek law as to the taxation
of corporations and about the various incentives to new investment
(investment allowances, tax depreciation allowances, grants, 
reductions in the lifetimes allowable for tax purposes) over the 
period 1959-1985.
iii)the computation of the effective tax rate on Greek limited liability 
companies, taking into account other fiscal burdens imposed apart 
from the taxation of undistributed profits (but neglecting certain 
tax reductions).
iv) the computation of an effective rate for each investment allowance 
in operation over the period 1959-1985, taking into account the
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detailed stipulations of the relevant fiscal decrees,
v) the computation of a figure for the economywide rate of depreciation 
for tax purposes and a series for the present discounted value of 
tax depreciation allowances over the period 1959-1985.
Thus a series for the present discounted value of total tax savings 
consequent upon one Drachma of investment, hence a series for the user 
cost under taxation, were constructed. Computations were repeated for 
private gross investment excluding expenditures on residential buildings.
The main conclusion of Chapter 4 is that the effective rate of 
investment allowance comes out to be very low, even when the separate 
effects of all fiscal decrees in operation at any moment of time are 
added up. Consequently, any intentions of the policymakers to provide 
investment incentives of economywide importance rather than of a 
regionally or sectorally limited scope, were frustrated. From a 
practical point of view we have demonstrated that one may proceed in the 
estimation of an investment function for Greece, ignoring investment 
allowances altogether. Explanations for the low effective rate of 
investment allowances (contrasting to the generous statutory 
percentages) are a) the exclusion of the service industries from the 
benefits of these allowances and b) the erosion of the value of the 
investment allowances, which could not be claimed at once due to 
insufficiency of profits, by inflation. Possible suggestions for 
improvement in this respect are the indexation of the allowances and the 
abolition of limitations on the proportion of profits against which 
allowances can be claimed.
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There is scope for further refinements in the computation of the 
series for the user cost under taxation. In particular, we neglected 
the following types of incentive, operative over our sample period, due 
to lack of data: increases in the allowable depreciation rates for tax
purposes, specification of favourable terms for credit to new 
investment, investment grants. Data on the payments of grants should 
be obtainable from a sufficiently fine disaggregation of the entries in 
the government budget. Similarly, a disaggregation of total loans 
would give the fraction contracted at preferential terms. Anyway a 
precise calculation of the effective rate of investment allowance 
requires further research. In particular, we need to be able to split 
the published figure for the total amount claimed as investment 
allowances in year t into a) accruals on account of purchases of 
investment goods in the same year t b) the amount carried forward to be 
claimed on account of investment expenditures in previous years. It is 
possible, that such data may not be available on an aggregate, but only 
on a sample basis (e.g. Manassakis 1982, conducts a study of investment 
in a panel of Greek firms).
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CHAPTER 5





In Chapter 5, we estimate the investment function, in Greece, over 
the period 1958-1985. We try various models of investment, various 
definitions for the dependent and independent variables and run the 
equations by two stage least squares as well as ordinary least squares.
In Section 5.2, we discuss the methodology and the tests used to 
select the equations which are reported. In Section 5.3, we analyse 
the features shared by almost all the reported equations. We discuss 
the magnitude, sign and significance of the coefficient on credit 
availability. We provide explanations for the appearance of lagged, 
rather than contemporaneous, credit availability and discuss the 
implications of this feature for policy. We also interpret the 
occasional appearance of two significant lags of credit availability, 
which sometimes bear alternating signs, and discuss its implications 
for policy. We comment on the comparative performance of the measure 
which deducts debt service payments from new loans. We relate these 
observations to the theoretical literature on financial repression and, 
in particular, to the issue whether the prospect of an increase in the 
burden of interest payments on firms should dissuade from financial 
liberalization.
Subsequently we discuss a puzzling feature of our results i.e. the 
appearance of a positive sign on the user cost. This seems to be 
robust across specification changes, different variable definitions and
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estimation techniques. We relate this finding to the impact of 
interest rate reform, and/or inflation in the presence of rigidities in
the banking system, on the growth rate of the economy. We examine a
number of factors which ensure that the user cost still proxies for the 
availability of finance even if a measure of real loans is included in 
the investment equation. The possibilities which we discuss include: 
deficiencies in our measure of credit availability; the influence of 
retained profits and the McKinnon effect on self financed investment; 
crowding in. We consider also the kinds of mispecification that may 
be responsible for the (puzzling) sign on the user cost. These 
include simultaneity bias and the misrepresentation of expectations.
Having placed our findings in the context of the financial
repression literature, we turn to discuss the specific features of the
reported equations from the perspective of the literature on investment 
functions. In Section 5.4, we comment on the comparative performance 
of the accelerator specifications and the specifications employing lags 
of Jorgenson's composite as regressors. We note the effect of the 
adjustment of the user cost for fiscal parameters as well as the effect 
of deflation by an index of nominal wages. In the final subsection of 
Section 5.4, we describe the lag profiles encountered in the reported 
equations and attempt to relate their features to the putty-clay 
debate. We also attempt to justify the sign on the lagged capital 
stock.
In Section 5.5 we try private investment excluding residential 
buildings as dependent variable. We expect that the exclusion of this
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component of investment, which is governed by the housing decisions of 
individuals rather than the behaviour of firms, must lead to 
substantially different results. We examine the differences in 
connection with: the sign on the user cost (and on the contemporaneous
value of credit availability in some equations); the distributed lags 
on the determinants of investment; the statistical performance of each 
equation as a whole. In Section 5.6, we re-estimate the reported 
equations, with total private investment as the regressand, by two 
stage least squares. We check whether our observations in Chapter 5 
are robust to this change of estimation technique. A complete 
macroeconomic system of simultaneous equations is put forward in order 





Regressions corresponding to each of the four basic models, as 
derived in Chapter 3, (three of which involve gross private investment 
while the remaining one has net private investment as its dependent 
variable) were run with a variety of independent variables:
1. The 'composite' of Jorgenson J = P.Y/c.
1. The tax rate can be omitted from C, if capital expenditures are 
fully deductible, or if tax depreciation equals the economic rate 
s - q/q (assuming deductibility of interest). In practice such 
runs without tax parameters (cf. King 1972; Malcomson 1982, p.233) 
are undertaken preliminarily to full fledged estimation of the 
investment function.
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2. Real income Y and real user cost C = [r+s-q/q]’ separately.
3. Real income Y and nominal user cost divided by an index of nominal 
wages S = q.[r+s-q/q]/w (cf. McLaren 1971; Sundararajan and Thakur
1980).
4. The aforementioned variables appropriately adjusted for corporate 
taxation and fiscal incentives, as discussed and derived in Chapter 
4, and adopting also a slightly more precise deflation for the 
real user cost C = q .(1-A).[(1-t ).r+s-q/q]/p.(l-r).
5. Two different credit variables L and LG, the latter of which
subtracts (cf. Currie and Anyadike-Danes 1980) from the real flow
of new credit (L) a rough measure of real interest payments on past 
loans.
6. In addition we have fitted pure accelerator (clay-clay or fixed 
proportions) variants for each of the four models, that is, in each 
case we excluded user cost variables from the matrix of regressors, 
(cf. the preambles of Bean 1981 and Schiantarelli 1983), In other 
words a specification search was, at least initiated, for no less 
than 56 distinct equations, in toto. These equations are all 
reported in Appendix L to this Chapter.
We selected the reported equations by a procedure similar with the
'general to specific' methodology associated with Hendry. It is
somewhat aberrant that we start off with crystallized p a r a m e t r i z a t i o n s ?
The alarm is perhaps false. In an experiment with the reported 
equations descending from the Hall-Jorgenson model and L as the 
credit measure, not one was rejected against an unrestricted broad 
equation containing 5 lags of the level of income, 5 lags of the 
level of the user cost, 5 lags of the credit variable, a constant 
and lagged net investment. More particularly equation 1 gave 
F(7,ll) = 1.86 (against a corresponding general pure accelerator 
formulation) equation 2 gave F(9,6) = 1.39, equation 4 gave 
F(9,6) = 0.84, equation 6 gave F(9,4) = 1.27, equation 7 gave 
F(9,4) = 1.04.
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(e.g. enter variables as weighted differences DY^ = - (1-s) .Y^ -_]^ )
rather than beginning say with (log) levels and modifying the 
parametrization at each step in the sequence (Anderson 1981; Bean 1981; 
Schiantarelli 1983). Such manipulation of the parametrization may also 
help to achieve reductions in multicollinearity (Gilbert 1986). Still 
what we do is consonant with what, for example, Poterba and Summers 
(1983) view as their implementation of Hendry's approach; besides 
differencing economizes on the coefficients to be estimated and yields 
"separate decision variables with sensible economic interpretation"
(cf. Hendry and Mizon 1978). At any rate it is our wish at this stage 
to run on Greek data four distinct models of investment chosen from or 
adapted for the financial repression literature. Of course such 
products of theoretical deduction seem drastic abstractions compared to 
(empirical) reality. Hence we intend the present as an investigation 
preliminary to an encompassing comparison with a completely data 
derived parametrization being compared too.3
We do not commit the logistic blunders of the specific to general 
progress. For each of the aforementioned models and with each of the 
possible combinations of independent variables, we set out a 'broad' 
overfitting equation to stand as our starting point and general 
maintained hypothesis, with reference to which testing is to be carried 
out. The broad equation cannot be too inadequate an approximate 
characterization of the underlying data generation process since we 
insist that it be free from residual autocorrelation at least at 5% 
otherwise do not proceed to simplify etc. (see 5.2.2).
3. Cf. Feldstein (1982) advocating a 'pluralist' approach to the study 
of investment to accommodate the notorious divergence among the 




Residual autocorrelation and parameter stability statistics
Hendry’s approach is particularly concerned with diagnosing any 
autocorrelation in the residual of the equation which provides the 
starting point of the specification search. This is partly because 
residual autocorrelation may be a general sign of mispecification i.e. 
"ignored simultaneity, omitted variables, measurement errors and 
incorrect functional form as well as dynamic-stochastic specification 
mistakes" (Hendry 1979, p.220), rather than of a non-white noise 
underlying error. (The common factor analysis was devised to clarify 
the matter in some circumstances). More specifically this concern is 
also justified because the conventional covariance matrix from ordinary 
least squares under residual autocorrelation, t-statistics,
F-statistics (e.g. Chow tests) etc. are all wrong. Hence inference, 
inspiring perhaps subsequent simplification or adoption of the equation 
as the preferred end product, is misled. In fact with regressors only 
weakly exogenous, coefficient estimates are not simply biased in small 
samples but also inconsistent (Johnston 1984, p.363).
As our main indicator of residual autocorrelation we adopt the 
first order LM test against (remarkably) both AR(1) or MA(1) error 
distributed as %2(1) and computed as ’TR?’ by TSP. Breusch and 
Godfrey (1981) quote evidence of satisfactory finite sample properties 
for this asymptotic test which is also approximately correct when no 
intercept is included in the regression (Harvey 1981, p.172). All the 
reported equations pass this test. Few of the underlying broad 
equations manage only to pass comfortably its F version (as given in
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TSP), which however is widely believed to be a better finite sample 
approximation (Kiviet 1986). The alternative Durbin-Watson bounds 
test (exact) is also reported. Consultation of the Savin White (1977) 
and the Farebrother (1980) tables (appropriate when there is no 
intercept), as required with many regressors, reveals that in most 
cases the statistic lies in the inconclusive range. The common 
recommendation (cf. Johnston 1984, p.316) to trust the upper bound for 
econometrics does not quite apply, at least in the case of the 
Hall-Jorgenson model, since (cf. Harvey 1981, p.201) in this case the 
regressors are first differences and anyway the statistic is typically 
much farther away from its lower limit. When presence of the once 
lagged dependent variable invalidates the Durbin-Watson test we report 
Durbin's (1970) 'h* (asymptotic test). We are not excessively worried 
by the rejections it occasionally indicates, given unfavourable 
evidence as to its small sample performance (Spencer 1975).
The practice in the investment literature is, at least, to start 
with very long maximal lag lengths going from around 2^ years (Bean 
1981; Schiantarelli 1983) to about 4 (Artus et al. 1981; Bergstrom and 
Sodersten 1984; Mackrell, Frisch and Roope 1971) or even 5 years (Hall 
and Jorgenson 1971) in the past. Thus although we face a tight 
constraint from the availability of observations, typically our broad 
equations are unrestricted distributed lags involving three or four 
annual lags of each regressor (difference). In addition we include 
the once lagged dependent variable or capital stock whenever 
appropriate, higher order lags of which never proved significant in 
trial runs. As may be expected, comprehensive quarterly national 
accounts series are not available for Greece (e.g. the OECD Quarterly
222
National Accounts give no quarterly disaggregation of investment into 
private and public components). Because our regressors are few by the 
standards of quarterly studies, we have avoided the arbitrary 
imposition of Almon polynomials, the pay-off to which, in terms of 
degrees of freedom savings and multicollinearity reduction, would have 
been low.
Those broad equations which passed the residual autocorrelation 
test, we proceed to specialize by sequential, data based, imposition of 
omission restrictions. In general we omit the most distant and/or 
least significant lags (cf. Anderson 1981 deleting regressors with 
t-statistics below unity). We often had to experiment (exhausting in 
fact all possible combinations of lags), since probably acute 
collinearity meant that variables which were insignificant in the broad 
equation would show up significantly in shorter versions and vice 
versa. In each case we reran the simplified equation to check whether 
omissions have induced residual autocorrelation. At this stage we may 
proceed to further omissions of any variables exhibiting significance 
at less than 10% until a parsimonious equation free from residual 
autocorrelation is reached.
Ultimately the criterion for selecting end-products to be reported 
among all those data coherent parsimonious equations corresponding to a 
given choice of model and combination of independent variables, is that 
of goodness of fit and plausibility of form. Goodness of fit we 
assess by means of (if an intercept is included), the standard error 
of the equation, t-statistics on individual coefficients etc. (without 
running the risk caricatured by Granger and Newbold since most of our
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regressors are differences or pairs of lags). Plausibility of form 
refers mainly to the smoothness and continuity of the lag profiles.
It never occured that in some equations coefficient signs were 
plausible but not in others (apart from the few cases where the 
coefficients on a subset of the credit lags were negative).
All the reported equations pass (at 5%) the Chow prediction test of 
parameter cum variance equality but some fail Hendry's (1979) 
asymptotically equivalent test. The latter is relied upon in 
Hendry's approach (consumption function, money demand equation) as the 
final arbiter of mispecification. The only approximate validity of 
the F distribution with stochastic (e.g. lagged dependent) regressors 
does not discourage frequent use of Chow tests as the sole indicator of 
parameter stability: (cf. Bean 1984 on the grounds that unlike the %%
they correct for the loss of degrees of freedom in estimation; and Bean
1981). More specifically Pesaran, Smith and Yeo (1985) quote 
(Kiviet's) Monte Carlo evidence on the poor small sample performance of 
Hendry's asymptotic test (overejects). Pesaran, Smith and Yeo 
(op.cit.) recommend the Chow prediction statistic instead, and this is 
also favoured in Harvey (1981, p.287) because it retains a size close 
to nominal even when classical regression assumptions do not hold.
Not only is (even conditional one-step) forecasting ability a 
pragmatic requirement and a natural antidote for data mining, but it is 
also diagnostic of general mispecification e.g. omitted variables. 
Indeed Pesaran, Smith and Yeo (1985) so interpret the Chow prediction 
statistic (when exceeding unity) while Rea (1978) notes that an 
insignificant value is necessary but not sufficient for parameter
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stability. This is reminiscent of the common observation that while 
stability tests may detect genuine structural breaks, they may not 
reveal mispecification if this does not occur in conjunction with 
shifts in the data generation processes of the variables in the true 
model.
We report the coefficient estimates over the whole sample (as 
recommended in Gilbert 1986, p.291; cf. also Anderson 1981) rather than 
post sample (Hendry 1979), and choose 1980 as the intermediate 
breakpoint. The second oil shock (Opec II) that preceded this year, 
was particularly severe for middle income countries (Bruno and Sachs 
1985, p.11) and marked the beginning of an unusually deep recession in 
Greece (OECD 1986, p.27). The choice of 1980 leaves also sufficient 
degrees of freedom in the estimation subperiod. We report the Chow 
prediction statistic and Hendry's test whenever reasonably valued.
Since our enquiry does not aim to come up with 'the' investment 
function, but rather to detect the role of credit availability in the 
latter within a financially repressed system, we do not report any end 
products which could not sustain significance of some lag of the credit 
variable at least at the 10% level. It is no surprise that, generally 
speaking, the significance of the credit variable(s) increases as poor 
determination due to multicollinearity (surely not wholly attributable 
to omission biases, cf. Davidson et al. 1978) is improved in the course 
of sequential simplification. Finally (as in Anderson 1981; Bean 
1981; Hendry 1979; Schiantarelli 1983) we compute the F test of the 
linear restrictions (vis a vis the 'broad') the joint imposition of 
which results in the reported equation. All our equations pass this
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test at 5%*^  hence are "F-acceptable" (Gilbert 1986, p.287).
Those few broad equations suffering from residual autocorrelation, 
we did not proceed to simplify (or increase the dimensionality of the 
parameter space to exhaust virtually all degrees of freedom). This is 
because residual autocorrelation may be indicative of general 
mispecification and also because of the complications in estimation it 
entails. E.g. even maximum likelihood under an AR(1) error seriously 
understates standard errors (Johnston 1984, p.327) while the common 
CORC also fails to yield unconditional standard errors thus blurring 
comparability with the main body of our equations estimated by ordinary 
least squares.
Section 5.3 




The reported investment equations are made up of significant lags 
of income (differenced or not) with the correct positive sign and of 
significant lags of the user cost (differenced or not, various
4. In fact most of the reported equations pass (unless if specifically 
indicated) both and F versions of the following diagnostics: 
Ramsey's 'Reset' test of functional form, Bera-Jarque's normality 
test and an LM test of heteroskedasticity. Cf. Loeb (1986) for 
a similar 'battery' of tests applied to investment functions and Uri 
(1982) for the extensive application of sophisticated (i.e. based 
on the recursive residuals) stability tests.
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definitions) with a perverse positive sign. In addition the equations 
typically show up a single significant positively signed lag of the 
flow of real credit and finally the lagged capital stock (negatively 
signed) or the lagged dependent variable (positively signed) may or may 
not be included.
A number of the series employed (capital consumption, net 
investment, net capital stock) were constructed on the basis of an 
assumed disaggregation of the published national accounts data between 
the private and the public sector. More particularly the estimation 
results (excluding the accelerator version of the Hall-Jorgenson model) 
are conditional on the figure for the rate of physical depreciation 
(which enters the user cost and weights lagged levels before 
differencing). The latter was computed in a separate r e g r e s s i o n . 5 
For convenience we repeat here the general form of the models fitted.
Hall-Jorgenson
Nit - a(L)[Yt-Yt_i] + /3(L)[Ct-Ct_i] + ?(L)CRt
Coen
It = a(L)[Yt - (l-s)Yt-i] + P(L)[Ct - (l-s)Ct_i]
+ 'y(L)[CRt - (l-s)CRt-i] + X It-1
5. The practice is established in the literature (cf. Sundararajan and 
Thakur 1980), while others such as Bischoff (1971a) employ totally 
extraneous estimates. Yet one also encounters the alternative of a 
grid search for this parameter (Bean 1981) presumably maximizing 
the fit of the investment regressions. Since we run a large number 
of regressions in the context of our sequential specialization 
procedure the latter method would have been impracticable.
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Blei er-Khan
It - a(L)[Yt - d-s)Yt_i] + g(L)[Ct - (l-s)Ct-i] 
+ 'y(L)CR^ + X 1^—1
Sundararai an-Thakur









real private net investment 
real private gross investment 
real income
real user cost (four alternative measures)
flow of real credit to private sector (two alternative
measures)
real private net capital stock 
rate of physical depreciation 
: lag polynomials.
Of all the reported equations those descending from the Hall-Jorgenson 
model reveal more clearly that long lags are involved in the investment 
process. Reported equations descending from other models are shorter, 
probably due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable (and less 
so the lagged capital stock), which proxies for influences on current 
investment from the past. All the reported equations descending from 
the Coen and the Blejer-Khan models pass Hendry's stability test at 5% 
while only few of the other reported equations manage to do so. This 
must be associated in part with the presence of lagged investment as a 
regressor in the former models.
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Investment (being a highly autocorrelated series) is satisfactorily 
predicted (one step ahead) by its past value. However inclusion of 
other variables as well in an ’econometric’ investment equation does 
shed extra light on behaviour (e.g. as suggested by their significant 
t-statistics) compared to a purely ’time series’ formulation. The 
following representation^ predicts adequately (as indicated by Z3 and 
Z4 ) but seems inferior to the econometric specifications in view of its 
substantially poorer standard error/within sample tracking ability.
It = 6.2 + 0.891t-i S = 6.21
(1.90*)(13.8**)
Zi(l) = 0.49 Z2(1,24) = 0.45 2^(5,20) - 0.77 2^(5) = 5.08
5.3.2
Credit availability and investment
The fundamental hypothesis (reflected also in the investment 
function of our theoretical macroeconomic model) i.e. that under 
financial repression the availability of credit in real terms is a 
crucial constraint on the determination of the volume of investment, is 
fully corroborated by the empirical results.
All the reported equations have been selected so as to show up 
significantly (at least at 1 0 %) and with the correct positive sign 
either of the measures of real credit availability adopted in this 
study^. In the majority of reported equations where L is the variable
6 . 1 has a continuously declining correlogram, still somewhat smoother
than exponential. We fit an AR(1) since higher order lags were not 
significant.
7. E.g. in the equations descending from the Hall-Jorgenson model, the 
t-statistics on the credit variable are between 5 and 10.
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included, it is its second lag (t-2) and in most cases where LC is our 
measure it is its first lag (t-1 ) or less commonly its third lag (t-3 ) 
which appears significantly. Similarly the second lag of the weighted 
difference of L or LC is significant in the reported equations 
descending from the Coen model of investment.
The coefficient on L, remarkably similar across different equations 
suggests that about 50% (25%® impact - 60% total multiplier) of the 
real value of new loans to the private sector is channelled into net 
(gross) private investment, after roughly a period of two years.9 
Could this confirm the common suspicion (Bitros 1981; Halikias 1978; 
Molho 1986b) that funds obtained preferentially from the banking system 
are diverted into unauthorized uses? Presumably, often, investment in 
residential buildings is one such use^O while we take it as common 
knowledge that there is little consumer credit in Greece.
Simultaneously one is led to question the view that reallocation of 
savings towards the public sector by means of reserve requirements on 
banks etc. is particularly damaging for total capital formation because
8 . Cf. identical figure obtained by Blejer and Khan (1984, p.395) for 
a pooled sample of 24 developing countries and with closely similar 
variable definitions.
9. Some considerable sluggishness is revealed for credit policy even 
under rationing. The point seems little emphasized in the 
relevant literature: the 'unanticipated' advent of liberalization
may bolster plans instantaneously but can be manifested in 
increased investment expenditures, and indeed production on the new 
capital goods, only after the usual delays in the investment 
process have elapsed.
10. In the equations we have run excluding residential buildings from 
the dependent variable the corresponding figures were 30% (15% 
impact - 40% total multiplier) for net (gross) investment.
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of the government's propensity towards current expenditures. Still a 
substantial fraction of credit subsumed under our measure is officially 
granted to finance in essence working capital. For example we may 
compute from data in the Bank of Greece Statistical Bulletin that on 
average over our sample period no more than 30% (standard deviation 2 
percentage points) of the outstanding loans to manufacturing and mining 
was designated as 'long term'. (The total of such loans constituted 
around one half of 'Domestic Credit Claims on the Private Sector').^^
It should not be surprising that only past values of real credit 
availability affect current investment. Lags may act as proxies for 
expected future availability (cf. Fazzari and Athey 1987, p.484; Sinai 
and Eckstein 1983, p.135). An average of past receipts of credit may 
be measuring the funds available to firms, or the letter's bargaining 
strength vis a vis the banks for prospective loan requests etc. It 
could be the practice that some funds must be procured in advance upon 
ordering rather than the delivery of capital goods when investment 
is recorded in the national accounts. Or investing firms faced 
perhaps with uncertain and variable (e.g. from the supply side) 
delivery lags compounded by bureaucratic delays in the processing of 
loan requests etc. choose to be burdened with term loans somewhat in 
advance. They may take out loans as precautionary liquid holdings at 
the planning stages of investment given also that trade or other credit 
may be more expensive than official loans, and that the structure of
11. Similarly in Bank of Greece (1982) an average of 40% (s.d. 6 
percentage points) of the total commercial banks credit (i.e. 
including advances to the public sector) is characterized as 'long 
term' over the period 1960-1980.
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Interest rates may have encouraged ’round-tripping' from time to time^Z 
(Union of Greek Banks 1987, p.24). Similar arguments are put forward 
by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a, pp.170-171) in order to 
justify the inclusion of two annual lags of fund availability in their 
investment equations. In particular they suggest that "lagged values 
of cash flow may have explanatory power for investment in a 
time-to-built context for example".
Some of the broad 'starting point' equations could be specialized 
to corresponding narrow equations free of residual autocorrelation with 
every included variable significant at least at 1 0 % and, notably, 
involving two lags of the credit variable (distributed over adjacent 
periods either side of t-2). Sometimes these had alternating signs.
We do not report specifically the above (apart from some 
Sundararajan-Thakur type equations) but rather other equations 
descending from the same models which in fact exhibit superior fit 
and/or statistical properties. In any case the appearance of a 
negative sign on some lags of new real loans, rather than disproving 
the role of fund availability in investment, has been proposed within 
just such a framework by Gardner and Sheldon (1975) and indeed 
discussed by us in Chapter 3. Consider the following example;
12. It is unlikely that "the well known collinearity of such variables 
with those of the accelerator type" (Nickell 1978, p.270) is 
responsible for the inability of contemporaneous values to show up 
significantly. In fact although L^ - moves together with the 
levels, its correlation coefficient with the differences of income 
or user cost is below 30% (an attractive feature of differenced 
formulations). For LC^ the position is reversed (and this might 
go part of the way towards explaining the relatively poorer 
performance of this variable in all formulations apart from 
Sundararajan-Thakur) but still the values of the respective 
correlation coefficients are low below 50%.
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It — 0.57DYt + 0.26Lt—1 — 0.22Lt_3 + 0.77It_i
(6.72**) (2.20**) (-2.04*) (11.55**)
S = 3.86
Zi(l) = 1.17 22(1,19) - 0.97 h = -1.05
2 3 (5 ,1 5 ) = 0.38 2 4 (5 ) = 5.13 2 5 (6 ,14) = 0.45
It = /CON/DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DYt_3/Lt/Lt_i/Lt_2/Lt-3/lt-l 
** **
Essentially, with reference to any one project, abundant credit in the 
current period implies that a relatively larger fraction of the total 
orders required can be placed in the present. Therefore fewer orders 
are left for the future. Hence investment in some future period may 
be negatively associated with credit availability in the current 
period. Indeed it is the more distant credit lag which bears a 
negative sign in the example given above. Another possibility could 
be that negatively signed lags of L may be capturing the contractionary 
effect that an increased amount of interest payments, due to a larger 
volume of new loans, has on investment. Nevertheless the sign pattern 
in some of the reported equations descending from the Sundararajan- 
Thakur model, where the contemporaneous value is negatively signed 
while credit lags are positive, remains a disturbing feature of the 
résultats (yet the total effect is above zero). Tun Wai and Wong
13. One could speculate that over our sample, credit requirements were 
obtained well before the expenditures financed. So more often than 
not periods of high investment took place at the same time that the 
demand for credit was lax, hence the negative association 
contemporaneously. Self finance with deposits being converted to 
currency after purchases of capital goods or crowding in with 
advances to the private and the public sector moving in opposite 
directions, is another possibility. There is sparse evidence that 
housing investment may be responsible: When equations 27 and 28
were run for investment excluding residential buildings all the 
(continued on next page)
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(1982), who estimate a similar equation with Greek data, also find that 
contemporaneous credit availability is negatively signed.
The statistical performance of L as a measure of real credit 
availability is more favourable than that of LC. Comparing from the 
reported equations those identical in all respects but for the choice 
of definition of real credit availability, and also by more general 
observation, we may conclude that: Typically LC bears a noticeably
lower t statistic (hardly significant at 5%), yields a higher standard 
error of estimate (with a simultaneous substantial rise in the 
t-statistic on the lagged dependent variable especially in the 
Blejer-Khan model) and worse residual autocorrelation statistics (thus 
suggesting some mispecification) for the equation as a whole. (Cf. 
Equations 11 to 12, 14 to 15, 16 to 17, 31 to 32.) There cannot be 
found many such comparable pairs of equations because it seems that 
inclusion of LC gives rise to a substantially different dynamic 
structure than obtained with L.
13. Continued/...
variables retained significance apart from the contemporaneous 
perversely signed credit availability w^ich became totally 
insignificant. Similarly the example below suggests that while 
housing investment is preceded by the accumulation of monetary 
balances (M is akin to M3) it occurs at the same time as a 
contraction in the real money supply (e.g. housing investment is 
stimulated during a general portfolio shift into inflation hedges 
or foreign assets).
Nit = 0.43HYt + 0.51HYt_2 + 21.0HCt_i + 10.0HCt_2 
(6.51**) (6.38**) (3.76**) (2.18**)
- 0.16Mt + 0.19Mt_i 
(-3.47**) (4.01**)
S = 2.88 Zi(l) “ 0.46 22(1,17) = 0.33 D.W. = 1.98
(Nb C is appropriately adjusted for this investment aggregate.
Note that the inspiration for this equation is similar to that of 
Kelly and Norton (1971) who apart from the constituents of the user 
cost introduce a liquid wealth argument, into their equation for 
investment in dwellings.)
234
As far as theory is concerned, the Insight of the Currie and 
Anyadike-Danes (1980) model lies in equating the volume of funds 
available to the firm for investment with retained profits plus new 
loans minus interest payments on outstanding loans. Fazzari and Athey 
(1987), as well as Sinai and Eckstein (1983), also acknowledge debt 
servicing payments as a signal of creditworthiness which influences the 
availability of further loans or other external funds to the firm.
That LC is not much of a significant determinant of investment is 
discouraging for this perspective. In Currie and Anyadike-Danes 
(1980) the fact that firms will have to pay increased interest bills 
when deposit rates are raised advises, considered in isolation, against 
liberalisation. (Cf. also Lanyi and Saracoglu 1983, p.17; Jao 1985 
etc.). Rather the superior standing of L vindicates Fry's approach 
which almost neglects any implications of the increased burden of 
interest payments. This approach concentrates on the beneficial 
impact of a larger flow of new loans on investment and growth upon 
financial liberalization.
On the other hand the relatively poor performance of LC may only be 
attributable to inadequacies in the incorporated representation of 
total interest payments (by the product of the current loan rate given 
in the IFS times the stock of outstanding loans lagged once). This is 
crude since in view of extensive selective credit controls, applicable 
loan rates are highly differentiated at any point in time, while a 
large fraction of the outstanding loans may have been extended in the 
distant past at radically different fixed r a t e s . F o r  example Sinai
14. E.g. in 1985 the Bank of Greece Statistical Bulletin distinguished 
seven official loan rate ceilings for commercial banks with an 
unweighted mean of 16% and a considerable standard deviation of 3 
percentage points while over time the employed IFS series averages 
to 1 2 % with a standard deviation about half as large as this mean.
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and Eckstein (1983, p.139) employ "weighted averages of current and 
past interest rates with a term to approximate average maturity" 
distinguishing also between different types of debt, in order to 
construct a proxy for debt service. Finally note that, to the extent 
that "the debt service variable acts to restrain investment spending 
through interest rate effects as well" (ibid.), the poor performance of 
LC may be associated with the perverse (yet weak) response of 
investment to nominal interest rates in our sample.
5.3.3
The sign on the user cost
A striking feature of the results is that irrespective of the 
estimation method (whether OLSQ or IV) or the.underlying model of 
investment or the particular dependent variable explained (whether net 
or gross investment and whether including or not expenditures on 
residential buildings) or the specific measure employed (whether tax 
adjusted or not) the sign on all the significant lags of the user cost 
in the reported equations comes out positive against the predictions of 
neoclassical theory.
At first sight this could be welcome given the belief held in the 
liberalization literature (excluding new structuralists) about the 
expansionary influence that a rise in the real deposit rate has on 
capital formation. This it achieves by increasing the availability of 
loanable funds from the banks since alternative sources of finance 
cannot be found. Of course the user cost (whether adjusted for fiscal
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parameters or not) is a series close to the real deposit rate 
(evaluated on the basis of the GDP deflator) with a correlation 
coefficient around 0.7. We confirmed that it is 'the real deposit 
rate component' RD = (l-r).r + s - q/q (0.82 correlation coefficient 
with real deposit rate) rather than the relative price component 
RP = q.(l-A)/p.(1-r) of user cost (= q .(1-A).[(1-t ).r+s-q/q]/p.(1-t )) 
which really shows up in our regressions by the following experiment: 
We run selected reported equations (4, 13, 23, 28) separating RD from 
RP (or the differences thereof). In every case it was the lags of RD 
which each retained significance and positive sign whilst the lags of 
RP were always individually insignificant and positively signed more 
often than not Cf. the counterpart to equation 4:
Nit = 0.52HYt + 0.71HYt_i + 0.47HYt_2 + 0.45HYt_3 + 0.14HRP,-
(5.10**) (5.90**) (3.03**) (3.83**) (0.01)
+ 70.0HRD(_ - 23.0HRPt_i + 60.0HRDt_i + 2.76HRPt_2 
(2.59**) (-1.0) (1.85*) (1.0)
+ 78 . OHRDt—2 0 57Lt—2
(4.83**) (10.55**)
S “ 3.01 Zi(l) - 1.57 22(1,12) = 0.84 D.W. - 1.55?
(The joint significance of HRP lags is F(3,13) = 0.52).
By contrast if inflation rises with inflexible ceilings for the 
nominal deposit rates and/or reserve ratios, funds are switched from 
bank deposits into various inflation hedges starving firms of (bank) 
finance (in real terms). Thus we may add to the list of the costs of 
(perfectly anticipated) inflation in the presence of rigidities, the 
overall reduction in investment (or even production in general).
Indeed it is a negative reaction of investment to the rate of (capital 
goods) inflation which seems to be underlying the perverse sign on the 
'user cost' while the loan rate plus rate of depreciation seems less
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important. To pursue this we run selected reported equations (2, 11, 
20, 26 from those not adjusting the user cost for fiscal parameters) 
decomposing C = r + s - q/q into RS = r + s and GQ = q/q. We found 
that almost invariably lags of GQ (differenced) were individually 
highly significant and had a negative sign, while lags of RS 
(differenced) were less significant (in part due to collinearity 
exactly because the administered rate has remained rather inflexible 
over our sample period) and generally bearing a (wrong) positive 
sign. To illustrate consider the counterpart to equation 26.
I t  =  - 9 1 . 0  +  0 . 5 6 Y t  +  0 . 2 0 Y t _ i  +  I S l . O R S t  -  3 9 . 0 G Q t  -  5 . 7 R S t _ i
( - 6 . 3 7 * * ) ( 5 . 4 8 * * )  ( 2 . 0 0 * )  ( 2 . 4 9 * * )  ( - 2 . 0 2 * )  ( - 0 . 0 6 )
-  5 3 . 0 G Q t _ i  +  1 6 . 0 R S t - 2  ~  3 1 . 0 G Q t _ 2  +  0 . 3 0 L t _ 2  "  0 . 2 3 K t _ i  
( - 3 . 2 8 * * )  ( 0 . 2 5 )  ( - 2 . 3 3 * * )  ( 2 . 8 3 * * )  ( - 7 . 0 6 * * )
S = 2 . 4 4  R 2  =  0 . 9 8  2 ^ ( 1 )  -  1 . 1 7  2 2 ( 1 , 1 3 )  =  0 . 6 4  D.W. = 2 . 3 7 ?
Omitting the lags of RS (not jointly significant F(2,14) — 0 . 0 3 )  we 
obtain:
I t  8 9 . 0  +  0 . 5 4 Y t  +  0 . 2 0 Y t _ i  +  1 4 9 . 0 R S t  -  4 1 . 0 G Q t  -  5 5 . 0 G Q t _ i
( - 1 1 . 0 * * )  ( 6 . 7 0 * * )  ( 2 . 1 9 * * )  ( 4 . 1 0 * * )  ( - 2 . 6 9 * * )  ( - 4 . 4 7 * * )
-  3 2 . 0 G Q t _ 2  +  0 . 3 1 L t _ 2  "  0 . 2 3 K t _ i  
( - 2 . 8 3 * * )  ( 3 . 0 7 * * )  ( - 1 3 . 0 * * )
S = 2 . 2 9  R 2  =  0 . 9 8  2 ^ ( 1 )  =  1 . 2 7  2 2 ( 1 , 1 5 )  =  0 . 8 0  D.W. = 2 . 2 9 ?
For every ceteris paribus percentage point long term rise in inflation, 
investment declines by around Ibn (1970 Dr) i.e. around 2% of its 
average value over the sample or an elasticity (evaluated at the means) 
of 0.2.15
15, The consequences of interest rate controls together with a similar 
argument why inflation may reduce investment via portfolio redistri­
butions towards short term assets or because of the real effects of 
nominal government institutions (e.g. depreciation allowances) in 
Fischer and Modigliani (1978).
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In Appendices N-0 we have empirically substantiated that a wide 
range of monetary and deposit aggregates (including the broadest series 
known as 'liquid liabilities' in the IFS) respond positively and 
significantly to the (actual) real deposit rate. Also one encounters 
in the literature regression equations with the (ex ante) real deposit 
rate positively signed and capable (together with other variables) of 
tracing the rate of investment (e.g. Kitchen 1986, p.92 in an otherwise 
pure accelerator formulation) or income growth (Fry 1980) in many 
financially repressed economies.
The problem with such analysis in our circumstances is that we 
include the real flow of new loans as an explanatory variable anyway. 
Therefore any further positive influence of the user cost on investment 
must be direct i.e. have an independent existence after the partial 
effect of credit has been taken into account.
On the other hand our measure of credit may not be sufficiently 
comprehensive and therefore the positive sign on the user cost may 
represent an expansion of the availability of uncaptured sources of 
finance as real loan rates, perhaps alongside other, even curb 
m a r k e t , i n t e r e s t  rates rise generally. Our measure though is the 
broadest available from official s o u r c e s . 17 The financial
16. Strictly under new-structuralist assumptions the official loan rate 
and the volume of unofficial transactions would move in opposite 
directions.
17. Our measure is the (deflated first difference of the) line 'Domestic 
Credit; Claims on Private Sector' in the IFS. It includes claims 
on business and individuals and claims on development banks held by 
the Bank of Greece as well as claims on the private sector held by 
Commercial Banks. This may omit any claims on the private sector 
by Special Credit Institutions which are not funds borrowed by the 
latter from the Central Bank and onlent.
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liberalisation literature provides a rationale for an aggregate 
dependence of profits on the real interest rate. A relatively higher 
rate rations out the lowest return borrowers and persuades prospective 
small self financed entrepreneurs to deposit their resources with 
banks. There, because of pooling, superior expertise/information, 
funds are channelled towards higher productivity uses. Sundararajan 
(1987) is an example of an empirical study which detects this 
effect. In addition in much of the work on investment within an 
environment of developed financial markets, retained profits are an 
influence on investment expenditures given difficulties in drawing on 
alternative sources of finance or their informational role. From such 
a standpoint we have mispecified our equations by omitting this 
determinant of investment which, in view of the above discussion, could 
be proxied by the user cost variables consequently showing a positive 
sign. Further to the extent that a fraction of investment is self 
financed, McKinnon (1973) proposes a positive relationship between it 
and the attractiveness of deposits quite independently from bank 
advances to the private sector. This is so, because monetary balances 
have to be accumulated until a threshold amount below which holdings of 
physical capital are indivisible, is exceeded. Keeping within this 
same literature, Blejer and Khan (1984) and Sundararajan and Thakur 
(1980) discover for some countries that private investment is 
positively related to public investment (say because the latter 
contributes to infrastructural improvements). Maybe government 
investment is financed by loans that do not necessarily move together 
with the aggregate included in our regressions but rather relate to the 
total size of the banking system which varies with the level of real 
interest rates. Both the possibility of crowding-in and a positive
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dependence of private investment on retained profits, are empirically 
substantiated for Greece by Tun Wai and Wong (1982).
Alternatively we may take the view that the role of the user cost 
is neoclassical. It (as well as income) has a place as a regressor in 
an investment function alongside the real flow of loans. This is the 
case either because the system is not continuously rationed (cf.
Stegman 1982 for a different approach in such circumstances) but only 
say in times of tight money (Blinder and Stiglitz 1983; Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss 1984) or because there exist some (highly 
creditworthy and/or favoured) firms which investment plans are 
constrained effectively only by the price of funds. In this case, 
however, the positive sign is perverse and ought to be attributed to 
some mispecification. There are suggestions in the literature that 
there may exist underlying simultaneity quite apart from that between 
investment and the current values of its determinants which only we 
ameliorate by our application of the instrumental variables technique 
below. For example, Lund (1976, p.262) quotes the observation "that a 
one period lag on the price of capital goods in an investment 
expenditure equation is not a sufficient condition for non-simultaneity 
since if current investment reflects last periods' new orders, [lagged] 
price and new orders [hence current investment] may then have been 
simultaneously determined".
More concretely, there has developed a line of thought (Abel 1980; 
Ando et al. 1974; Bernanke 1983; Birch and Siebert 1976; Feldstein and 
Flemming 1971; Helliwell and Glorieux 1970; Nickell 1978; Schiantarelli 
1983 etc.) portraying investment as, par excellence, a forward looking
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exercise. This approach challenges the assumptions of perfect 
certainty and reversibility on which use of actual values for the 
explanatory variables rests. Its more recent advocates recommend 
against representations of expectations by distributed lags in favour 
of rational expectations generated as fitted values from some 
econometric forecasting scheme. Bean (1981) warns us specifically 
that using the actual, rather than some proxy for the expected, values 
of inflation in the construction of a measure for the user cost is 
particularly inappropriate in periods of volatility of the former. 
Feldstein and Flemming (1971, p.428) also, cast doubt on the 
meaningfulness of their results in connection with the relative price 
component of the user cost. In their view, the employed observed 
values for the latter only very imperfectly capture the expectations to 
which investment genuinely responds. It follows that perhaps we 
should not reach a definite conclusion on the interpretation of the 
perverse sign on the user cost unless some adequate modelling of 




Issues in the reported equations
Comparing the pure accelerator version with other reported 
equations ultimately descending from the same model we have: The
inclusion of lags of (differences of) the user cost variable (however
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measured) does not change the total effect of income (differences), 
always leads to a reduction in the standard error of estimate^® and in 
the case of the Hall-Jorgenson equations brings about a substantial 
improvement of the residual autocorrelation statistics (that presumably 
were warning for the omitted variables) (Cf. Broad Equations 1 to 2).
When Jorgenson's composite J (whether adjusted or not for fiscal 
parameters) was tried as the independent variable, out of all the eight 
combinations of model and credit measure each giving a distinct broad 
equation for a starting point, our procedure of sequential 
specialization led to only a single reportable equation (equation 9) 
descending in fact from the Hall-Jorgenson model and employing a 
measure without adjustment for fiscal parameters. In the majority of 
cases (especially for broad equations representing the Hall-Jorgenson 
or the Sundararajan-Thakur models where a lagged dependent variable 
was not present to 'soak up' the serial correlation) highly significant 
residual autocorrelation statistics (Z2 ) at the outset averted any 
further specialization. Also the single reported equation has a very
18, Halving in the case of Hall-Jorgenson: All the t-statistics on
the lags of the first difference of income also rose 
substantially. Since the pure accelerator version of this model 
(Equation 1) happens to be nested within the other reported 
equations that include user cost variables we are able to give 
their joint significance as follows: In equation 2 we have
F(3,16) =• 13.42 -, in equation 4 F(3,16) = 15.35-, in equation 6 
F (3,14) “ 6,81-, in equation 7 F(3,14) = 7.75-. Whether reflecting 
mechanisms under financial repression or possessing a neoclassical 
(but mispecified) role, user cost variables make a significant 
contribution to the explanation of investment. Thus we can hardly 
agree with the common conclusion (e.g. Shapiro 1986), most recently 
reconfirmed (by means of tests of non-nested alternatives, in the 
presence of residual autocorrelation) in Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss 
(1988, p.294) "that there is modest support for investment models 
that use output or sales variables, and that there is little 
support for models that employ user cost of capital or Q 
variables".
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much worse fit than any other reported regression explaining net 
investment: These are indications of mispecification, more
particularly that the restriction incorporated in the composite and 
implied by the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function is not 
accepted by our data.19
The a d j u s t m e n t ^ O  of our measure of the user cost for the various 
relevant fiscal provisions makes little difference to the statistical 
properties of our equations and leaves the dynamic structure almost 
unaltered (as demonstrated by those reported equations descending from 
Coen's or from Blejer-Khan's model). This further reveals the role of 
the user cost not to be here as stipulated by the neoclassical 
analysis. If neoclassical mechanisms were operative (barring extreme 
inelasticities), taking into account the substantial changes in the 
effective price of capital goods due to fiscal incentives, as well as 
the movements in the user cost due to alterations in the rate of 
corporate taxation, should have been capable of improving the 
explanation of the behaviour of the investment series. Assume that 
the user cost mainly proxies the effect of the real interest rate on 
the volume of deposits, hence on credit availability and investment. 
Then indeed this influence ought not be directly (apart from liquidity 
effects) responsive to changes in corporate taxation (deposit interest
19. The poor performance of the composite may be associated with the 
perverse response of investment to the user cost. Alternatively, 
as Chirinko (1986) would suggest, it may be due to the fact that 
the influence of income on investment takes place at a different 
lag from the influence of the user cost.
20. Together with this we change from q to p as the deflator of the 
nominal user cost, which also accords more with a neoclassical 
interpretation, and further differentiates the measure from a real 
interest rate (but itself makes a negligible difference for the 
results).
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income is tax free in Greece) , or to changes in tax depreciation, 
investment allowances etc. on physical capital (apart from portfolio 
effects).
Compare from the reported equations those differing only in whether 
they incorporate fiscal parameters in any given measure of the user 
cost or not: This adjustment, (leaves of course unaltered the value of 
the coefficients on the income variables), may change the standard 
error of estimate and t-statistics on the user cost lags either way but 
only slightly (tending to increase them when C is the measure) , lowers 
the residual autocorrelation statistics in most cases hardly noticeably 
and consistently reduces the value of the coefficients on the lags of 
the user costal. (Cf. Equations 2 to 4, 11 to 13, 14 to 16, 20 to 22,
24 to 25 and the Broad Equations 11 to 13, 14 to 16, 29 to 31 and 30 to 
32).
Nor are there any clearcut indications as to which is the 
appropriate measure of the user cost, C or S , whether adjusted or not 
for fiscal parameters. A comparison comes up against the difficulty 
that the available series for S begins two years later than that for C ; 
combined with the small number of observations overall, this almost 
makes for non identical samples. No dramatic differences can be seen 
but for example the comparison of broad equation 5 to 8, of equation 13 
to 16 and 26 to 29 suggests that S yields best overall fit (on the basis 
of the standard error of estimate) and residual autocorrelation
21. Cf. King (1972, p.139) "if we exclude investment incentives the 
result is that we appear to overestimate the true coefficient of 
the relative factor price term because we are underestimating the 
rise in relative factor prices".
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statistics, while the position is reversed with respect to fit for the 
pairs equation 4 and 7, 11 and 14, 12 and 15.
5.4.2
Details of the reported equations
We turn to a detailed look at the reported equations by model of 
origin (most features retained intact after instrumentation).
The Hall-Jorgenson model: Equations descending from this model
comprise four lags of the first difference of income (t-3 being the 
farthest) with a median lag of just under a year and three lags of the 
first difference of whatever measure of the user cost is employed (t-2 
being the farthest). Where L is the credit measure, the lag profile 
on the user cost variable is such that coefficients increase as we move 
from the current value towards the longest lag, t-2, which is also the 
most significant. By contrast the most significant lag of the first 
difference of income is the contemporaneous or first lag (their t 
statistics are anyway very close); its lag profile is hump shaped 
rising smoothly to a single peak one or two years in the past and then 
declining continuously. The lag profile on income in the pure 
accelerator version of this, as well as in the Blejer-Khan model, is 
continuously declining.
The Coen model: The reported equations descending from this model
are the shortest, containing the current value of (the weighted 
difference of) income the first lag of (the weighted difference of) 
whichever measure of the user cost is employed and the second lag of
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(the weighted difference of) real credit availability. In all cases 
apart from one both L and LC give rise to otherwise identical 
reportable equations. Significant autocorrelation in the residual, to 
be expected because the model is obtained by the application of the 
Koyck transformation to eliminate the capital stock, is not detectable 
in the data.
The Blejer-Khan model: These equations include at most two to
three lags of (the weighted difference of) income, (t-2 being the 
farthest) and at most two lags of (the weighted difference of) whatever 
measure of the user cost is tried. The fit of these equations is 
close to the fit of the reported equations descending from Coen's 
model. The standard error of estimate ranges from around 3 to about 4 
(6-8% of the mean of the dependent variable). In those reported 
equations with several lags of income, the lag profile is V-shaped with 
the current value giving the largest and most significant response.
The coefficients and t-statistics on the user cost are continuously 
declining (in contrast to what was found for the Hall-Jorgenson 
equations).
The lag profile and t-statistics on the user cost in the reported 
equations of the Hall-Jorgenson model are ascending. The current 
value of the user cost is invariably absent (the distributed lag begins 
from t-1) in the reported equations of the Coen and the Blejer-Khan 
models. These could be taken as hints that the reaction of investment 
to the user cost builds up somewhat more slowly than in response to 
income. Such a delay is commonly attributed to ex post fixity of 
proportions whereby a change in the optimal capital-output ratio
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induced by a movement in the user cost cannot be implemented 
instantaneously on the existing capital stock (e.g. cf. Eisner and 
Nadiri 1968, p.377). A putty clay interpretation of the role of the 
user cost is, however, hardly compatible with the perverse sign taken 
by this variable in the regressions. Alternatively within a 
financial repression interpretation, we can invoke Molho (1986a), who 
has suggested particularly long lags in the influence of the real 
interest rate, associated with the intertemporal nature of McKinnon's 
accumulation mechanism.
The Sundararajan-Thakur model: A prima facie alarming feature is
the invariable appearance of a negative sign on the lagged capital 
stock in these reported equations. However, this is not ruled out by 
the assumptions of the model, if the rate of depreciation should fall 
short of the constant component of the speed of adjustment. In fact 
this finding occurs also in the regressions presented in the paper of 
Sundararaj an and Thakur (1980) and in the paper of Tun Wai and Wong 
(1982) (for Greece). The blame, however, cannot be placed exclusively 
on the constructed series for the private net capital stock. This can 
be demonstrated by experimentally fitting an equation,22 such as those 
of Mackrell, Frisch and Roope (1971). Here the coefficient on lagged 
capital stock comes out positive and with a magnitude close to the rate 
of depreciation. Thus the suggestion, by Tun Wai and Wong (op.cit.), 
that the negative sign on lagged capital stock is attributable to 
multicollinearity, might be correct. Indeed, the capital stock is
22. Note the slightly superior fit of this equation compared to those 
descending from Coen and Blejer-Khan on average, its much inferior 
fit compared to the Sundararajan-Thakur equations, and finally the 
appearance of L^-_2 as the pertinent lag of the credit variable 
(in contrast to the Sundararajan-Thakur equations).
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more highly correlated with the level than with the difference of 
income. Apart from picking up the initial capital stock at the 
beginning of the sample the constant may indicate non-exponential 
depreciation (Clark 1979, pp.108-110; Dinenis 1985, p.30).
It - 4.10 + 0.54HYt + 0.63HYt_i + 0.54HYt_2 + 0.41HYt_3
(1.90*) (7.05**) (6.03**) (4.93**) (4.11**)
+ 33.0HCt + 50.0HCt_i + 63.0HCt_2 + 0.41Lt_2 + 0.03Kt_i
(1.90*) (3.81**) (5.33**) (2.71**) (5.92**)
S = 2.94
Zi(l) = 0.83 Z2(1,14) = 0.50 D.W. = 1.65
Z](5,10) = 0.32 Zs(5,9) = 0.70
It = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt_3/HCt/HCt_i/HCt-2/HCt-3/Lt/Lt-l/Lt_2/ 
** ** ** ** ** * ** **
At-3/Kt-l
**
Otherwise most of the reported equations comprise two lags of the 
level of income and three lags of the level of the user cost. The lag 
profiles on both income and user cost are declining with the current 
value of income and the first lag of the user cost being the most 
significant. Fit and residual autocorrelation statistics are the best 
among equations explaining gross investment. An exception to the rule 
that L yields superior fit to LG is provided by the comparison of 
equations 29 to 30 and equations 31 to 32.
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Section 5.5
Equations with Real Gross Private Fixed Capital 
Formation Excluding Expenditures on Residential Buildings 
as the Dependent Variable
To provide yet another variation on our results (and to check if 
this would correct the perverse sign on the user cost) we tried private 
investment minus expenditures on the construction of residential 
buildings/dwellings (which average to a 40% of the total) as the 
dependent variable. Here we undertook specification searches (to 
arrive at equations to be reported) for only two of our investment 
models, that of Hall-Jorgenson and that of Blejer-Khan. We tried most 
of our combinations of independent variables but did not run any 
equations for the measures of user cost which exclude fiscal 
parameters. We report only the best equation from those obtained by 
the two alternative credit variables employed. To undertake these 
estimations it was necessary to repeat with this investment aggregate 
the steps (described in Chapter 3) required to attribute capital 
consumption to the private sector, thus construct a series for private 
net investment and the private net capital stock excluding residential 
buildings, and thus compute a figure for the rate of depreciation of 
the latter (s = 0.036 as expected higher than the rate of 0.027 worked 
out for the total private net capital stock).23
Comparing the reported equations descending from the Hall-Jorgenson 
model with, and without, expenditures on residential buildings in the
23. DE?t = 2.69 + 0.036Kt_i R^ = 0.99 D.W. = 1.05-
(78.0**)(282.0**)
(Fitting an AR(1) or AR(2) error by ML or CORC does not change the 
[rounded] figure for the rate of depreciation.)
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regressand we note a lengthening of the distributed lag on income and 
user cost. The t-4th difference of income is present here as a 
significant explanatory variable and correspondingly the median lag 
rises from just under to a bit over a year. A similar observation can 
be made in the single reported equation (equation 34) containing a 
distributed lag of the user cost where the t-3rd difference of the user 
cost turns up and the median lag almost doubles (compared to equation 
4) to over a year. Also the lag profile on income changes to become 
bimodal while that on the user cost becomes declining. It may be that 
the construction of residential buildings can take place over a 
relatively short duration and therefore the exclusion of such 
expenditures from the investment series, leaves an aggregate of types 
of investment which respond to changes in their determinants with 
somewhat longer delays.
However in this set of reported equations we do not find again the 
almost invariable appearance of L^_2» but rather more 'recent' lags of 
the credit variable. This may be a hint that the longer lags of the 
flow of real credit reflected influences less relevant to the credit 
availability m e c h a n i s m . 24 This mechanism may be more clearly depicted 
by the present set of estimates, which points to a faster response to 
credit conditions (a delay of one year or less). The coefficient on 
the flow of real credit drops by about 1/3.
24. E.g. more distant lags of the difference of income (which here 
are significant on their own right). Also common sense would 
link residential investment with the level of deposits sometime 
before the construction of housing although direct mortgage 
lending would not be very usual in Greece.
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The two instances of pure accelerator specifications which we 
report here (equations 33 and 36 descending from either models of 
investment) both show a substantially lower residual autocorrelation 
statistic and a better standard error of estimate as a proportion of 
the mean (although goodness of fit cannot be strictly comparable) 
contrasted to their (only approximate in the case of equation 33 which 
also has much better stability tests) counterparts with total private 
investment (equations 1 and 18 respectively). As might be expected, 
the selected models of investment explain the behaviour of capital 
expenditures undertaken in the majority by firms better than when using 
a series a sizeable component of which is governed by the housing 
decisions of individuals. Lack of comparability between the 
respective reported equations prevents us from generalizing this 
conclusion beyond the pure accelerator versions.
Section 5.6 
Instrumental Variables Estimation
The problem of simultaneity in the estimation of investment 
functions is commonly noted and could be acute in our case since we 
work with annual observations. Various ways of coping with this 
difficulty have been put forward: Hall (1977) favours the use of
Jorgenson's composite as the explanatory variable (which gave poor 
results with our sample) while Harberger (quoted in Lund 1976, p.253 
n27) remarks that this may also help to reduce the effect of errors in 
the measurement of the elusive user cost. Anderson (1981) and 
Schiantarelli (1983) avoid simultaneity by omitting the contemporaneous 
value of income from their specifications. Bean (1981) reassures
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himself that the resultant biases are negligible after also applying 
instrumental variables to the equation which provided the starting 
point for his sequential specialization.
To eliminate simultaneity bias and obtain consistent (albeit not 
unbiased) estimates of the coefficients of each of our reported 
(structural) investment equations, we made use of 2SLS interpreted as
an instrumental variables m e t h o d . ^5 in order to motivate the use of a
number of exogenous variables in this exercise we embedded each
reported investment equation, say:
NI^ = OfgHY^ + 0!iHY^_i + 0(2^t-2 oi3^t-3
+ o^MCt-i + a6HCt_2 + «7^t-2 (I)
into a plausible system of simultaneous equations comprising a 
relationship that links gross to net investment by means of exponential 
depreciation:
I t  =  C O n 2 6  +  s . K t _ i  +  N i t  ( I I )
an output exhaustion equation:
Y t  =  C O t  +  I t  +  G t  +  ( X - M ) t  ( I I I )
the determination of net exports by competitiveness 0Q(eP*)t + 0i?t, 
world trade WTt and income :
25. The method is operative in large samples under the assumption of no 
residual autocorrelation which is accepted by our data, as verified 
by means of the LM(1) statistic adapted for instrumental variables 
estimation.
26. The constant absorbs the benchmark value of the capital stock in 
the beginning of our sample not included in K^-l-
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(X-M)t - Po(eP*)t + PlPt + 0 2 ^ t  + (IV)
a simple consumption function:
COt = CON + 7iYt (V)
and the determination of domestic prices by a money market clearing 
condition:
?t = gQCt + &l[p]^+ Ô2Yt + 33%% + Ô4 .TREND27 (VI)
To gain some additional instruments for investment equations of the 
Sundararajan-Thakur type we introduce a ratchet effect as well as 
lagged real net wealth ( R L Q ) i n  the consumption function:
C0% = CON + 7 iY% + 72(RIQ)t-l + YlCOt-l (Va)
and also assume a partial adjustment of money holdings to desired 
levels :
Ft = 5or% + 5l[f]^ + ^2"^ t + 53M% + ô4M%_i
+ ÔsPt-l + ôg.TREND (Via)
Similarly when the investment equation is descending from the Coen or 
the Blejer-Khan model^S we describe world trade by four distinct 
component series while real government expenditure and foreign prices 
are each resolved into a pair of components. In addition we justify 
the presence of two lagged values of income on account of a dependence 
of consumption (or money demand) on some (backward looking) measure of
27. The trend comes from money demand and stands for financial 
innovation.
28. In this case also we do not write the relationship between gross 
and net investment (since the latter does not appear anywhere).
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permanent income, alongside the wealth effect;
C0(- = CON + + 72Yt-l + 7sYt-2 + 74(&LQ)t-l (Vb)
We retain partial adjustment in the money market, and also put the rate 
of exchange rate depreciation in the demand for money function, as an 
approximation to the return on assets alternative (feasibly in view of 
capital flight) to domestic monetary balances.
Ft = ^O^t + ^l[p]^ + + ^3^t +
+ 1 + ^6^t—1 Ô7 «trend (VIb)
For the cases where the contemporaneous value of the user cost 
turns up as an endogenous right hand side variable in the investment 
equation, we close the system with an index for the price of capital 
goods placing perhaps greatest weight on imported investment goods the 
price q* of which is set in world markets (cf. Bilsborrow 1977, 
p.702). Thus we write an expression for the domestic rate of 
inflation of capital goods prices and adding the loan rate (remember 
C = r - q/q+s taking no cognizance of the tax system) we obtain an 
equation for the real user cost:
Ct - CON + + ft (VII)
while if fiscal parameters are introduced as well:
Ct - + «3^t
+ #4%^ 0 5ft (Vila)
Finally we ignore at this stage any complications arising in connection 
with the measure of the user cost S^ - which is deflated by an index of
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nominal wages.
The underlying macroeconomics could be something as follows :
Income is determined by output exhaustion (III) . There exists the 
usual element of feedback since income influences investment (I), 
consumption (V) and net exports (IV) , which expenditures in turn add up 
to give income. Income also affects money demand, hence the price 
level required (VI) to deflate the exogenous nominal money supply to 
equality with the former. In turn domestic prices determine 
competitiveness; hence affecting net exports (IV); as well as the 
current (given past prices) rate of inflation for capital goods; thus 
the user cost and investment (I).
Since it is the first differences of income and user cost which 
need be instrumented both in the investment equations descending from 
the Hall-Jorgenson model, and approximately so in those descending from 
the Coen and Blejer-Khan models, we put this system in differenced 
form: The level form of the system is used (apart from II but with Va
and VIb) in the case of the Sundararaj an-Thakur model. In these 
latter equations the contemporaneous value of real loans shows up as 
well, and could be viewed as endogenous. Under financial repression 
the real volume of loans is determined by the real supply of deposits 
(after allowing for the requirements of government expenditures) which 
depends on the real deposit rate and income, therefore not contributing 
any further exogenous variables to our system. Still the contribution 
from the identity defining LG is taken into account:
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Table 5.1
For a Hall-Jorgenson type investment equation
Nit = ckqHY^ + + «2HYt-2 agHYt-g 
+ o^HCt + asHCt-i + agHC^_2 + nyLt_2 (I)
Hit “ CON + s.K^_i + NI^ - — It—1 (II)
HYt = HCOt + Hit + HCt + H(X-M)t (III)
H(X-M)t - PoH(eP*)c + glHPc + 0 2 ' ^ t  + PsHYc (IV)
HCOt - YlHYt (V)
HPt =
P
ôgHrt + Ô ^ H — —j + 62HYt ô^HM^ + CON (VI)
HCt =
e q* P 
OoH[ \ ]  + «ih[ /  ] + «2h[p \ ]  + Hrt
qt-1
+ {OgHAt + #^H^t (VII)
4 ^ ] = XQHPt + XlHPt-l (VIII)
29. Bracket applicable in case of adjustment for fiscal parameters
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Table 5.2
For a Coen or Blejer-Khan tvpe^^ investment equation 
The system in differenced form (H: first difference)
It = agHYt + a^HYt-i + «2^t-2 ^3^^t-l <^4^^t-2
+ «5^t-2 + «6^t-l (I)
Hit = It - It-1 (II)
HYt = HCOt + Hit + HCt + H(X-M)t (III)
H(X-M) t “ PoH(eP*)t + PlHPt + ^ 2 "^t + l33HYt (IV)
HCOt - TlHYt + 72^t-l + 73^t-2 + 74H(RLQ)t-i (Vb)
p
HPt = agHrt +  ^2^  + ^3™ t
+ + Ô^HPt—1 ■*■ CON (VIb)
30. There is no equation determining the user cost since its 
contemporaneous value doesn't ever appear in the reported 
equations descending from these models.
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LCf. — Lf ~ ITt
[Domestic Credit: Claims on private sector!
I q J t-1
We consider as exogenous all lags (including those found in the 
investment equation), constants and trends as well as the following 
contemporaneous variables as they appear in the differenced system: 
Output exhaustion gives differenced government expenditure in real 
terms,31 the determination of net exports gives the differenced 
domestic price of foreign goods^^ (since the exchange rate is a policy 
instrument) and naturally the differenced measure of world traders 
The money market clearing equation gives the differenced administered 
rate on d e p o s i t s ^ ^  as well as the differenced nominal broad money 
s u p p l y 35 (the exogeneity of which may be contentious but is maintained 
e.g. by Alogoskoufis 1982, pp.296-297 n6 and Leventakis 1980, p.554 for 
a more unlikely narrow aggregate). A wealth effect and a ratchet 
effect in consumption and a partial adjustment in the money market give 
lagged differences of real net financial wealth36 and real
31. Cf. Bean (1981), standard textbook. For Coen and Blejer-Khan 
equations we distinguish government investment and government 
consumption in real terms (Nat. Acc.).
32. Dr/$ exchange rate times $ index of world import unit values (IPS). 
Additionally for Coen and Blejer/Khan equations, Dr/$ exchange rate 
times $ index of industrial countries import unit values (IPS).
33. $ value of industrial countries imports/$ index of industrial 
countries import unit values (IPS). For Coen and Blejer/Khan 
equations the following as well. $ value of non-oil developing 
countries exports/$ index of non oil developing countries export 
unit values, world real GDP and developing countries real GDP.
(All from IPS).
34. In fact we use the Central Bank discount rate for which a complete 
series exists in IPS.
35. Money plus Quasi Money (IPS)
36. Coarsely measured by outstanding claims of commercial banks on 
government/GDP deflator.
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consumption as exogenous variables. The equation for the user cost 
gives the differenced rate of exchange rate d e p r e c i a t i o n , 3? the 
differenced rate of inflation of foreign capital g o o d s , t h e  
differenced loan rate and in the case where fiscal parameters are 
incorporated, the differenced corporate tax rate and the differenced 
present value of tax savings consequent upon a unit value of investment.
Subsequently the contemporaneous value of the difference (or level 
whenever appropriate) of income (and user cost or credit availability 
if required) was regressed on all the exogenous variables selected 
above. Then the reported (overidentified) investment equation was run 
by the instrumental variables technique. Besides the predetermined 
variables, the respective fitted values from the aforementioned reduced 
form regression were employed as (indeed the optimal in the 
circumstances) instruments for the current difference (or level) of 
income and user cost or credit availability. The two stage least 
squares estimates of our equations are shown in Appendix M. The 
changes in the magnitudes of coefficients and in the standard error of 
estimate with this method compared to the ordinary least squares 
results were slight, never exceeding one tenth in proportionate 
terms. The coefficient on the contemporaneous value of income (or 
difference thereof) tended to rise. The coefficients on all the other 
variables (apart from the current level of the user cost and sometimes 
credit availability in the Sundararajan-Thakur type equations) were 
reduced or left unchanged.
37. Annual average of Dr/$ exchange rate (IPS).




Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
In Chapter 5 we present estimates of the investment function in 
Greece over the period 1958-1985. We adopted an econometric procedure 
inspired by the 'general to specific' methodology. Common elements 
include a) concern with residual autocorrelation and parameter 
stability b) the sequential data based specialization of a general 
equation by means of restrictions that are jointly tested. This 
procedure was applied to a number of investment models, using a variety 
of alternative measures for the dependent and independent variables and 
reporting the best equation in each case.
The broad conclusions from this exercise are as follows:
The availability of credit influences private investment expenditures 
positively and quite significantly with a (reasonable) lag, which is 
shortest for investment excluding dwellings. Occasionally, many lags 
of the credit variable were significant and bore alternating signs, as 
expected. The flow of new private loans in real terms does not
translate to private investment one for one but there are leakages.
The measure of credit availability subtracting interest payments on 
outstanding debt from new loans, does not perform well in the 
regressions. Overall our results confirm the importance given to 
credit in the financial repression literature but do not lend support 
(subject to reservations about the precision of our measure) to the 
particular approach of Currie and Anyadike-Danes (1980) and Chapter 2.
A surprising feature of the results is that the sign on the user
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cost invariably comes out to be positive (perverse). It could be that 
the user cost (close to the real deposit rate) proxies for the 
availability of loanable funds, only imperfectly captured by our 
measure of real loans. We have substantiated that a broad range of 
deposit aggregates all respond positively to the real deposit rate. 
Alternatively, the user cost may be proxying the effects of profits on 
investment, since, according to the financial repression literature, 
profits are positively related to the real deposit rate. Also, 
according to McKinnon, self financed investment ought to vary directly 
with the real deposit rate. Finally the disturbing sign on the user 
cost may be attributable to (remaining) simultaneity or to inadequacies 
in the representation of expectations on the determinants of investment 
by distributed lags of their actual values.
Other, more specific, observations are that the user cost variables 
possess significant joint explanatory power (reflecting primarily a 
negative reaction of investment to inflation) although accelerator 
equations are also satisfactory. Jorgenson's composite cannot explain 
our investment series. Adjustment of the user cost for fiscal 
parameters and/or deflation of the nominal user cost by the nominal 
wage rather than the GDP or the investment deflator, makes little 
difference to the fit or the diagnostic statistics of the investment 
regression. The reported equations including the lagged dependent 
variable (i.e. those descending from the Coen and the Blejer-Khan 
models) are the shortest and stablest while those descending from the 
Sundararajan-Thakur model show better fit and residual autocorrelation 
statistics than the former. The longest equations, exhibiting the 
most significant influence for the credit variables, are those
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descending from the Hall-Jorgenson model. Finally we ran each 
reported investment equation by two stage least squares after embedding 
it in a simple macroeconomic model to motivate the choice of 
instruments. The results were almost indistinguishable from those of 
ordinary least squares estimation.
An immediate extension of the empirical work in Chapter 5 would be 
to substitute forecast values for the (capital goods) inflation term in 
the user cost, generated by a separate (but ideally jointly estimated) 
econometric equation. (Cf. Garantis 1984, pp.10-13 for Greek consumer 
prices.) This could reveal the cause for the perverse sign on the 
user cost in our regressions. It can be implemented without altering 
the structure of the investment equation. Note that recent work (e.g. 
Bean 1981) does not involve any additional sophistication in the 
representation of the role of expectations in the investment function.
There is a tradition for studies of investment to evolve around a 
comparison of alternative specifications (e.g. Bischoff 1971a; Clark 
1979; Feldstein 1982; Jorgenson 1971). Although we provide a 
corresponding informal discussion, an interesting extension would be to 
carry out strict encompassing tests (cf. Bean 1981; Bernanke, Bohn and 
Reiss 1988; Wisley and Johnson 1985) of the numerous investment 
equations reported here, against each other.
A relationship alluded to in our argument is that between the real 
value of profits and the real interest rate. It ought to be tested. 
One of the measures of the real user cost that we make use of, divides 
the nominal user cost adjusted for the various fiscal parameters by an
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index for the nominal wage. For consistency the nominal wage must be 
adjusted for (employer) taxes as well.
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APPENDIX L 
OLS ESTIMATES OF THE INVESTMENT FUNCTION 
IN GREECE 1958-1985
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NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
I. Sample : Annual Data 1958-1985
II. t-statistics in parentheses
III. Significance : (i) For t-statistics significance at least at 10%
is indicated by a single asterisk (*) while significance at least 
at 5% is shown by a double asterisk (**)
(ii) For all other statistics significance at least 
at 5% is indicated by a hyphen (-)
(iii) A question mark denotes an inconclusive D.W.
statistic.
IV. Broad equations : (i) Underneath each reported equation we state
the form (i.e. the lags included and their significance) of the 
broad equation which provided the starting point of the sequential 
specialisation procedure with end product the reported equation
(ii) We indicate also in case the broad equation
manages to pass only the F version of the IM(1) test of residual
autocorrelation and in case the reported equation fails any of a 
number of secondary diagnostic tests computed by DFIT [Functional 
form, normality or heteroscedasticity].
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THE STATISTICS
D.W. ; Durbin Watson statistic for residual autocorrelation
S : Standard error of estimate
: Adjusted coefficient of determination
Zi : First order LM test of residual autocorrelation distributed
as % 2 (1 )
Z2 : F version of the above with the indicated degrees of freedom
Z3 : Chow prediction test with 1980 as breakpoint distributed as
F with the indicated degrees of freedom 
Z4 : Hendry's predictive failure test with 1980 as breakpoint
distributed as %2(5)
Z5 : F test of the restrictions incorporated in the reported
equation versus the unrestricted broad equation underneath 
with the indicated degrees of freedom.
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THE SYMBOLS
A : Computed present discounted value of tax reductions consequent
upon a drachma of investment
Computed measure of the real user cost
(i) unadjusted for fiscal parameters 
C = [r+s-q/q]
(ii) adjusted for fiscal parameters
C = q.(l-A).[(l-T).r+s-q/q]/P.(l-T)
Computed corresponding measure of the nominal user cost
I : Real gross private fixed capital formation (investment)
[National Accounts of Greece]
Computed Jorgenson’s composite, with or without adjustment 
for fiscal parameters 
J = p.Y/c
K : Computed real net private capital stock
Computed real flow of new credit to the private sector
L = First difference of ’Domestic Credit: Claims on 
Private Sector' deflated by q.
LC : Computed real ’net flow of finance’ to the private sector
LC = L-r.[’Domestic Credit: Claims on Private Sector']_i/q
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NI : Computed real net private fixed capital formation (Investment)
Computed Implicit GDP deflator
Computed Implicit deflator for gross private fixed capital 
formation (Investment)
loan rate [IFS]
S : Computed nominal user cost divided by an Index of nominal
wages.
(I) unadjusted for fiscal parameters
S = q.[r+s-q/q]/W
(II) adjusted for fiscal parameters
S - q.(1-A).[(l-r).r+s-q/q]/W.(1-t )
s : Computed rate of physical depreciation of private capital
stock
Computed rate of corporate taxation
Real gross domestic product [National Accounts of Greece]
W : Index of nominal wages [IFS
First differences:
HC% = Ct - Ct_i
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HJt = J’t - Jt-1
HSt - St - St-1 
HYt = Yt - Yt_i
Weighted differences 
DCt = Ct - (l-s).Ct-i
DJt = dt " (l-s).Jt-l 
DLt = Lt - (l-s).Lt-x 
DLC^ = LCt — (1—s).LCt—]_
DSt = St - (l-s).St-i 
DYt = Yt - (l-s).Yt-i
N b . Quantities (I, N I , Y, L, LC, K) are measured in (American) Billions 
of 1970 Drachmas. Rates are defined per year.
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EQUATIONS DESCENDING FROM THE HALL/JORGENSON MODEL
PURE ACCELERATOR VERSION
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 1
Nit = 0.57HYt + 0.55HYt_i + 0.45HYt_2 + 0.36HYt_3 + 0.61Lt_2 
(4.81**) (4.49**) (3.63**) (2.87**) (7.58**)
S = 5.13
Zi(l) = 2.60 22(1,18) = 2.03 D.W. = 1.32?
23(5,14) = 2.27 2 4 (5 ) = 18.03- 2 5 (4 ,15) = 1.96
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt-2/HYt-3/Lt/Lt-l/Lt_2/Lt-3 
** ** ** **
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: L 
EQUATION 2
Nit “ 0.55HYt + 0.65HYt_i + 0.5IHYt_2 + 0.37HYt_3 + 48.0HCt 
( 7 . 9 2 * * )  ( 7 . I I * * )  ( 4 . 7 4 * * )  ( 3 . 7 9 * * )  ( 2 . 9 1 * * )
+  6 2 . 0 H C t _ i  +  7 I . 0 H C t _ 2  +  0 . 5 4 L t _ 2  
( 3 . 8 9 * * )  ( 5 . 2 2 * * )  ( 1 1 . 0 5 * * )
S = 2.98
Z i ( I )  =  1 . 6 7  2 2 ( 1 , 1 5 )  -  1 . 0 9  D.W. -  1 . 4 4 ?
2 3 ( 5 , 1 1 )  =  0 . 5 4  25 ( 5 ,10 ) =  0 . 3 4
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt-i/HYt-2/HYt_3/HCt/HCt_i/HCt_2/HCt-3/Lt
** ** ** ** ** **
A t - l A t - 2 A t - 3
**
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REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: LC 
EQUATION 3
Nit = 0.58HYt + 0.58HYt_i + 0.78HYt_2 + 0.58HYt_3 + 121.0HCt_i 
(3.14**) (3.05**) (3.25**) (2.21**) (2.52**)
+ 129.0HCt_2 + 64.0HCt_3 + 0.55LCt_3 
(3.76**) (2.04*) (1.81*)
S = 7.59
Zi(l) = 3.48 22(1,14) = 2.21 D.W. = 1.10?
23(5,10) = 6.04- 2 5 (4 ,1 1 ) = 1.10
Nit = /HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt-3/HCt/HCt-i/HCt_2/HCt_3/LCt/ 
** ** * ** ** **
LCt_1/LGt_2/LOt-3
Nb. Problems with 'other'statistics
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REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: L
EQUATION 4
Nit = 0.52HYt + 0.69HYt_i + 0.49HYt_2 + 0.38HYt_3 + 47.0HCt 
(7.86**) (7.97**) (5.00**) (4.21**) (3.79**)
+ 54.0HCt_1 + 60.0HCt_2 * 0.58Lt_2 
(4.52**) (5.58**) (12.46**)
S = 2.84
Zi(l) = 1.44 22(1,15) = 0.94 D.W. = 1.49?
23(5,11) = 0.21 2 5 (5 ,1 0 ) = 0.25
Nit - /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt-2/HYt-3/HCt/HCt_i/HCt_2/HCt_3/




REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: LC 
EQUATION 5
Nit = 0.46HYt + 0.44HYt_i + 0.83HYt_2 + 0.84HYt_4 + 154.0HCt_i 
(3.60**) (3.57**) (5.72**) (5.81**) (6.05**)
+ 74.0HCt_2 + 130.0HCt_3 + 60.0HCt_4 + 0.80LCt_3 
(3.35**) (5.98**) (2.98**) (3.93**)
S = 4.60
Zi(l) = 0.35 22(1,12) - 0.20 D.W. = 1.87?
2 3 (5 ,8 ) - 1.34 2 5 (6 ,7 ) - 0.18
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt-3/HYt-4/HCt/HCt_i/HCt_2/HCt_3/
** ** *
/ H C  t - 4 / L C t / L C  t - l / L C t _ 2 / L C t - 3
*
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT
ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: L
EQUATION 6
N i t  =  5 . 6 0  +  0 . 4 4 H Y t  +  0 . 4 5 H Y t _ i  +  0 . 5 9 H Y t _ 2  +  0 . 3 5 H Y t _ 3  
( 1 . 9 0 * ) ( 4 . 2 6 * * )  ( 4 . 3 1 * * )  ( 4 . 4 5 * * )  ( 2 . 7 0 * * )
+  8 9 1 . 0 H S t _ i  +  9 1 7 . 0 H S t _ 2  +  0 . 4 4 L t _ 2  
( 2 . 4 2 * * )  ( 3 . 3 0 * * )  ( 5 . 2 3 * * )
S = 3 . 8 1  R ^  -  0 . 8 7
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 7 9  2 2 ( 1 , 1 3 )  =  0 . 4 9  D . W .  -  1 . 6 3 ?
23 ( 5 ,9 ) =  0 . 3 1  25 ( 5 ,8 ) =  0 . 5 2
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt-3/HSt/HSt-i/HSt-2/HSt-3/ 








Nit = 0.48HYt + 0.67HYt-i + 0.54KYt-2 + 0.45HYt_3 + 714.0HSt 
( 5 . 2 3 * * )  ( 5 . 5 4 * * )  ( 3 . 8 4 * * )  ( 3 . 5 4 * * )  ( 2 . 1 9 * * )
+  9 4 0 . 0 H S t _ i  +  9 9 4 . 0 H S t - 2  +  0 . 5 3 L t _ 2  
( 3 . 1 7 * * )  ( 3 . 9 4 * * )  ( 8 . 6 9 * * )
S = 3.66
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 5 8  2 2 ( 1 , 1 3 )  =  0 . 3 6  D.W. =  1 . 6 5 ?
2 3 ( 5 ,9 ) =  0 . 5 8  2 5 ( 5 ,8 ) =  0 . 4 9
Nit - /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt_3/HSt/HSt-l/HSt._2/HSt-3/Lt/l-t-l/ 
** ** ** ** * **
/Lt-2/Lt-3
*
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 8
NIt = 19.0 + G.lBHYt + 0.37HYt_i + 0.73HYt_2 + 1804.0HSt_i +
(11.69**)(2.14*) (4.39**) (6.98**) (7.04**)
+  1 2 8 6 . 0 H S t _ 2  +  5 1 2 . 0 H S t _ 4  +  0 . 3 0 L C t _ 2  +  0 . 3 4 L C t _ 3
(5.88**) (3.00**) (3.10**) (2.94**)
S = 2.89 R^ = 0.92
Zi(l) = 0.83 22(1,10) - 0.44 D.W. = 1.70?
2 3 (5 ,6 ) = 2.86 2 5 (6 ,5 ) = 0.98
NIt = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt_3/HYt-4/HSt/HSt-i/HSt-2/HSt-3/ 
** * ** ** **
/HS t—4 /LC t/LCt—1/LC t—2/LC t—3
*
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JORGENSON COMPOSITE NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: LC
EQUATION 9
NIt = 0.57E-3HJt_i + 1.31E-3HJt_2 + 0.71E-3HJt_3 + 1.7210^-2 
( 1 . 7 8 * )  ( 3 . 4 2 * * )  ( 1 . 9 7 * )  ( 2 . 8 6 * * )
+  2 . 1 2 L C t _ 3  
( 3 . 4 5 * * )
S = 18.64
Zi(l) = 1.76 22(1,17) = 1.36 D.W. = 1.12?
23(5,13) = 2.03 2 4 (5 ) = 17.83- 2 5 (3 ,15) = 2.05
NIt = /HJt/HJt-l/HJt-2/HJt-3/LCt/LCt_i/LCt-2/LCt_3/ 
* ** ** **
Nb. Problems with 'other' statistics.
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EQUATIONS DESCENDING FROM THE COEN MODEL
PURE ACCELERATOR VERSION
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 10
It = 0.59DYt + 0.28DLt_2 + 0.781^-1 
(6.94**) (2.40**) (22.04**)
S = 3.91
Zi(l) = 0.85 22(1,20) = 0.74 h = -0.77
23(5,16) = 0.77 2 4 (5 ) - 3.94 2 5 (7 ,13) = 0.54
It = /CON/DYt/DYt-i/DYt-2/DYt-3/DLt/DLt_i/DLt_2/DLt_3/It-l 
** **
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REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 11
I t  =  O . S B D Y t  +  2 6 . 0 D C t _ i  +  0 . 2 3 D L t _ 2  +  0 . 7 9 1 % - !  
( 7 . 1 2 * * )  ( 1 . 7 6 * )  ( 1 . 9 8 * )  ( 2 3 . 1 7 * * )
S = 3.73
Zi(l) = 2 . 3 0  2 2 ( 1 , 1 9 )  -  1 . 9  h -  - 1 . 4 3
2 3 ( 5 , 1 5 )  =  0 . 5 5  2 4 ( 5 ) =  3 . 2 5  2 5 ( 9 ,10 ) =  0 . 8 0





REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 12
I t  =  0 . 5 7 D Y t  +  2 7 . 0 D C t - i  +  0 . 2 0 D L C t _ 2  +  0 . 8 0 1 ^ - 1  
(6.97**) ( 1 . 8 5 * )  (I.91*) ( 2 3 . 7 6 * * )
S = 3.75
Z i ( I )  =  2 . 5 3  2 2 ( 1 , 1 9 )  -  2 . 0 9  h  =  - 1 . 4 7
2 3 ( 5 , 1 5 )  =  0 . 5 4  24 ( 5 ) =  3 . 0 3  25 ( 9 , 1 0 )  =  0 . 8 6




REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE: L
EQUATION 13
I t  “  O . S S D Y t  +  2 1 . 0 D C t _ i  +  0 . 2 1 D L t _ 2  +  0 . 7 9 l t _ i  
( 7 . 0 5 * * )  ( 1 . 7 3 * )  ( 1 . 8 1 * )  ( 2 3 . 0 2 * * )
S = 3.74
Z i ( l )  =  1 . 9 9  2 2 ( 1 , 1 9 )  =  1 . 6 4  h  =  - 1 . 3 2
2 3 ( 5 , 1 5 )  =  0 . 4 8  2 4 ( 5 ) =  2 . 8 2  25 ( 9 ,10 ) =  0 . 7 4




NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT
ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 14
It- =  O . S S D Y t  +  4 0 6 . 0 D S t - i  +  0 . 2 4 D L t _ 2  +  0 . 7 9 1 % - !  
( 7 . 1 0 * * )  ( 1 . 8 0 * )  ( 2 . 1 4 * )  ( 2 2 . 9 9 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 3
Zi(l) = 1.88 22(1,18) = 1.54 h = -1.33
23(5,14) = 0.60 2 4 (5 ) - 3.14 2 5 (1 0 ,7) « 0.52




(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
284
NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT
ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 15
I t  =  0 . 5 7 D Y t  +  4 2 6 . 0 D S t - i  +  0 . 2 2 D L C t _ 2  +  0 . 8 0 I t - i  
( 6 . 9 5 * * )  ( 1 . 8 9 * )  ( 2 . 0 9 * )  ( 2 3 . 8 5 * * )
S = 3.75
Z i ( l )  =  2 . 1 0  2 2 ( 1 , 1 8 )  =  1 . 7 2  h  =  - 1 . 3 9
2 3 ( 5 , 1 4 )  =  0 . 6 1  24 ( 5 ) -  3 . 1 6  25 ( 1 0 ,7 ) =  0 . 5 2




(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 16
It = O.SSDYt + 354.0DSt-i + 0.23DLt_2 + 0.79It_i 
(7.07**) (1.85*) (2.00*) (23.02**)
S = 3.72
Zi(l) = 1.77 22(1,18) = 1.45 h = -1.30
23(5,14) = 0.57 2 4 (5 ) - 3.03 2 5 (8 ,1 0 ) = 0.84
It = /CON/DYt/DYt_i/DYt-2/DSt/DSt-i/DSt-2/DLt/DLt-i/DLt_2/ 
** *
/DLt-3/It-l 
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED 
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 17
I t  =  0 . 5 6 D Y t  +  3 7 1 . 0 D S t _ i  +  0 . 2 0 D L C t _ 2  +  0 . 8 0 I t _ i  
( 6 . 9 3 * * )  ( 1 . 9 4 * )  ( 1 . 9 5 * )  ( 2 3 . 6 6 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 4
Zx(l) = 1.98 22(1,18) = 1.62 h = -1.35
23(5,14) = 0.58 2 4 (5 ) = 3.06 2 5 (1 0 ,7 ) = 0.55
It = /CON/DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DYt_3/DSt/DSt_i/DSt_2/DSt_3/ 
/DLCt/DLCt-i/DLCt_2/DLCt_3/It-l
**
(LM(1); F version only non-significant)
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It = O.SlDYt + 0.23DYt_i + 0.29Lt_i + 0.61It_i 
(5.99**) (2.11**) (2.41**) (8.06**)
S = 3.86
Zi(l) = 0.95 22(1,21) - 0.80 h = -0.87
23(5,17) = 0.96 2 4 (5 ) = 5.76 2 5 (7 ,1 2 ) = 0.61





PURE ACCELERATOR VERSION 
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 19
It = O.SODYt + 0.20LCt_i + 0.801%-!
(5.56**) (1.90*) (22.09**)
S = 4.09
Zi(l) = 2.19 22(1,22) = 1.92 h = -1.47




REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 20
It = 0.52DYt + 0.21DYt_i + 0.36DYt_2 + 65.000^-1 + 36.000^-2 
(7.37**) (2.28**) (2.93**) (4.30**) (2.83**)
+ 0.24Lt_2 * 0.511^—1 
(2.10*) (5.22**)
S = 3.08
Zi(l) - 2.91 22(1,16) - 2.03 h - -1.86-
2 3 (5 ,1 2 ) = 0.25 2 4 (5 ) = 2.35 2 5 (6 ,1 0 ) = 0.47
It - /DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DYt_3/DCt/DCt-i/DCt_2/»Ct-3/Lt/Lt-l/Lt_2
** ** ** *
A t - 3/It-l
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REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 21
I t  -  0 . 5 3 D Y t  +  4 0 . 0 D C t _ i  +  2 8 . 0 D C t _ 2  +  0 . 1 7 L C t _ i  
(6.80**) ( 2 . 8 9 * * )  ( 2 . 0 5 * * )  ( 1 . 8 7 * )
+  0 . 7 9 I t - i  
( 2 5 . 3 0 * * )
S = 3.47
Zi(l) = 3.48 22(1,18) = 2.72 h = -1.85-





REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 22
I t  =  0 . 5 2 D Y t  +  0 . 1 8 D Y t _ i  +  0 . 3 3 D Y t _ 2  +  5 1 . 0 D C t _ i  +  2 9 . 0 0 0 ^ - 2  
( 7 . 2 7 * * )  ( 1 . 9 5 * )  ( 2 . 7 2 * * )  ( 4 . 2 8 * * )  ( 2 . 7 4 * * )
+ 0.22Lt_2 + 0.55It_i 
(1.86*) (5.71**)
S = 3.11
Zi(l) = 2.25 22(1,16) = 1.56 h = -1.63
23(5,12) = 0.19 2 4 (5 ) = 2.16 2 5 (4 ,13) = 0.55
t - /DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DCt/DCt-i/DCt_2/LtAt-l/Lt-2At-3/




REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L C
E Q U A T I O N  2 3
I t  =  0 . 4 8 D Y t  +  2 2 . 0 D C t _ i  +  0 . 1 9 L C t _ i  +  0 . 8 1 1 ^ - 1  
( 5 . 5 9 * * )  ( 1 . 8 8 * )  ( 1 . 8 3 * )  ( 2 2 . 9 5 * * )
S  =  3 . 9 4
Z i ( l )  -  3 . 2 8  22(1,20) -  2.73 h -  -1.36
23(5,16) = 0.19 2 4 (5 ) = 2.01 2 5 (9 ,1 0 ) = 1.15




(Iü(l): F version only non-significant)
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT
ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L C
E Q U A T I O N  2 4
I t  =  0 . 5 2 D Y t  +  4 7 1 . 0 D S t _ i  +  0 . 1 9 L C t _ i  +  0 . 7 9 l t - i  
( 6 . 0 2 * * )  ( 2 . 0 8 * )  ( 1 . 9 4 * )  ( 2 3 . 0 8 * * )
S  =  3 . 8 0
Zi(l) = 2.67 22(1,18) = 2.19 h = -1.65-
23(5,14) = 0.49 2 4 (5 ) - 4.43 2 5 (1 0 ,7 ) = 0.58
It = /CON/DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DYt-3/DSt/DSt_i/DSt_2/DSt-3/LCt/LCt_i/ 
/LCt-2/LCt-3/It-l
**
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND
ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 25
I t  =  O . S l D Y t  +  4 2 0 . 0 D S t _ i  +  0 . 1 8 L C t _ i  +  0 . 8 0 I t - i  
( 6 . 0 8 * * )  ( 2 . 2 2 * )  ( 1 . 9 1 * )  ( 2 3 . 3 9 * * )
S = 3.75
Zi(l) = 2.74 22(1,18) - 2.25 h = -1.67 -
23(5,14) = 0.44 2 4 (5 ) -  4.27 2 5 (1 0 ,7 ) =  0 . 5 8




(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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EQUATIONS DESCENDING FROM THE SUNDARARAJAN/THAKUR MODEL
REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS 
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 26
I t  ----- 8 7 . 0  +  0 . 4 8 Y t  +  0 . 2 8 Y t _ i  +  4 4 . 0 0 ^  +  4 5 . 0 0 ^ - 1
( - 1 0 . 2 9 * * ) ( 7 . 1 5 * * )  ( 3 . 0 6 * * )  ( 2 . 7 5 * * )  ( 3 . 3 5 * * )
+ 28.0Ct_2 + 0.28Lt_2 - 0.23Kt_i 
( 2 . 3 1 * * )  ( 2 . 5 0 * * )  ( - 1 2 . 4 8 * * )
S  =  2 . 6 2  R ^  -  0 . 9 7
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 5 3  2 2 ( 1 , 1 6 )  -  0 . 3 5  D.W. = 1 . 7 3 ?
2 3 ( 5 , 1 2 )  =  0 . 6 2  25 (4 ,12 ) =  0 . 4 5
t - /CONAtAt-lAt-2/Ct/Ct-l/Ct-2AtAt-l/Lt-2/Lt-3/ 




REAL USER COST NOT ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS 
CREDIT MEASURE : LC
EQUATION 27
It - -90.0 + O.SOYt + 0.29Yt_i + 45.00% + 45.0C%_i
(-10.27**)(7.75**) (3.35**) (3.04**) (3.70**)
24.0C%_2 - 0.17LC% + 0.24LC%_2 - 0.23K%_i 
(2.11*) (-1.90*) (2.39**) (-10.36**)
S = 2.42 R^ = 0.98
Zi(l) = 0.01 22(1,15) = 0.06 D.W. = 2.11?
23(5,11) = 0.49 25(3,12) - 0.12
1% = /CONAtAt-lAt-2/Ct/Ct-l/Ct-2/LCt/LCt_i/LCt_2/ 
** ** * ** *
/LC%_3/Kt_i
**
N b . Problems with ’other' statistics.
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REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E :  L  
E Q U A T I O N  2 8
I t  =  - 7 4 . 0  +  0 . 4 5 Y t  +  0 . 2 7 Y t - i  +  5 2 . 0 C t  -  0 . 3 0 L t
( - 6 . 1 4 * * ) ( 4 . 7 2 * * )  ( 1 . 9 1 * )  ( 2 . 4 8 * * )  ( - 1 . 8 7 * )
+  0 . 3 4 L t _ 2  -  0 . 2 1 K t _ i  
( 2 . 0 5 * )  ( - 7 . 6 4 * * )
S  =  3 . 6 9  R ^  =  0 . 9 5
Z i ( l )  -  0 . 5 4  2 2 ( 1 , 1 7 )  “  0 . 3 8  D . W .  =  1 . 7 3 ?
2 3 ( 5 , 1 3 )  =  1 . 6 8  25( 7 ,10) -  1 . 7 1
I t  - /CONAtAt-lAt-2At-3/Ct/Ct-l/Ct-2/Ct-3AtAt-l/ 
** ** 
A t - 2 A t - 3 A t - l
**
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NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E :  L
E Q U A T I O N  2 9
I t  ----- 1 0 5 . 0  +  0 . 5 3 Y t  +  0 . 3 0 Y t _ i  +  8 9 3 . 0 8 %  +  7 6 5 . 0 S % _ i
( - 9 . 0 4 * * ) ( 7 . 4 7 * * )  ( 3 . 2 6 * * )  ( 3 . 1 3 * * )  ( 3 . 7 1 * * )
+  6 5 3 . 0 S % _ 2  +  0 . 2 8 L % _ 2  -  0 . 2 4 K % _ i  
( 3 . 1 9 * * )  ( 2 . 7 2 * * )  ( - 1 1 . 9 0 * * )
S  =  2 . 5 1  R ^  =  0 . 9 7
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 4 2  2 2 ( 1 , 1 4 )  =  0 . 2 7  D . W .  =  2 . 0 9 ?
2 3 ( 5 , 1 0 )  =  0 . 2 1  25(4 ,11) =  0 . 5 2
It = /CONAtAt-lAt-2/St/St-l/St-2/LtAt-lAt-2At-3/




NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND NOT ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L C
E Q U A T I O N  3 0
It = -100.0 + O.SlYt + 0.28Yt_i + 876.OS^ + 800.08^-1
(-8.71**)(7.34**) (2.99**) (3.13**) (3.91**)
+ 687.0St-2 + 0.27LCt_2 ~ 0.22Kt_i 
(3.37**) (2.78**) (-10.36**)
S  = 2.49 R^ - 0.97
Zi(l) = 0.47 22(1,14) - 0.30 D . W .  = 2.13?
23(5,10) - 0.21 25(4,11) - 0.53
It = /CONAtAt-lAt-2/St/St-l/St-2/LCt/LCt_i/LCt_2/LCt_3/




NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L
E Q U A T I O N  3 1
I t  =  - 9 5 . 0  +  0 . 4 6 Y t  +  0 . 3 5 Y t _ i  +  8 6 5 . 0 8 %  +  6 7 6 . 0 S % _ i
( - 8 . 6 9 * * ) ( 6 . 2 6 * * )  ( 3 . 3 9 * * )  ( 3 . 1 0 * * )  ( 3 . 6 7 * * )
+  5 1 7 . 0 S % _ 2  +  0 . 2 8 L % _ 2  -  0 . 2 3 K % _ i  
( 2 . 8 3 * * )  ( 2 . 5 7 * * )  ( - 1 1 . 3 4 * * )
S  =  2 . 6 4  R ^  =  0 . 9 7
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 9 4  2 2 ( 1 , 1 4 )  -  0 . 6 0  D . W .  =  2 . 0 5 ?
23( 5 ,10) =  0 . 3 6  25( 6 ,8) “  1 . 1 4
1% = /CONAtAt-lAt-2At-3/St/St-l/St-2/St-3At/Lt-l 




NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L C
E Q U A T I O N  3 2
I t  =  - 9 1 . 0  +  0 . 4 4 Y t  +  0 . 3 2 Y t _ i  +  8 5 3 . 0 5 %  +  7 0 8 . 0 S % _ i
( - 8 . 2 9 * * ) ( 6 . 0 6 * * )  ( 3 . 1 6 * * )  ( 3 . 1 0 * * )  ( 3 . 8 7 * * )
5 4 6 . 0 S % _ 2  +  0 . 2 7 L C % _ 2  -  0 . 2 1 K % _ i  
( 2 . 9 9 * * )  ( 2 . 6 1 * * )  ( - 9 . 7 6 * * )
S  =  2 . 6 2  R ^  =  0 . 9 7
Z i ( l )  =  0 . 9 7  2 2 ( 1 , 1 4 )  -  0 . 6 2  D . W .  =  2 . 0 9 ?
23( 5 ,10) =  0 . 3 5  25( 6 ,8) =  1 . 1 3
1% = /CONAtAt-lAt-2At-3/St/St-l/St-2/St-3/LCt/LCt_i/ 
** ** * **
/LCt_2/LCt_3/K%_i
**
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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EQUATIONS DESCENDING FROM THE HALL/JORGENSON MODEL
DEPENDENT VARIABLE EXCLUDES RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
PURE ACCELERATOR VERSION 
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 33
N i t  =  3  5 4  +  0 . 1 3 H Y t  +  0 . 3 1 H Y t _ i  +  0 . 2 0 H Y t _ 2  +  0 . 1 6 H Y t _ 3
( 2 . 2 5 * * )  ( 2 . 2 5 * * )  ( 5 . 4 1 * * )  ( 3 . 6 0 * * )  ( 2 . 7 3 * * )
+ 0.12HYt_4 + 0.28Lt_i 
( 1 . 8 2 * )  ( 5 . 8 0 * * )
S = 2 . 1 9  R^ = 0 . 8 7
Zi(l) =  1 . 1 3  2 2 ( 1 , 1 5 )  = 0 . 7 7  D.W. = 1 . 5 5 ?
2 3 ( 5 , 1 1 )  =  1 . 2 7  24( 5) -  8 . 0  25( 3 ,13) =  2 . 1
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt_3/HYt_4/Lt/ 
** ** ** *
A t - i A t - 2 A t - 3
*
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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D E P E N D E N T  V A R I A B L E  E X C L U D E S  R E S I D E N T I A L  C O N S T R U C T I O N  
R E A L  U S E R  C O S T  A D J U S T E D  F O R  F I S C A L  P A R A M E T E R S  
C R E D I T  M E A S U R E  : L
E Q U A T I O N  3 4
N i t  =  0 . 2 2 H Y t  +  0 . 2 5 H Y t _ i  +  0 . 2 8 H Y t _ 2  +  0 . 1 6 H Y t _ 3  +  
( 5 . 0 4 * * )  ( 5 . 0 1 * * )  ( 5 . 2 3 * * )  ( 2 . 7 3 * * )
+  0 . 2 6 H Y t _ 4  +  4 3 . 0 H C t _ i  +  3 6 . 0 H C t _ 2  +  2 9 . 0 H C t _ 3  
( 3 . 6 3 * * )  ( 4 . 4 6 * * )  ( 3 . 5 2 * * )  ( 2 . 2 4 * * )
+ 0.17Lt + 0.16Lt_3 
( 2 . 7 7 * * )  ( 3 . 4 4 * * )
S  -  1 . 8 0
Z i ( l )  =  1 . 2 9  Z 2 ( 1 , 1 2 )  =  0 . 7 0  D . W .  =  1 . 5 6 ?
Z 3 ( 5 , 8 )  -  0 . 8 0  Z s ( 5 , 7 )  =  0 . 9 1
Nit = /CON/HYt/HYt_i/HYt_2/HYt_3/HYt_4/HCt/HCt_i/HCt_2/ 
** ** ** ** **
/HCt-3/HCt_4/Lt/Lt_i/Lt_2/Lt-3
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE EXCLUDES RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
NOMINAL USER COST DIVIDED BY INDEX OF NOMINAL WAGES AND ADJUSTED 
FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 35
N i t  “  O . l S H Y t  +  0 . 3 8 H Y t _ i  +  0 . 2 0 H Y t _ 2  +  0 . 2 8 H Y t _ 3  
( 2 . 8 6 * * )  ( 5 . 8 0 * * )  ( 2 . 8 4 * * )  ( 3 . 6 0 * * )
+  3 7 4 . 0 H S t - 2  +  0 . 3 8 L t _ i  
( 2 . 0 3 * )  ( 9 . 2 4 * * )
S = 2.51
Z i ( l )  -  0 . 6 1  2 2 ( 1 , 1 5 )  -  0 . 4 4  D.W. = 1 . 6 4 ?
23 ( 5 ,11 ) =  0 . 9 1  24 ( 5 ) =  6 . 6 4  2 5 ( 8 , 6 ) =  1 . 5 4




EQUATIONS DESCENDING FROM THE BLEJER/KHAN MODEL
DEPENDENT VARIABLE EXCLUDES RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
PURE ACCELERATOR VERSION 
CREDIT MEASURE : L
EQUATION 36
It = G.lSDYt + 0.22DYt_i + 0.14Lt_i + 0.66It_i 
(4.44**) (4.87**) (2.42**) (11.21**)
S = 1.68
Zi(l) = 0.26 22(1,21) = 0.22 h = -0.41






DEPENDENT VARIABLE EXCLUDES RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
REAL USER COST ADJUSTED FOR FISCAL PARAMETERS 
CREDIT MEASURE: L
EQUATION 37
I t  =  0 . 1 7 D Y t  +  0 . 1 9 D Y t _ i  +  I S . O D C t  +  2 6 . 0 D C t _ i  
( 4 . 6 4 * * )  ( 4 . 5 1 * * )  ( 1 . 8 6 * )  ( 3 . 2 8 * * )
+ 1 7 . 0 D C t _ 2  +  O . l O L t  +  0 . 7 1 I t - i
( 2 . 4 8 * * )  ( 1 . 9 5 * )  ( 1 4 . 2 6 * * )
S = 1.47
Z i ( l )  -  2 . 5 5  2 2 ( 1 , 1 6 )  -  1 . 7 7  h  -  - 0 . 3 5
2 3 ( 5 , 1 2 )  =  0 . 4 9  24 ( 5 ) =  6 . 7 9  25 ( 7 ,9 ) =  0 . 3 3
It = /CON/DYt/DYt_i/DYt_2/DYt_3/DCt/DCt_i/DCt_2/ 
** **
/DCc_3/Lt/Lt_i/Lt_2/Lt_3/lt-l
(LM(1): F version only non-significant)
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APPENDIX M
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (2SLS> ESTIMATES 
OF THE INVESTMENT FUNCTION IN GREECE 1958-1985
The equations are numbered so as to correspond to the reported OLSQ 
estimates.
Nb Zg(l) is an LM test of first order residual autocorrelation under 
instrumental variables estimation, distributed as %2(1).
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EQUATION 1
Nit = 0.62HYt + 0.53HYt_i + 0.44HYt_2 + 0.35HYt_3 






Nit = 0.57HYt + 0.64HYt_i + 0.51HYt_2 + 0.37HYt_3 
(7.73**) (6.72**) (4.66**) (3.75**)
+ 47.0HCt + 62.0HCt_i + 70.0HCt_2 + 0.54Lt_2 
(2.64**) (3.86**) (5.16**) (11.0**)
S = 2.99 
Z g d )  = 1.65
EQUATION 3
Nit - 0.64HYt + 0.55HYt_i + 0.76HYt_2 + 0.58HYt_3 
(3.14**) (2.85**) (3.15**) (2.18**)
+ 119.0HCt_i + 129.0HCt_2 + 69.0HCt_3 + 0.52LCt_3 
(2.46**) (3.73**) (2.05**) (1.70)
S = 7.62 
Z g d )  = 4.25 -
309
EQUATION 4
Nit “ 0.53HYt + 0.68HYt_i + 0.50HYt_2 + 0.38HYt_3 
(7.82**) (7.80**) (5.0**) (4.18**)
+ 46.0HCt + 54.0HCt_i + 59.0HCt_2 + 0.58Lt_2 
(3.65**) (4.50**) (5.54**) (12.41**)
S = 2.84 
Z g d )  = 1.55
EQUATION 5
Nit = 0.52HYt + 0.42HYt_i + 0.81HYt_2 + 0.85HYt_4 
(3.52**) (3.24**) (5.44**) (5.81**)
+ 149.0HCt_i + 71.0HCt_2 + 129.0HCt_3 + 56.0HCt_4 






Nit = 4.90 + 0.50HYt + 0.44HYt_i + 0.59HYt_2 + 0.35HYt_3
(1.62) (4.17**) (4.07**) (4.35**) (2.65**)
+ 863.0HSt_i + 905.0HSt_2 + 0.45Lt_2 
(2.31**) (3.21**) (5.24**)




Nit = 0-50HYt + 0.64HYt_i + 0.55HYt_2 + 0.44HYt_3 
(5.27**) (5.22**) (3.84**) (3.47**)
+ 659.0HSt + 925.0HSt_i + 973.0HSt_2 + 0.53Lt_2 
(1.93*) (3.10**) (3.82**) (8.66**)
S = 3.67 
Zgd )  = 0.72
EQUATION
Nit = 19.0 + 0.16HYt + 0.37HYt_i + 0.73HYt_2 + 1814.0HSt_i
(11.63**)(1.82*) (4.39**) (6.98**) (7.03**)
+ 1288.0HSt_2 + 517.0HSt_4 + 0.30LCt_2 + 0.35LCt_3 
(5.88**) (3.02**) (3.10**) (2.96**)
S = 2.89 
Zgd) = 0.60
EQUATION 10
0.60DYt + 0.28DLt_2 + 0.78It_i 
(6.81**) (2.41**) (21.14**)
S = 3.91 
Z6(l) = 0.81
1. Nb Equation 9 does not require instrumentation.
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EQUATION 11
I t  =  0 . 6 0 D Y t  +  2 6 . 0 D C t _ i  +  0 . 2 3 D L t _ 2  +  0 . 7 8 1 ^ - 1  
( 7 . 1 4 * * )  ( 1 . 7 3 * )  ( 2 . 0 1 * )  ( 2 2 . 1 8 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 4
Z g ( l )  =  2 . 3 8
E Q U A T I O N  1 2
I t  =  0 . 5 9 D Y t  +  
( 6 . 9 9 * * )
2 7 . 0 D C t _ i
( 1 . 8 3 * )
+  0 .20D L C t —2 
( 1 . 9 2 * )
+  0 . 7 9 I t _ i  
( 2 2 . 7 8 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 6
Z g d )  =  2 . 5 9
E Q U A T I O N  1 3
I t  =  0 . 6 0 D Y t  +  
( 7 . 1 0 * * )
2 0 . 0 D C t _ i
( 1 . 7 0 )
+  0 . 2 2 D L t _ 2  
( 1 . 8 4 * )
+  0 . 7 8 I t — 1  
( 2 2 . 0 4 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 5
Z g d )  =  2 . 0 4
E Q U A T I O N  1 4
I t  =  0 . 5 9 D Y t  +  
( 7 . 1 2 * * )
4 0 4 . 0 D S t _
( 1 . 7 9 * )
2 +  0 . 2 4 D L t — 2  
( 2 . 1 5 * * )
+  0 . 7 8 I t - i  
( 2 2 . 7 6 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 3
Z g d )  =  1 . 9 8
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EQUATION 15
0 . 5 7 D Y t  +  4 2 5 . 0 D S t - i  +  0 . 2 2 D L C t _ 2  +  0 . 8 0 l t _ i  
( 6 . 9 5 * * )  ( 1 . 8 8 * )  ( 2 . 0 9 * )  ( 2 3 . 3 0 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 5  
Z g d )  =  2 . 1 9
E Q U A T I O N  1 6
I t  “  0 . 5 8 D Y t +  3 5 3 . 0 D S t _ i  +  0 . 2 3 D L t - -2 +  0 . 7 9 I t _ i
( 7 . 0 9 * * ) ( 1 . 8 4 * )  ( 2 . 0 1 * ) ( 2 2 . 8 0 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 2
Z 6 ( l )  =  1.86
E Q U A T I O N  1 7
I t  =  0 . 5 7 D Y t +  3 6 9 . 0 D S t _ i  +  0 . 2 0 D L C t -2 +  0 8 0 I t _ i
( 6 . 9 3 * * ) ( 1 . 9 3 * )  ( 1 . 9 5 * ) ( 2 3 . 3 8 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 4
Z & ( 1 )  =  2 . 0 6
E Q U A T I O N  1 8
I t  =  0 . 5 1 D Y t +  0 . 2 3 D Y t _ i  +  0 . 3 0 L t _ i +  0 . 6 1 I t - i
( 5 . 6 5 * * ) ( 2 . 0 6 * )  ( 2 . 4 4 * * ) ( 7 . 8 2 * * )
S  =  3 . 9 1
Z g d )  =  0 . 6 2
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EQUATION 19
I t  =  O . S O D Y t  +  0 . 2 0 L C t _ i  +  0 . 8 0 1 % - !  
( 5 . 2 2 * * )  ( 1 . 8 6 * )  ( 2 0 . 8 4 * * )
S  =  4 . 1 6
Z6(l) = 1.86
E Q U A T I O N  2 0
1 %  =  0 . 5 4 D Y %  +  0 . 2 1 D Y % _ !  +  0 . 3 5 D Y % _ 2  +  6 4 . 0 D C % _ !  
( 7 . 3 2 * * )  ( 2 . 1 9 * * )  ( 2 . 8 9 * * )  ( 4 . 2 6 * * )
+  3 6 . 0 D C % _ 2  +  0 . 2 4 L % _ 2  +  0 . 5 0 I % _ !  
( 2 . 8 3 * * )  ( 2 . 1 0 * )  ( 5 . 1 6 * * )
S  =  3 . 0 9
Z g d )  =  2 . 8 2
E Q U A T I O N  2 1
1 %  =  0 . 5 5 D Y %  +  4 0 . 0 D C % _ i  +  2 8 . 0 D C % _ 2  +  0 . 1 6 L C % _ !  
( 6 . 7 4 * * )  ( 2 . 8 9 * * )  ( 2 . 0 7 * )  ( 1 . 7 9 * )
+  0 . 7 8 I % _ !  
( 2 4 . 2 8 * * )
S  =  3 . 4 7
Z g d )  =  3 . 6 2
314
EQUATION 22
I t  =  0 . 5 4 D Y t  +  0 . 1 8 D Y t _ i  +  0 . 3 2 D Y t _ 2  +  5 1 . 0 0 0 ^ - 1  
( 7 . 2 3 * * )  ( 1 . 8 8 * )  ( 2 . 6 9 * * )  ( 4 . 2 4 * * )
+ 29.0DCt_2 + 0.22Lt_2 + 0.551%-!
( 2 . 7 4 * * )  ( 1 . 8 7 * )  ( 5 . 6 5 * * )
S  =  3 . 1 2
Z g d )  -  2 . 1 7
E Q U A T I O N  2 3
1 %  -  0 . 4 9 D Y %  
( 5 . 4 5 * * )
+  2 2 . 0 D C % _ !  +  0 . 1 8 L C % _ !  +  0 . 8 0 I % _ !  
( 1 . 8 7 * )  ( 1 . 8 0 * )  ( 2 2 . 1 0 * * )
S  =  3 . 9 4
Z g d )  =  2 . 9 5
E Q U A T I O N  2 4
1 %  =  0 . 5 2 D Y %  
( 5 . 9 0 * * )
+  4 7 0 . 0 D S % _ !  +  0 . 1 9 L C % _ !  +  0 . 7 9 I % _ !  
( 2 . 0 7 * )  ( 1 . 9 1 * )  ( 2 2 . 4 1 * * )
S  =  3 . 8 0
Z g d )  =  2 . 7 9
E Q U A T I O N  2 5
1 %  =  0 . 5 2 D Y %  
( 5 . 9 8 * * )
+  4 1 9 . 0 D S % _ i  +  0 . 1 8 L C % _ !  +  0 . 7 9 I % _ !  
( 2 . 2 1 * * )  ( 1 . 8 7 * )  ( 2 2 . 7 1 * * )
S  =  3 . 7 5
Z g d )  =  2 . 8 3
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EQUATION 26
It = -88.0 + O.SlYt + 0.25Yt_i + 48.00% + 44.0C%_i
(-10.15**)(7.26**) (2.60**) (2.77**) (3.25**)
+ 28.0C%_2 + 0.29L%_2 - 0.23K%_i 
(2.33**) (2.53**) (-12.17**)
S = 2.64
Z gd) = 0.87
EQUATION 27
1% = -91.0 + 0.54Y% + 0.26Y%_i + 
(-10.21**)(7.86**) (2.85**)




- 0.20LC% + 0.24LC%_ 
(-2.02*) (2.27**)





1% = -76.0 + 0.46Y% + 0.27Y%_i + 
(-6.11**)(4.69**) (1.87*)







Zgd )  = 0.30
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EQUATION 29
I t  =  - 1 0 8 . 0  +  0 . 5 6 Y t  +  0 . 2 9 Y t - i  +  1 0 0 1 . 0 8 %  +  7 4 6 . 0 S % _ i
( - 9 . 0 * * )  ( 7 . 5 6 * * )  ( 2 . 9 6 * * ) ( 3 . 2 9 * * )  ( 3 . 5 8 * * )
+  6 8 2 . 0 S % _ 2  +  0 . 2 9 L % _ 2  -  0 . 2 5 K % _ i  
( 3 . 2 9 * * )  ( 2 . 8 0 * * )  ( - 1 1 . 6 8 * * )
S  =  2 . 5 3
Z e d )  = 0.04
E Q U A T I O N  3 0
1 %  =  - 1 0 4 . 0  +  0 . 5 5 Y %  +  0 . 2 6 Y % _ i  +  9 8 9 . 0 8 %  +  7 8 0 . 0 8 % _ i
( - 8 . 7 1 * * ) ( 7 . 4 7 * * )  ( 2 . 6 7 * * ) ( 3 . 3 0 * * )  ( 3 . 7 7 * * )
+  7 2 1 . 0 8 % _ 2  +  0 . 2 8 L C % _ 2  -  0 . 2 2 K % _ i  
( 3 . 4 8 * * )  ( 2 . 8 2 * * )  ( - 1 0 . 2 7 * * )
8 =  2 . 5 1
Z g ( l )  =  0 . 0 8
E Q U A T I O N  3 1
1 %  ----- 9 6 . 0  +  0 . 4 6 Y %  +  0 . 3 5 Y % _ i  +  9 0 4 . 0 8 %  +  6 7 1 . 8 % _ i
( - 8 . 7 1 * * ) ( 6 . 2 8 * * )  ( 3 . 3 8 * * )  ( 3 . 1 8 * * )  ( 3 . 6 3 * * )
+  5 2 5 . 0 8 % _ 2  +  0 . 2 9 L % _ 2  -  0 . 2 3 K % _ i  
( 2 . 8 7 * * )  ( 2 . 6 2 * * )  ( - 1 1 . 3 3 * * )
8 =  2 . 6 4
Z e d )  =  0 . 0 7
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E Q U A T I O N  3 2
I t  =  - 9 1 . 0  +  0 . 4 5 Y t  +  0 . 3 2 Y t _ i  +  8 8 8 . 0 8 %  +  7 0 3 . 0 S % _ i
( - 8 . 3 1 * * ) ( 6 . 0 9 * * )  ( 3 . 1 2 * * )  ( 3 . 1 7 * * )  ( 3 . 8 4 * * )
+  5 5 4 . 0 S % _ 2  +  0 . 2 8 L C % _ 2  -  0 . 2 1 K % _ i  
( 3 . 0 3 * * )  ( 2 . 6 5 * * )  ( - 9 . 7 7 * * )
S  =  2 . 6 3  
Z g d )  =  0 . 1 2
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APPENDIX N 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEPOSITS TO INCOME.
THE DEPOSIT RATE AND INFLATION IN GREECE. 1961-1985
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Introduction
Whereas in highly developed financial systems where there are many 
alternative financial assets, the demand for money function is normally 
taken to be a negative function of nominal interest rates on some 
substitute non-monetary financial asset, in financially repressed 
economies where hardly any alternative financial assets exist, the demand 
for money is generally seen as a positive function of the real rate of 
interest available on such deposits.
The nature of the relationship between the level of real interest 
rates and the volume of bank deposits is an important element in the 
financial repression and liberalization literature. Complete
deregulation or generous administered rises in bank deposit rates are 
integral components of financial liberalization programmes. Whether 
financial liberalization is likely to promote output growth depends to a 
large extent on the response of the volume of bank deposits to the 
administered rises in deposit rates. If this response is sufficiently 
vigorous, financial liberalization will ensure a substantial increase in 
the resources available to banks for onlending. The increase in the 
resources of banks is bound to be used to reduce the excess demand for 
loans, which is pervasive under financial repression. Investment 
projects that could not materialize under financial repression, for the 
lack of finance, will be carried out after financial liberalization. 
Therefore the accumulation of capital and thus the growth rate of 
aggregate output will be increased by financial liberalization.
A number of studies (summarised in Fry 1988) have found the
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relationship between bank deposits and real interest rates to be 
statistically significant in pooled samples of financially repressed 
economies. We attempt to estimate this relationship on Greek data in the 
context of our effort to apply the financial repression approach to the 
Greek economy. However, we take an interest in this relationship for the 
following reason as well:
In our empirical study of the investment function in Greece (Chapter 
5), we discovered that the sign on all the included significant lags of 
the real user cost variable turned out to be positive. This result 
proved robust to changes in specification, (dependent and independent) 
variable definitions and estimation technique. This result seems 
perverse from a neoclassical point of view. However, we attributed the 
appearance of the positive sign on the user cost to the presence of credit 
rationing, on the following rationale: When the real deposit rate (which
is a series very close to the user cost) is raised, the volume of funds 
deposited with banks (and possibly with the unofficial market) rises.
Thus the flow of new loans and (credit constrained) investment can 
increase. In addition, the accumulation of monetary balances which is 
required before (self financed) purchases of indivisible physical capital 
can occur, becomes more attractive. Therefore, a positive association 
between investment expenditures and the real user cost would be 
justified!. In this Appendix we examine whether this posited 
relationship between credit availability and deposit rates, on which these 
explanations are predicated, exists. If not, there would be little point
1. We do not need to discuss here whether these explanations (for the 
appearance of a positive sign on the real user cost variable) are 
valid when a measure of credit availability is also included in the 
investment equation. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
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in entertaining such explanations in the first place.
Comparison with other studies of money demand
We shall assess the relationship between interest rates and deposits 
by fitting a (deposit) money demand equation. That is, an equation with 
a measure of real (deposit) money balances as its dependent variable and 
various lags of real income, of the real deposit rate (or the nominal 
deposit rate and the rate of inflation separately), as well as lags of the 
dependent variable, as regressors. We note that such estimating 
equations should not always be interpreted as structural demand 
functions (Gordon 1984). However, when we adopt such estimating 
equations, we are able to compare and contrast our econometric procedure 
and results with a very limited sample of studies of money demand in 
Greece. From those recent studies of the demand for money in Greece that 
have been published in English, we select for comparison the papers by 
Brissimis and Leventakis (1981) and Prodromidis (1984).
The similarities and differences between our study and the 
aforementioned papers are as follows: We consider more or less the same
explanatory variables. Brissimis and Leventakis (op.cit.) do not run 
equations including interest rates and the rate of inflation at the same 
time. Neither paper includes the real interest rate as a regressor.
They take their data from Greek sources while our data come from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF (IMF 1986). The 
period covered by our sample is more recent and overlaps only partly with 
the samples of either earlier paper. Brissimis and Leventakis (op.cit.) 
(and I) work with annual data while Prodromidis (op.cit.) makes use of
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(seasonally adjusted) quarterly observations on the monetary aggregates.
Although Brisslmis and Leventakls (op.cit.) and Prodromidis (op.cit.) 
adopt almost identical explanatory variables as here, they explain 
different monetary aggregates. This is due, in part, to the difference 
in the data sources. For example the IPS do not disaggregate between 
time and savings deposits. However in Prodromidis (op.cit.) the 
difference between his measures M2 and M3 is that the latter (but not the 
former) includes private time deposits.
In part, the differences in the dependent variables employed are 
attributable to a difference in the objectives of our study (compared to 
their work). Brissimis and Leventakis (1981) and Prodromidis (1984) 
undertake standard demand for money studies. Accordingly, the authors 
expend some effort to fit equations for Ml and M2. By contrast, the main 
concern of this study is to detect a positive sensitivity of the volume of 
loanable funds (through the banking system) to movements in the real 
deposit rate. Thus we take no particular interest in the demand for 
currency. So, we do not concern ourselves with Ml, a large fraction of 
which is currency (70% on average over our sample period). M2 (as 
defined by Prodromidis op.cit.) does not have an easily interpretable 
credit counterpart and hence is of little interest as well. For our 
purposes, it would not suffice to detect a positive response to the real 
deposit rate for a single narrow deposit aggregate. A positive response 
of any particular narrow aggregate would have no effect on the volume of 
loanable funds if it were offset, say, by a simultaneous reduction in some 
other deposit aggregate. We need establish that comprehensive deposit 
aggregates respond positively to the real deposit rate. Consequently, we
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share with Prodromidis an interest in the demand for M3.
Rather than focusing attention on broad measures of deposits, we could 
establish that each separate component of total deposits responds 
positively to the real deposit rate. Below we indicate a number of 
deposit aggregates that we constructed from the data in the IPS. They 
are ranked in an order from narrower to broader. The criterion of the 
ranking is the fraction of total domestic credit represented by each 
deposit aggregate on average over the period 1961-1985. We fit a demand 
function for each of these aggregates. Thus we confirm that both very 
comprehensive monetary aggregates (e.g. RLQ, RM) and their individual 
components (e.g. RDD, RSD, RBM) respond positively to the real deposit 
rate.
The coverage of our monetary aggregates in terms of loanable funds
(Deposit) Money % of Total 
Domestic Credit 
(1961-1985)
% of Domestic Credit: 
Claims on Private 
Sector (1961-1985)
RDD: Demand Deposits with 
Commercial Banks
RSD: Time, Savings and Other 
Deposits with Commercial 
Banks
RTD: RSD plus RDD
RBM: Time, Savings and Foreign 
Currency Deposits of 
Residents
RDM: Demand Deposits of Private 
Sector plus RBM
RM: Currency Outside Banks
plus RDM
RLQ: Liabilities of Commercial 

















As far as methodology is concerned, our approach differs from 
Brissimis and Leventakis (1981) and Prodromidis (1984) in various ways:
For example, Prodromidis (op.cit.) tends to 'correct' for residual 
autocorrelation by applying the iterative CORC technique.% We take the 
view that residual autocorrelation may be a general sign of 
mispecification. We try to avoid that here by adopting a sufficiently 
general dynamic specification. By contrast, both authors present 'long 
run' money demand equations with current values for the independent 
variables as the only regressors. Not surprisingly, therefore, both 
authors find highly significant values for the D.W. statistic on these 
equations. None of our reported equations (some of which involve 
comparable dependent variables) reached by a structured specification 
search, assumes this form (i.e. includes current values only).
As Brissimis and Leventakis (op.cit.) verify, inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable (on the assumption of a partial adjustment of actual to 
desired money holdings), 'soaks up' the autocorrelation in the residual. 
This confirms the appropriateness of our methodology. We start our 
specification search with a broad equation which possesses a rich dynamic 
structure. Subsequently, we do not impose any a priori (as the authors 
do) but only data derived simplifications. The parsimonious reported 
equations, reached by this procedure all involve a highly significant 
dependent variable.^
2. Note that this fails to yield unconditional standard errors and 
also leads to an overstatement of coefficient significance 
(Johnston 1984, p.327).
3. An equation with current valued explanatory variables is prone to 
simultaneity problems. This possibility is not entertained by 
Brissimis and Leventakis (op.cit.) or Prodromidis (op.cit.). We deal 
with the problem of simultaneity by providing two stage least squares 
estimates as well. We find that simultaneity biases may be quite 
important (at least for annual data).
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The D.W. test is, strictly speaking, invalid in equations with a 
lagged dependent variable. Both authors report values for Durbin's h 
test as well. However, the performance of this statistic in small 
samples is not good (both authors work with less than 50 observations).
So, instead we assess residual autocorrelation on the basis of the LM(1) 
test (x^ and F version). None of these tests are invalidated by the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable. It is suggested (ibid.) that 
the modified LM(1) test performs satisfactorily in very small samples 
(e.g. 20 observations).
Although Brissimis and Leventakis (1981) and Prodromidis (1984) are 
not so much concerned about residual autocorrelation, they share our 
concern with the other diagnostic of mispecification i.e. parameter 
stability tests. Their equations exhibit instability around the time of 
the first oil shock. Our equations are superior in that they prove quite 
stable in the face of the second oil shock (which was more destabilising 
than the first one as argued in Chapter 5). Finally, we start our 
specification search from broad equations which include three lags of each 
variable. Given very limited degrees of freedom we cannot enter lags of 
prices as separate regressors. Thus homogeneity with respect to prices 
has to be imposed. This contrasts with the authors who test this 
restriction; we rely on their findings that the restriction is acceptable 
for all monetary aggregates M l , M2, M3.
Our econometric procedure
We estimate the relationship of each of seven monetary aggregates in 
real terms to real income, the interest rate and inflation. In all the
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equations, the real values of the monetary aggregate and Income are 
entered in logarithms. For each monetary aggregate, we run a) equations 
entering the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate separately (cf. 
semilogarithmic money demand); b) equations entering the nominal interest 
rate and the inflation rate separately and in logarithms (cf. 
doublelogarithmic money demand) and c) equations entering the nominal 
interest rate minus the inflation rate (i.e. the real interest rate).
For each of the 21 possible combinations of monetary aggregate and 
functional form, we begin a specification search by estimating a broad 
equation. This broad equation includes as regressors the current value 
and two lags of each explanatory variable, as well as two lags of the 
dependent variable. If this broad equation is free from residual 
autocorrelation, we proceed to simplify it by omitting more distant and/or 
less significant lags. We continue the simplification until an equation 
is derived with all included variables significant at least at 10%. At 
each stage in the specification search we make sure that none of the 
omissions has induced residual autocorrelation. From such parsimonious 
equations free from residual autocorrelation, we select to report the 
equations with best fit and insignificant parameter stability tests.
As indicators of residual autocorrelation we employ the LM(1) test as 
well as the modified LM(1) test suggested by Durbin (see Harvey 1981, 
p.276). As indicators of parameter stability we employ the 
Chow 'prediction' test as well as Hendry's statistic (Hendry 1979). 
Finally, we report the F test of the linear restrictions imposed on the 
broad equation (from which we start the specification search) in order to 
obtain the parsimonious equation which is reported. All our equations
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pass comfortably the residual autocorrelation and parameter stability 
tests (at 5%). A few reported equations have F tests (vis a vis the
broad) with marginally significant values at 5%.
For the majority of monetary aggregates the semilogarithmic equations 
yield the best fit and residual autocorrelation statistics. The reported 
equations entering the real interest rate follow, with the doublelog
specification yielding the worst results. Tests of heteroskedasticity
and functional form (undertaken but not reported here) do not guide us on 
whether the semilogarithmic or double logarithmic functional form is 
preferable.
We begin by discussing the equations which include the real deposit 
rate as a regressor. All the monetary aggregates considered are 
significantly related to (a single lag of) real income, (a single lag of) 
the real interest rate and their own (once) lagged value. The 
coefficient on the real deposit rate is positive and significant at least 
at 5% in all the reported equations. The highest t-statistics on this 
variable can be seen in the reported equations with RSD, RTD or RLQ as the 
regressand.
RTD and RLQ are very comprehensive aggregates (total commercial bank 
deposits and total liabilities of banks and other financial institutions 
respectively). Consequently, our finding that these aggregates are 
significantly responsive to the real deposit rate, confirms that the 
latter influences the availability of loanable funds from the financial 
system. Accordingly the real user cost (a series very close to the real 
deposit rate) may proxy for credit conditions. Thus, the real user cost
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may appear in the Investment function with a (perverse) positive sign.
In many of the reported equations, the first lag of the real deposit 
rate, rather than its contemporaneous value, is significant. A possible 
explanation is that the lagged actual value proxies best for the expected 
or permanent real deposit rate. Behaviour (i.e. money demand) may 
respond more closely to expected rather than actual values.
Alternatively, simultaneity or multicollinearity with other regressors may 
blur the significance of the current value of the real interest rate.
This finding can be related to a similar feature of the reported 
investment equations (Chapter 5). There, we noted that frequently the 
contemporaneous value of the user cost did not appear at all as a 
significant explanatory variable. Rather .ags of the user cost (most 
commonly the first lag in the Coen and Blejer-Khan equations) were 
significant. In other equations (those descending from the 
Hall-Jorgenson model) the contemporaneous value of the real user cost 
appeared but the median lag came down to around a year. We are 
suggesting that the real interest rate affects the volume of loanable 
funds with a delay. The influence of the real interest rate on 
investment takes place with a similar delay. This is a further 
indication that this latter influence is transmitted via the availability 
of credit.
We may now turn to the semilogarithmic and doublelogarithmic reported 
regressions. All the monetary aggregates considered are significantly 
related to (a single lag of) real income, (a single lag of) the rate of 
inflation or its logarithm and their own (once) lagged value. (Note that 
the doublelog equation for RM contains two lags of the inflation rate.
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Also the second lag of the dependent variable is significant in the 
equations for RDD). The nominal interest rate shows up significantly and 
with the correct positive sign only in the reported equations for RSD, RLQ 
and RTD. Furthermore in the reported equations for RLQ and RTD it fails 
to attain significance at 5%. In fact when these equations were run by 
two stage least squares, the t values on the nominal interest rate 
declined below the 10% level of significance. There is a single 
instance (equation XVIII) where the validity of combining nominal deposit 
rate and rate of inflation in a real deposit rate, can be tested 
directly. The restriction that the coefficient on the nominal deposit 
rate equals in magnitude but is opposite in sign to the coefficient on the 
rate of inflation is easily accepted. The F test of equation XVIII 
against equation XIX is F(l,18) - 0.187.
How can we explain the failure of the nominal deposit rate to appear 
significantly in most of the reported equations? We believe that the 
following considerations are relevant: We employ the only series given
for the deposit rate in the IFS. By comparison with data in the Bank of 
Greece Statistical Bulletin we verified that this series gives the rate on 
commercial bank time deposits held by the private sector with an original 
maturity of 3-6 months. Although a decomposition is not available in the 
IFS, it is likely that a large fraction of RSD (savings plus time deposits 
with commercial banks) is made up of 3-6 months time deposits. This is 
probably why the nominal deposit rate is significant in the semilog and 
doublelog regressions for RSD. By contrast, the other monetary 
aggregates contain, apart from 3-6 months time deposits, other types of 
deposits each bearing a different interest rate, as well as, currency.
For example, the ratio of RSD to RM averages to 50% over our sample
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period. This figure provides an upper bound to the proportion of total 
time deposits with commercial banks in RM (i.e. money plus quasi-money). 
The figure suggests that the 3-6 month time deposit rate may not provide 
an adequate proxy for the (effective) own interest rate on monetary 
aggregates such as RM. Indeed, the Bank of Greece Statistical Bulletin 
distinguishes 15 types of deposits, no two of which bear the same interest 
rate. In the end of 1980 the (unweighted) average deposit rate was 15.4% 
with a sizeable standard deviation of 3 percentage points. It is no 
surprise then, that the movements of our series for the deposit rate do 
not provide a significant explanation for the movements in monetary 
aggregates other than RSD. Even if each of those other monetary 
aggregates responds vigorously to its own rate, that rate is not entered 
in the regressions. Therefore we cannot detect the response.
Nevertheless in Greece rates on different types of deposits are 
changed (by decree) more or less simultaneously. The coefficient of 
variation (i.e. standard deviation divided by mean) of the administered 
deposit rate, over the different deposit types given in the Bank of Greece 
Statistical Bulletin, was 0.39 in 1961, 0.33 in 1970 and 0.20 in 1980.
We decided to use a single series for the deposit rate in all our 
regressions because we assumed that such variation in the structure of 
interest rates would be negligible. However, it seems that this did not 
work for most monetary aggregates. Furthermore, monetary aggregates, 
made up of types of deposits other than those included in RSD, may 
contract upon a rise in our series for the deposit rate. This could 
happen if the rates set on those other types of deposits follow a rise in 
the 3-6 month rate only after a delay. This would tend to blur (or even 
render negative) the statistical relationship between those other types of
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deposits and our series for the deposit rate. This may be the cause of 
the frequent failure of the nominal Interest rate to attain even a 10% 
level of significance In our equations, and also of the negative signs on 
the current value of the deposit rate (combined with positive coefficients 
on Its first lag) encountered In the course of our specification 
searches. This may also account for the negative and significant 
coefficients on the own rate (both for M2 and M3) reported In Prodromidis 
(1984) .
We were not able to calculate precise effective own Interest rates for
each of our monetary aggregates. This Is because the series for the
monetary aggregates In the IFS cannot be paired with the detailed data on 
deposit rates given In the Bank of Greece Statistical Bulletin. For 
example, the latter distinguishes between time and savings bank deposit 
rates. No disaggregation between the two types Is available In the
IFS. Both time and savings deposits with commercial banks are merged In
RSD.
In the vast majority of the reported equations the contemporaneous 
value of the rate of Inflation appears very significantly and with the 
correct negative sign. In a few of these equations lagged, rather than 
the contemporaneous, values of Inflation are significant. In all cases, 
the t-statlstlcs on the rate of Inflation exceed the 5% critical value. 
They are almost always higher than the t-statlstlcs on any other regressor 
In the equation.
This result has an Important counterpart In the Investment equations, 
reported In Chapter 5. There, we found that Investment Is remarkably
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sensitive to inflation while it is less sensitive to changes in the level 
of nominal (loan) interest rates. Furthermore, we found that the 
response of investment to the rate of (capital goods) inflation was not 
positive, as predicted by neoclassical theory, but rather negative. We 
may now interpret these features of the investment equations in the light 
of our findings with the regressions for the monetary aggregates. Over 
our sample period the real volume of funds available to the banking system 
for onlending was inversely related to the rate of inflation. For 
statistical or other reasons, the resources available to the banking 
system for onlending did not seem to increase significantly with rises in 
(at least our measure of) nominal interest rates. Thus to the extent 
that investment depended on credit conditions over our sample period a) it 
would be markedly reduced upon rises in the rate of inflation, b) it would 
be hardly affected (and if at all it would be positively affected, as 
suggested by reported equations such as those for RSD) by rises in nominal 
interest rates.
The finding that the liabilities of the banking system are 
significantly (negatively) related to the inflation rate but not 
significantly (positively) related to the nominal deposit rate, is still 
consistent with the financial repression approach. Of course, this 
approach stresses the potential of administered rises in the nominal 
deposit rate to promote output growth by enabling increases in loans. If 
only because such administered rises took place only very seldom over our 
sample period, it is not surprising that this effect is captured in only a 
few of the reported equations.
The profile of the series for the deposit rate is that of a
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staircase. Over our sample period deposit rates were set by decree of 
the Greek monetary authorities. Administrative discretion is typically 
associated with sluggishness (even for monetary control by market 
intervention). Indeed, in the 25 years of our sample the series for the 
nominal deposit rate moved (by more than 1%) only 6 times (5 of which were 
rises), giving a coefficient of variation around 0.4. By contrast, the 
rate of inflation was much more volatile with a coefficient of variation 
almost twice as large.
Apart from stressing the potentialities of interest rate reform, the 
financial repression literature also emphasizes the adverse consequences 
of high rates of inflation. It is claimed that inflation causes a 
shrinkage to the size of the banking system when reserve ratios and/or 
inflexible interest rate ceilings are imposed. Our results confirm that 
the demand for deposits in real terms contracts under inflation. This 
explains also the negative association between inflation and investment.
As a matter of fact nominal deposit rates did not move sufficiently to 
counteract this tendency in Greece over the period 1961-1985.
The significance of the current value of the rate of inflation also 
has the following implications: First, the significance of the real
deposit rate (in the equations not entering the nominal rate and inflation 
separately) is probably due to the underlying response of monetary 
aggregates to the rate of inflation.^ Second, it is doubtful whether
4. The real deposit rate is most significant in the equations for RSD, 
RLQ and RTD. These are also the only monetary aggregates which are 
significantly associated with the nominal deposit rate in the semilog 
and doublelog equations.
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the common finding here that it is lags of the real interest rate, rather 
than its contemporaneous value, which show up significantly in many 
reported equations could be due to a delayed response of desired money 
holdings to the actual level of inflation (which delayed response we would 
expect, since deposit holdings may depend on the anticipated real interest 
rate or, if simultaneity were present). By default, the delayed response 
of money holdings to the real deposit rate should be attributable to a 
delayed response to its nominal rate component. We have already 
discussed a possible reason for a delayed response (of virtually every 
monetary aggregate apart from RSD) to movements in our series for the 
nominal deposit rate. There may, however, be additional reasons for a 
delay: Indeed, even in the reported semilog and doublelog equations for
RSD, it is the first lag of the interest rate which is significant. A 
partial explanation for this feature is the following: Interest earnings
(accruing towards the end of the year or even on a six monthly basis) are 
automatically credited to the deposits on which they are due. This 
mechanism could also explain the absence of the nominal interest rate from 
the reported semilog and doublelog equations especially for RM and less so 
for RDD : The latter is made up of low or non-interest bearing demand
deposits. A substantial fraction of the former monetary aggregate is 
currency (30% on average over the sample period). In either case, there 
must be only a small proportionate rise in these monetary aggregates when 
banks credit interest earnings to deposits.
The result, that the nominal interest rate is hardly significant while 
the rate of inflation is a significant determinant of money (under various 
definitions), is also found by Brissimis and Leventakis (1981) and also 
Prodromidis (1984). The interest responses of the monetary aggregates.
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examined by the them, are either positive but insignificant (Brissimis and 
Leventakis op.cit. for Ml and M2) or wrongly (negatively) signed and quite 
significant (Prodromidis op.cit. for M2 and M3). By contrast, the 
coefficient on the log of their measure of inflation comes out negative 
and quite significant. This happens with M2 and M3 but not with Ml as 
Brissimis and Leventakis find. (Note that the measure of inflation 
employed in both papers differs algebraically from our measure.
Therefore we cannot easily compare our estimates with the coefficients 
they report).
Whenever we report a significant coefficient for the nominal interest 
rate, its sign is positive. The positive sign on the interest rate, in a 
demand for money function, is another of those paradoxical features of the 
financial repression literature. (Cf. also the response of investment to 
a rise in interest rates). In the standard literature, on money demand 
in. developed financial systems, the sign on the nominal interest rate is 
expected to be negative. This is because the main interest bearing asset 
and alternative to money in such financial systems is (government) 
bonds. However, there exist no well developed markets for, nor any 
substantial (non-bank) holdings of, government bonds in repressed 
financial systems in general and in Greece in particular (Courakis 1981b, 
e.g. p.210). The major (widely available) interest bearing asset in 
these economies is bank deposits (e.g. in Greece even bank deposits 
designated as 'sight deposits' have been interest bearing for some decades 
now). Accordingly, 'the interest rate' relates primarily to those rates 
payable on various types of bank liabilities (or loan assets). Most of 
these rates are changed, almost in step, by decree. If that is 'the 
interest rate', the demand for a monetary aggregate, which is made up
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mainly by interest bearing deposits, ought to be positively 
related to it.
But, if 'the interest rate' is the own rate on money, what is the 
opportunity cost of holding money? In the absence of other domestic 
financial assets (and given at least partially effective exchange 
controls), the only alternative to holding money is goods. This is 
reflected in the equations, which determine the inflation rate by the 
excess supply of m o n e y , 5 in the macromodels of the financial repression 
literature. (These are identified as Phelpsian Phillips curves in Fry
1988, p.67). The nominal rate of return on goods, hence the opportunity
cost of holding money balances, is the rate of goods prices inflation. 
Indeed, the Keynesian transmission mechanism of monetary policy is not 
operative in financially repressed economies which essentially lack 
markets determining bond prices. Individuals, who find that their 
holdings of money exceed desired levels, attempt to exchange them with 
goods. Thus, changes in the supply of money are transmitted to 
inflationary shocks. In fact our findings suggest that disequilibrium is 
likely to persist in the money market and may even become explosive. For 
as prices accelerate with an excess supply of money we have found that the 
demand for money contracts further and quite rapidly.
We have dealt with the deposit rate and rate of inflation variables.
We may now assess the performance of the income variable. Income appears 
significantly at least at 1 0 % and with the correct positive sign (that
5. There seems little point in relating the rate of inflation to the 
excess supply for narrow money. Excess supply for a particular 
component of money would presumably spill over to other monetary 
assets. Rather it is laxity in overall monetary conditions which is 
likely to spill over to goods markets.
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would be expected in a demand for money function) in all the reported 
equations. However, in a number of reported equations, the income 
variable fails to reach significance at 5%. This contrasts with the 
invariable appearance of the rate of inflation or the real interest rate 
as regressors significant at 5% or stricter.
We compare now coefficients across reported equations with the same 
functional form (e.g. doublelog) but which explain different monetary 
aggregates. The estimated value for the long run elasticity with respect 
to income increases as we move towards monetary aggregates dominated by 
types of deposits that are likely to serve more as assets, rather than 
media of exchange. This finding accords with the common belief (e.g. 
Laidler 1985, p.145) that economies of scale are more pronounced with 
transactions balances. For example, RM, which includes currency and 
deposits, is less income elastic than RDM, which excludes currency. In
turn, RDM is less income elastic than RBM, which excludes demand deposits
(contains 'savings', 'time' and 'foreign currency'^ deposits which 
presumably fulfill the asset function). Similarly demand deposits with 
banks (RDD) are less income elastic than savings and time deposits (RSD) 
with banks.
The long-run income elasticities in the reported doublelog equations 
for RLQ(1.650), RM(1.5B9) and RDM(1.B89) are very close to the income 
elasticities (1.7-1.8 ) in similar equations reported for the aggregate M3 
by Prodromidis (1984). This is not surprising, since M3 cannot differ by 
much from RM (i.e. currency plus all types of deposits) or RLQ
(liabilities of commercial banks and other financial institutions).
6 . Foreign currency deposits obviously cause noise to our estimates.
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Finally, in many of the reported equations, we do not find the 
contemporaneous value, but rather a lag (most commonly the second lag) of 
the income variable, being significant. A possible explanation is that 
simultaneity or multicollinearity with other included regressors is 
blurring the significance of the current value. Alternatively, the 
demand for money holdings may be associated more closely with expected or 
permanent, rather than actual, income. In turn, the expected or 
permanent value may be proxied best by the second lag of income. It is
commonly believed that the current, rather than the permanent, value of 
income is more likely to show up in a transactions demand for money.
This belief (opposed somewhat in Laidler 1985, p.119) is upheld by the 
results from the equations for RDD (demand deposits with commercial 
banks). Unlike all other (but for RLQ) mostly broad monetary aggregates, 
RDD is significantly explained by current, rather than lagged, income.
Instrumental variables estimation
Each reported equation was run by two stage least squares. For all 
equations, the predetermined variables used in this exercise include a 
constant, two lags of income and two lags of the monetary aggregate (in 
real terms and in logarithms). For semilog (doublelog) reported 
equations two lags of the (log of the) deposit rate and two lags of the 
(log of the) rate of inflation provide additional predetermined 
variables. For equations entering the real deposit rate, we use two lags 
of the former as predetermined variables. The two stage least squares 
estimates of all the reported equations are free from residual 
autocorrelation at 5%, as indicated by the LM(1) statistic adapted for
339
instrumental variables.
The two stage least squares estimates are quite different from the 
estimates obtained by ordinary least squares. Long run coefficients on 
income and inflation variables almost double for most reported 
equations. This may not be entirely due to simultaneity. If 
substantial simultaneity were present, we would observe large differences 
between the coefficients of reported equations including current values 
and reported equations (for the same monetary aggregate but with different 
functional form) with predetermined regressors only. Although such 
comparisons (cf. IV to V) reveal differences in coefficients, these are 
not as large as the differences induced by instrumentation. The former 
differences may reflect the change in functional form (e.g. IV involves 
the real rate while V is semi log) rather than the removal of 
simultaneity. Moreover, equations with predetermined regressors only 
tend to have lower long run coefficients on the lag of income, compared to 
equations reported for the same monetary aggregate but including current 
valued regressors. By contrast, the long run coefficients on the income 
variables are increased upon instrumentation. In particular, the cause 
for the rise in long run coefficients is that the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable invariably rises upon instrumentation. This 
may indicate that the instruments, generated by the two stage least 
squares procedure, have poor explanatory power, thereby causing a 
substantial difference from the ordinary least squares estimates. Yet, 
the correlation coefficients, of our current valued explanatory variables 
(apart from the real interest rate) with their instruments, are frequently 
of the order of 0.9.
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E S T I M A T E S  O F  T H E  R E L A T I O N S H I P  O F  D E P O S I T S  T O  I N C O M E .  
T H E  D E P O S I T  R A T E .  A N D  I N F L A T I O N  I N  G R E E C E  1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 5
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Estimates of the Relationship between 
Various Monetary Aggregates, Income and the 
Interest Rate as well as Inflation
EXPLANATION OF THE SYMBOLS
All series taken from IFS [Annual 1961-1985] Series in Real Terms are 
deflated by the GDP deflator and measured in (American) Bn of 1980 
Drachmas.
Monetary Aggregates in Real Terms:
RLQ: Liabilities of Commercial Banks plus Liabilities of other
Financial Institutions
RBM: Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposits of Residents






RM - Currency Outside Banks
Time, Savings and Other Deposits with Commercial Banks 




R: Nominal Deposit Rate [in Logarithms LR] (%)
DP: Rate of Inflation of CDP deflator [in Logarithms LDP] (%)
RR: R - DP (%).
Monetary Aggregates and Income are entered in Logarithms in the 
regressions.
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Notes on the Presentation of Results
a) t-statistics in parentheses
b) Significance: (i) For t-statistics significance at least at 10% is 
indicated by a single asterisk (*) while significance at least at 5 % 
is shown by a double asterisk (**)
(ii) For all other statistics significance at least at 
5% is indicated by a hyphen (-)
c) Broad-equations: (i) Underneath each reported equation we state the 
form (i.e. the lags included and their significance) of the broad 
equation which provided the starting point of the sequential speciali­
sation procedure whose end product is the reported equation
(ii) If the broad equation passes only the F version 
(Z2 , for more explanation see below) of the LM(1 ) test of residual 
autocorrelation and fails the version (Z^) of the same test, the 
following note appears: 'IM(l): F version only non-significant'.
The Statistics
S : Standard error of estimate
R2 : Adjusted coefficient of determination
Zi : First order LM test of residual autocorrelation distributed
as % 2 (1 )
Z2 : F version of the above with the indicated degrees of freedom
Z3 : Chow prediction test with 1980 as breakpoint distributed as F
with the indicated degrees of freedom
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: Hendry's predictive failure test with 1980 as breakpoint
distributed as %z(5)
Z5 : F test of the restrictions incorporated in the reported
equation versus the unrestricted broad equation underneath with 
the indicated degrees of freedom
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EQUATION I
R L Q t  1.260 + 0.372Yt + 0.009RRt + 0.802RIjQt_i
(-2.057*)(2.233**) (4.129**) (8.758**)
S - 0.037 R2 - 0.997 Zi(l) - 1.139 22(1,19) = 0.941
23(5,15) - 0.808 2 4 (5 ) - 14.185- 2 5 (5 ,13) - 1.790
RLQt -  /CONAtAt-lAt-2/RRt/RRt-l/RRt-2/RLQt-l/RLQt-2 
** ** **
EQUATION II
RLQt - -1.598 + 0.495Yt + O.OllRt-i - 0.0070?% + 0.713RLQ%_i
(-1.851*)(1.798*) (1.914*) (-3.129**) (3.907**)
S - 0.037 R2 - 0.997 2^(1) - 1.028 22(1,18) - 0.804
2 3 (5 ,1 4 ) - 0.463 2 4 (5 ) - 5.786 2 5 (7 ,1 0 ) - 1.548
RLQt - / C O N A t A t - l A t - 2 A t A t - l A t - 2 A P t / D P t - l A P t - 2 A l ^ t - l A L Q t - 2
** **
EQUATION III
RLQt - -1.960 + 0.599Y% + 0.109LRt_i - 0.051LD?t + 0.637RLQt_i 
(-2.486**) (2.584**) (2.03*) (-2.717**) (4.194**)
S - 0.039 R2 - 0.996 2^(1) - 2.394 22(1,18) - 1.874
2 3 (5 ,1 4 ) - 0.470 2 4 (5 ) - 12.119- 2 5 (7 ,1 0 ) - 1.160




RBMt = -2.898 + 0.775Yt_2 + 0.009RRt-l + 0.583RBMt_i
(-2.333**) (2.544**) (2.411**) (3.722**)
S - 0.059 r 2 - 0.992 2^(1) - 1.471 22(1,18) - 1.204
2 3 (5 ,1 4 ) - 0.233 2 4 (5 ) - 1.425 2 5 (5 ,1 3 ) - 2.852
RBMt -  /C0NAtAt-lAt-2/RRt/RRt-l/RRt-2/RBMt-_i/RBMt-2 
* *★ **
E Q U A T I O N  V
RBMt “ -2.022 + 0.453Yt_2 - 0.013DPt + 0.843RBMt_i 
(-2.747**) (2.448**) (-5.717**) (8.251**)
S  - 0.041 r2 - 0.996 2^(1) - 0.938 22(1,18) - 0.768
23(5,14) - 1.034 24(5) - 8.285 25(8,10) - 1.029
RBMt - /C0NAcAt-lAt-2AtAt-lAt-2/DPt/DPt-l/DPt-2/RBMt_i/RBMt_2
E Q U A T I O N  V I
RBMt " -1.670 + 0.371Yt_2 - 0.119LD?t + 0.900RBMt_i 
(-2.165**) (1.887*) (-5.196**) (8.089**)
S  - 0.043 r2 - 0.996 2^(1) - 1.023 22(1,18) - 0.837





RMt = -1.752 + 0.689Yt_2 + 0.007RRt-l + 0.528RM|-_i
(-2.175**)(2.607**) (2.749**) (3.145**)
S = 0.040 r 2 = 0.994 2^(1) - 2.725 22(1,18) = 2.230
23(5,14) - 0.393 2 4 (5 ) - 2.958 2 5 (5 ,13) - 3.611 -
RMt - /C0NAtAt-iAt-2/RRt/RRt-i/RRt-2/RMt-i/RMt-2 
** ** ** *
EQUATION VIII
RMt “ -1.095 + 0.326Yt_2 - 0.0100?% + 0.841RM%_i
(-2.457**) (2.152**) (-6.200**) (8.223**)
S - 0.027 r 2 - 0.997 2^(1) - 0.858 22(1,18) - 0.702
23(5 ,14) - 1.289 24(5) - 9.871 25(8,10) - 1.25
RM% - / C O N A t A t - l A t - 2 A t A t - l A t - 2 A P t / D P t - l A P t - 2 A M t - l / R M % _ 2
** **
(LM(1): F-verslon only non-significant)
EQUATION IX
RM% “ -2.067 + 0.715Y%_i - 0.067LDP%_i + 0.035LDP%_2 + 0.550RM%_i
(-1.627) (1.862*) (-2.696**) (1.798*) (2.379**)
S - 0.042 r 2 - 0.993 2^(1) - 1.418 2^(1,16) - 1.080
23(5,12) - 0.119 24(5) - 0.835 25(7,10) - 2.468
RM% - /CONAtAt-lAt-2/I^t/LRt-l/l^t-2/LDPt/LDPt-l/LDPt-2AMt-l/RMt-2
*
(IM(1): F-version only non-significant)
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EQUATION X
RDMt - -2.680 + 0.782Yt_2 + 0.009RRt-l + 0 .550RDMt_i
(-2.489**) (2.737**) (2.599**) (3.478**)
S  -  0 . 0 5 6  R 2  -  0 . 9 9 2  2 ^ ( 1 )  -  1 . 3 3 3  2 2 ( 1 , 1 8 )  -  1 . 0 9 1
2 3 ( 5 , 1 4 )  -  0 . 1 9 2  2 4 ( 5 ) -  1 . 2 2 7  25 ( 5 , 1 3 )  -  2 . 0 4 8
RDMt -  /CONAtAt-lAt-2/RRt/RRt-l/RRt-2/RDMt_i/RDMt_2 
* ** **
EQUATION XI
RDMt - -1.821 + 0.430Yc_2 - 0.0130?% + 0.839RDM%_i
(-2.670**) (2.299**) (-5.306**) (7.500**)
S - 0.041 R2 - 0.995 2i(l) - 1.800 22(1,18) - 1.473
23(5,14) - 0.985 24(5) - 7.680 25(8 ,10) - 1.11
RDM% - /C0N/Y%/Y%_i/Y%_2AtAt-lAt-2/DPt/DPt-l/DPt-2/RDM%_i/RDM%_2
** * **
(LM(1) : F version only non-significant)
EQUATION XII
RDM% - -3.079 + 0.865Y%_2 - 0.075LDP%_i + 0.542RDM%_i
(-2.692**) (2.913**) (-2.693**) (3.449**)
S - 0.055 R2 - 0.992 2i(l) - 2.945 22(1,18) - 2.41
2 3 (5 ,1 4 ) - 1.758 2 4 (5 ) - 0.233 2 5 (8 ,1 0 ) - 2.794
RDMt - /C0N/Yt/Yt-i/Yt_2/LRt/I^ t-l/:^ t-2/LDFt/LDPc_i/LDPt_2/RBMc_i/RDMc_2 
*  ** ** *
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EQUATION XIII
R S D t  -  - 1 . 9 0 7  +  0 . 4 5 4 Y t _ 2  +  0 . 0 1 4 R R ^  +  0 . 7 9 7 R S D t _ i
( - 2 . 0 3 5 * )  ( 2 . 0 4 9 * )  ( 4 . 4 9 0 * * )  ( 7 . 0 0 7 * * )
S  -  0 . 0 5 5  R 2  -  0 . 9 9 4  Z i ( l )  -  0 . 3 9 2  2 2 ( 1 , 1 8 )  -  0 . 3 2 1
2 3 ( 5 , 1 4 )  -  0 . 4 7 1  24 ( 5 ) -  2 . 9 6 2  25 ( 5 , 1 3 )  -  1 . 0 1 5
RSDt - /C0NAtAt-iAt-2/RRt/RRt-i/RRt-2/RSDt-i/RSDt_2 
** ** **
EQUATION XIV
RSDt - -2.325 + 0.549Yt_i + 0.015Rt_i - 0.0130?% + 0.746RSD%_i 
(-1.908*) (1.998*) (2.494**) (-4.269**) (5.464**)
S - 0.058 R2 - 0.994 2i(l) - 1.121 22(1,18) - 0.878
23(5,14) - 0.372 24(5) - 3.373 25(7,10) - 2.662
ESD% - /C0NAtAt-lAt-2AtAt-lAt-2/DPt/DPt-l/DPt-2ASD%_i/RSD%_2 
* ** * **
(LM(1): F-version only non-significant)
EQUATION XV
RSD% - -2.429 + 0.561Y%_i + 0.124LR%_i - 0.111LDP% + 0.742RSD%_i
(-1.949*) (2.019*) (2.057*) (-4.079**) (5.454**)
S - 0.059 R2 - 0.994 2i(l) - 3.200 22(1,18) - 2.505
23(5,14) - 0.190 24(5) - 1.005 25(7,10) - 2.143




R D D t  =  - 3 . 9 8 9  +  0 . 8 9 2 Y t  +  0 . 0 1 6 R R t - i  +  0 . 4 1 6 R D D t _ 2
(-3.387**) (3.197**) (2.392**) ( 1 . 8 4 3 * )
S - 0.069 R2 - 0.976 Zi(l) - 2.319 22(1,18) - 1.897
2 3 ( 5 , 1 4 )  =  1 . 0 1 2  24( 5) -  9 . 2 2 4  25( 5 ,13) -  0 . 9 8 5
RDDt = /CONAtAt-lAt-2/RRt/RRt-l/RRt-2/RDDt-l/RDDt_2 
* *
EQUATION XVII
RDDt ---4.537 + 0.975Yt - 0.014DPt_i + 0.436RDDt_2
(-4.806**) (4.363**)(-3.054**) (2.247**)
S = 0.065 R2 = 0.979 2^(1) = 0.894 22(1,18) = 0.731





RTDt = -3.400 + 0.873Yt_2 + O.OllRR^-i + 0.549RTDt_i
(-2.685**) (2.866**) (2.738**) (3.570**)
S = 0.064 R2 = 0.991 Z^d) = 1.037 22(1,18) = 0.848
23(5,14) = 0.325 2^(5) - 2.455 2 5 (5 ,1 3 ) = 2.566
RTDt = /CONAtAt-lAt-2/RRt/RRt-l/RRt-2/RTDt-i/RTDt_2 
* ** **
E Q U A T I O N  X I X
R T D t  -  - 3 . 2 6 1  +  0 . 8 5 1 Y t _ 2  +  0 . 0 1 4 R t _ i  -  0 . 0 1 1 D P t _ i  +  0 . 5 4 7 R T D t _ i
( - 2 . 4 5 0 * * )  ( 2 . 7 0 3 * * )  ( 1 . 7 9 5 * )  ( - 2 . 6 7 0 * * )  ( 3 . 4 7 7 * * )
S  =  0 . 0 6 5  R 2  -  0 . 9 9 1  2 ^ ( 1 )  -  1 . 1 5 0  2 2 ( 1 , 1 7 )  «  0 . 8 8 9




RTDt = -2.159 + 0.472Yt_2 " 0.133LDPt + 0.865RTDt_i
(-2.644**) (2.333**) (-5.143**) (7.702**)
S - 0.049 R2 - 0.995 2i(l) - 3.084 22(1,18) = 2.524
2 3 (5 ,1 4 ) = 0.610 2 4 (5 ) = 3.171 2 5 (8 ,1 0 ) = 1.00
RTDt = /C 0N A tA t-lA t-2/L R t/L R t-l/L R c-2/L D P t/L D P t_l/L D P t_2/R T D t_i/R T D t_2  
* ** *
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Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Relationship 
between Various Monetary Aggregates, Income and the 
Interest Rate as well as Inflation
EQUATION I
RLQt - -2.549 + 0.6537% + 0.0I2RR% + 0.69IRLQ%_i 
(-3.301**) (3.319**) (3.447**) (6.734**)
S = 0.036 Z5(I)t = 0.246 
EQUATION II
RLQ% = -2.445 + 0.6I8Y% + 0.009R%_i - O.OIIDP% + 0.7I6RLQ%_i 
(-2.605**) (1.975*) (1.462) (-2.520**) (3.214**)
S = 0.035 Z g d )  = 1.941 
EQUATION III
RLQ% = -2.297 + 0.596Y% + 0.07ILR%_x - 0.082LDP% + 0.7I5RLQ%_X
(-2.515**) (2.233**) (1.249) (-2.667**) (3.975**)
S = 0.037 Z g d )  = 0.815
EQUATION IV No instrumentation required.
All variables predetermined.
EQUATION V
RBM% - -2.326 + 0.464Y%_2 - 0.0I8DP% + 0.89IRBM%_i
(-2.987**) (2.461**) (-4.059**) (8.159**)
S = 0.041 Z&(I) = 0.864
EQUATION VI
RBM% = -I.751 + 0.359Y%_2 - O.I47LDP% + 0.938RBM%_i
(-2.123**) (I.716) (-4.069**) (7.573**)
S = 0.045 Zg(I) = 0.881
t LM(I) test for (first order) residual autocorrelation under 
instrumental variables estimation.
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EQUATION VII No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION VIII
RM^ = -1.109 + 0.259Yt_2 - 0.0120?% + 0.921RM%_i
(-2.367**) (1.648) (-4.605**) (8.195**)
S = 0.027 Zg(l) = 0.003
EQUATION IX No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION X No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION XI
RDM% = -2.136 + 0.422Y%_2 - 0.018DP% + 0.911RDM%_i
(-2.828**) (2.118**) (-3.868**) (7.134**)
S = 0.044 Zg(l) = 0.044
EQUATION XII No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION XIII
RSD% = -2.026 + 0.439Y%_2 + 0.020RR% + 0.838RSD%_i 
(-2.060*) (1.892*) (3.043**) (6.783**)
S = 0.057 Z gd) = 0.000 
EQUATION XIV
RSD% = -3.972 + 0.789Y%_i + 0.012R%_1 - 0.023DP% + 0.759RSD%_i 
(-2.933**) (2.749**) (1.891*) (-3.747**) (5.535**)
S = 0.055 Zg(l) - 0.597 
EQUATION XV
RSD% = -3.155 + 0.639Y%_i + 0.072LR%_i - 0.168LDP% + 0.812RSD%_i
(-2.628**) (2.451**) (1.253) (-4.100**) (6.339**)
S = 0.052 Zg(l) = 1.621
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EQUATION XVI
RDDt = -3.489 + 0.772%% + 0.018RR%_i + 0.511RDD%_2
(-2.437**) (2.328**) (2.517**) (1.976*)
S = 0.071 Zgd) - 2.025
EQUATION XVII
RDD% = -4.694 + 0.995Y% - 0.015DP%_i + 0.441RDD%_2
(-4.408**) (4.078**)(-3.130**) (2.171**)
S = 0.065 Zgd) = 0.543
EQUATION XVIII No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION XIX No instrumentation required
All variables predetermined
EQUATION XX
RTD% = -2.285 + 0.474Y%_2 - 0.157LDP% + 0.894RTD%_i
(2.628**) (2.228**) (-3.983**) (7.307**)




What insights can be drawn from the financial repression literature, 
concerning an economy such as that of Greece? We expect to find 
disequilibrium in the loan market. As a consequence, aggregate private 
investment is likely to be maintained below what could be financed in 
equilibrium. Moreover, investment (both externally and internally 
financed) may respond positively to increases in interest rates, in 
contrast to a developed financial system. Dynamic macroeconomic 
instability may be manifested as a result of the prevalence of financial 
rationing and inflexible interest rates. We expect to encounter wasteful 
and inefficient loan rationing practices. These are likely to rely 
heavily on cpllateral and/or to favour large borrowers (as has actually 
been observed in Greece). We expect to find parallel capital markets. 
Their existence also has been noted by observers in Greece; it implies 
that those economic benefits, which require the emergence of financial 
intermediaries to be obtained, are not exploited in full.
Advocates of financial liberalization have been vocal. Consequently 
policy makers must have realized that increases in the level of 
administered interest rates could promote output growth, both by enabling 
a higher volume of aggregate investment and by improving the allocation of 
resources. Indeed, while this thesis was being researched, a number of 
policy measures were taken (mainly during 1987 and 1988) in order to 
deregulate the Greek banking system. This should be sufficient to 
emphasize the relevance of our work to current major problems of economic 
policy.
This thesis enables us to offer detailed advice to a policy maker who 
is contemplating the liberalization of the financial system in Greece.
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We have confirmed that the rationale, on which part of the literature 
summarized in Chapter 1 unequivocally recommends financial liberalization, 
is valid in the Greek case.
According to this rationale, under financial repression, investment 
depends on the availability of credit. Indeed, under financial 
repression, typically there is extreme dependence on bank finance. We
have also noted that bank loans are rationed. Thus, investment becomes 
constrained by the availability of loanable funds.
However, as argued in Chapter 3, it does not follow that an investment 
equation, for a financially repressed economy, should not include other 
explanatory variables (e.g. income and user cost) apart from credit 
availability. In fact, this is a point on which this thesis has 
clarified the existing literature on investment functions under financial 
repression. We have pointed out that not all borrowers are rationed all 
the time. We have produced some evidence that such is the situation in 
Greece. Thus, we concluded that only some components of aggregate 
investment are determined by the availability of finance, while other 
parts are determined by their (neoclassical) demand. Therefore, 
aggregate investment is affected both by movements in income and user cost 
(on account of the latter components) and by changes in the availability 
of credit (on account of the former components). Moreover, we have 
argued that the user cost and income may proxy for the effect of movements 
in retained profits, and/or in debt service, on the availability of funds 
for investment. Under this interpretation, the sign on the user cost in 
an investment function is most likely to come out positive. This is 
precisely what we found in Chapter 5.
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In Chapter 3, we have drawn a parallel with a recently (re)developing 
line of work on the impact of financial conditions on investment in highly 
developed financial systems. The availability of (internal) funds is put 
forward as a crucial explanatory variable in investment functions. This 
is because, for a variety of reasons, internal funds are comparatively 
cheaper than external funds. In the limit, the latter may be entirely 
unavailable due to equilibrium credit rationing in the loans and/or 
equities markets. A measure of outstanding loans may also be included to 
reflect the fact that the higher corporate indebtedness is, the more 
difficult it is to obtain further external finance. Further, internal 
funds may proxy for expectations about the prospects of the firm.
It is argued, in the financial repression literature (Chapter 1), that 
rises in interest rates induce an expansion in the volume of bank 
deposits. Therefore, an increase in bank loans is made possible. In 
addition, economywide profits (available for reinvestment) increase for 
reasons explained in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and restated 
below. On both counts, investment expenditures are stimulated.
The empirical work in this thesis confirms that these mechanisms are 
present in Greece. Therefore, they could be exploited by a policy maker 
who undertakes interest rate (or more generally financial) deregulation.
Of course, the ability to rely on past regularities for future policy 
purposes is always limited by the possibility of substantial structural 
changes in the course of financial deregulation. Indeed, the possibility 
of instability was raised in Chapter 3 in connection with the coefficients 
of our investment equations. However, we have enumerated the 
difficulties preventing a more satisfactory representation of expectations
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(which could resolve this problem).
Specifically, the empirical results in Chapter 5 demonstrate that 
private investment has been positively and very significantly associated 
to the volume of loans to the private sector, in Greece over the past 30 
years. The empirical results in the appendix to Chapter 5 indicate that 
the volume of deposit liabilities of commercial banks and other financial 
institutions would respond positively and significantly to increases in 
the real deposit rate, according to the experience of (roughly) the past 
30 years. Moreover, these econometric results are robust across 
alternative specifications of the investment function, alternative 
definitions of the dependent and independent variables (both in the 
investment and the deposit demand functions), and alternative estimation 
techniques.
Not only have we detected the existence of a general relationship 
between the availability of loans and capital formation but we can also 
illuminate the particulars of the transmission from credit to private 
investment. This is a refinement of the financial repression
literature. This literature invokes the association between credit
conditions and investment quite frequently but does not give much detail 
about its operation.
In Chapter 5, we found that the expansionary influence of an increase 
in credit, in real terms, on private investment takes place only after a
considerable delay of around two years. We may conclude that financial
liberalization (or more generally credit policy) is one of those sluggish 
policies which cannot safely be used for fine tuning. Admittedly, this
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conclusion is not upheld by the equations explaining private investment 
excluding expenditures on residential buildings. We have argued that the 
medium term nature of credit policy should not be surprising. We have 
pointed out that it can be attributed to the well known delays in the 
investment process or to lags in the formation of expectations about the 
availability of credit. For example, the length of gestation periods may 
be subject to uncertainty. Thus firms, in our sample, may have taken out 
bank loans as precautionary liquid holdings, more often than not, before 
the actual delivery of investment goods. This tendency would be 
reinforced by variable bureaucratic delays in the processing of loan 
applications, lack of alternative cheap sources of finance and occasional 
opportunities for round-tripping, downpayment requirements on orders of 
capital goods etc.
We have also explored (both from a theoretical and an empirical point 
of view) the possibility of a dependence of investment on multiple lags of 
credit. Rather than invoking an ad hoc justification, we have actually 
formalised this possibility in Chapter 3. We have contributed a small 
extension of the specification of the investment function, by Hall and 
Jorgenson, as a distributed lag of changes in the optimal capital stock.
We made the lag coefficients depend, in a consistent manner, on the 
availability of credit throughout the period from initiation to completion 
of investment projects. We have also argued that the sign on the various 
lags of credit availability is ambiguous. For example, even if the 
provision of abundant credit stimulates investment almost 
contemporaneously, it may only do so at the expense of future investment. 
For abundant credit may merely enable orders of investment goods (which 
would have anyway been placed some time in the future) to be brought
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forward towards the present. Or overinvestment may occur in anticipation 
of future credit shortages. This is reminiscent of an idea encountered 
in the literature surveyed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. It is often argued 
that the availability of funds affects only the speed of adjustment 
towards, and not the long run value of, the optimal capital stock and 
investment. Indeed, in Chapter 5, we found that private investment in 
Greece is subject to the influence of loans extended at different points 
in the past. Sometimes the most distant credit lags bear a negative sign 
but the total effect of credit is positive.
The empirical work in Chapter 5 reveals a further qualification about 
the potency of credit policy, namely that it is subject to leakages. It 
is commonly assumed, in the financial repression literature, that new 
loans finance accretions to the capital stock. Therefore, the real value 
of new loans need only be multiplied by the output to capital ratio in 
order to obtain the resulting increment in aggregate output. Our 
findings suggest that this assumption must be qualified. A rise in 
domestic credit to the private sector, in real terms, does not translate 
one for one to expenditures for fixed capital formation. Part of the 
expansion in credit is (officially) intended for the finance of working 
capital, thus enabling the maintenance of the current level of 
production. Another substantial part (more than a third) is associated 
with expenditures on residential buildings. Finally, part of the 
expansion in credit might be diverted to totally ’unauthorised’ and 
’unproductive’ uses. These results corroborate existing evidence on the 
ineffectiveness of selective credit controls. They suggest that the 
imposition of reserve ratios might serve to divert funds away from 
consumption uses (by the private sector) towards capital formation (by the
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public sector). They do not accord with the view in the literature that 
reserve ratios invariably detract from capital formation.
It is not simply our empirical work (mostly in Chapter 5) which 
provides only qualified support for financial deregulation. It is also 
the theoretical work of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 which suggests that 
support for financial liberalization cannot be unequivocal. In 
particular, we can give the following words of caution to a policy maker 
who is contemplating the policy option of financial liberalization:
Financial repression is a political economic phenomenon and therefore 
financial liberalization may be fiercely opposed by vested interest. For 
example, in Greece financial liberalization was clearly opposed by the 
handicraft industries which would lose significant borrowing privileges.^
The discussion in Chapter 1 urges the policy maker to evaluate 
carefully the impact of financial liberalization on government finances. 
For financial regulations may be the means of extracting government 
revenue. The expenditures financed thereby (or even financial 
regulations themselves e.g. loan rate ceilings) may serve distributional 
goals. Then, financial liberalization may achieve an increase in 
efficiency and growth at the expense of equity. However, the prevalent 
view in the literature is that regulations are counter-productive and that 
financial repression is itself a source of inequities. On the other 
hand, government expenditures may finance capital formation. Then, there 
must be a tendency for output growth to decline, as government revenues 
are reduced because of deregulation. In particular, the outcome of
1. Cf. Oikonomikos Tachydromos, 19 May 1988
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financial liberalization for the total volume of loanable funds, (which 
measures the potential for public plus private investment hence output 
growth), depends crucially on the market structure in the banking 
system. For example, a monopoly banking system might react to loan rate 
deregulation by contracting in size.
Financial regulations (e.g. barriers to entry, deposit rate ceilings) 
may fulfil prudential functions. Therefore, their removal may lead on to 
prudential problems and destabilization of the financial system. For 
example, it has been argued in the literature, that deposit rate ceilings 
are required in order to prevent episodes of intense competitive 
outbidding among banks, for deposits, which could precipitate a systemic 
crisis.
The consequences of the abrupt rise in the level of interest rates, 
which typically accompanies financial liberalization, occasion major 
objections to this policy. It is well known that an uncontrolled rise in 
interest rates causes a severe profit squeeze to financial intermediaries 
with assets longer than liabilities. Indeed, it was recently suggested 
in the financial press in G r e e c e ^  that interest rate subsidies had to be 
given to certain Greek banks. In part, this was necessary in order to 
enable them to cope with profitability problems accentuated by financial 
deregulation in 1987-1988.
Banks may also be faced with a deterioration in the quality of their 
loan portfolios upon financial deregulation. The general increase in 
interest rates is bound to put financial stress on firms which borrow in 
order to undertake investment in physical capital. This is an issue of
2. Oikonomikos Tachydromos, 16 February 1989
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particular relevance to Greece in recent years. In the Introduction to 
this thesis, we have cited evidence that a significant number of firms 
appeared to be loss making and to be overburdened with debt service 
payments (even before the implementation of financial deregulation in 
1987-1988).
So, in Chapter 2 we provided an extensive discussion of this problem, 
within the context of a suitable macromodel. We distinguished three 
effects of the rise in interest rates:
(i) It tends to increase investable funds by attracting additional bank 
deposits. Thus, it makes possible additional private loans and 
also raises inflation tax revenues on bank reserves.
(ii) It tends to reduce investable funds since it increases the flow of 
interest payments on outstanding loans.
(iii) It tends to raise the volume of investable funds by increasing 
economywide profits (which, potentially, may be retained for 
reinvestment). Indeed, when bank real interest rates rise, from 
all projects that depend on bank loans, it is those having the 
lowest profitability which can no longer break even, and 
withdraw. They are replaced by projects, of necessarily higher 
profitability, which were rationed out previously by means of 
non-price criteria. In addition, a rise in the real bank deposit 
rate may discourage (contemporaneously) self-financed, (typically 
low-scale), projects by rendering placements in deposits more 
attractive. The banks, using their superior project evaluation 
expertise and capable of pooling small holdings, lend out the 
intermediated funds to finance, higher yielding, large-scale
proj ects.
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We demonstrated that if only effects (1) and (11) are operative, the 
rise In Interest rates, accompanying financial deregulation. Is likely to 
reduce steady state output growth. Moreoever, higher Interest charges 
might be passed on In higher prices (a point elaborated In new 
structuralist models). However, If effect (111) Is reasonably vigorous, 
financial liberalization has an overall positive Impact on output growth.
Although the basic model of Chapter 2 existed already In the 
literature, this thesis has extended and refined It. We have 
Incorporated a government sector which raises an Inflation tax on bank 
reserves and channels Its revenues to capital formation. This modelling 
assumption, borrowed from the literature on Inflationary finance and 
growth, enabled us to explore the Implications of variations In government 
revenues Induced by financial liberalization. We proved that removal of 
the reserve ratio Is neutral for total capital formation. The rise In 
deposit rates would. In fact, augment government revenues within our 
model. But the consequent Increase In government capital formation does 
not suffice to compensate for the decrease In private Investment due to 
higher debt service. We have also modelled effect (111) by expressing 
the share of profits In output (rather than merely the capital output 
ratio) as a function of the real Interest rate. This was an Important 
departure from the basic model (In the literature) since It led us to 
conclusions that clearly support financial deregulation.
Apart from theoretical analysis of the relevant considerations, this 
thesis also offers empirical evidence about the likely consequences of the 
general rise In Interest rates during financial deregulation. More 
specifically, the empirical methods of Chapter 5 have not detected any
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particular sensitivity of private investment to changes in debt service.
For the past 30 years, private investment in Greece was much more closely 
associated to the real value of new loans than to a measure of new credit 
netting out interest payments on outstanding loans. Moreover, the 
declines in real interest rates which took place over the past 30 years in 
Greece, (mostly as a result of accelerating inflation), are statistically 
associated with reductions in private investment. Therefore, we would 
expect the increases in real interest rates during financial 
liberalization to stimulate, rather than discourage, private investment. 
This is all the more likely, since financial liberalization is usually 
accompanied by declines in inflation, as we suggest in Chapter 1.
Additional insights can be gained from the fact that, in Chapter 5, we 
obtained a positive relationship between investment and the real interest 
rate (user cost) even after allowing, in our regressions, for the positive 
influence of bank credit on investment. We put forward the following 
interpretation for this finding: Private investment is not reduced by 
increases in real interest rates because economywide profits (thus the 
availability of internal investable funds) expand in response (i.e. effect
(iii) above). Alternatively, we may be picking up (for the first time 
for Greece) McKinnon's effect: There may exist a positive relationship 
between the self-financed component of our investment series and the 
attractiveness of deposits, quite independently from bank advances to the 
private sector. This is because monetary balances have to be 
accumulated, prior to self-financed investment, until a threshold amount, 
below which holdings of physical capital are indivisible, is exceeded. A 
final possibility is that the user cost proxies for the flow of bank loans 
to the government. This would work towards a positive sign on the
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user cost assuming that government investment, (financed by bank loans), 
crowds-in private investment expenditures. Both the possibility of 
crowding-in and a positive dependence of private investment on retained 
profits have been empirically substantiated for Greece by previous authors.
Apart from assessing the impact of financial repression on capital 
formation, this thesis contributes to various aspects of the estimation of 
the investment function, in Greece, in its own right. Someone wishing to 
undertake research on investment in Greece can find series for total 
depreciation and total net capital stock only, in published statistics. 
Unless he/she is prepared to estimate an (implausible) equation for 
private and public investment together, the published data are not 
sufficient. However, in Chapter 3, we proposed a method to disaggregate 
depreciation between the private and the public sector. This enabled us 
to construct a series for net private investment. This was cumulated to
yield a series for the net private capital stock. These series are
required to be used as dependent and independent variables respectively in 
two distinct investment specifications. The series for private 
depreciation and net capital stock are also quite indispensable in order 
to compute a figure for the economywide (exponential) rate of 
depreciation. It is hard to think of a study of the investment function 
that could proceed without this figure. The figure is necessary in order 
to calculate the user cost and also in order to construct the weighted 
differences of income and user cost which are used as regressors in a wide 
range of specifications of the investment function.
Our method of 'attributing* a part of total depreciation to the 
capital stock of the private sector relies on two assumptions: First, that
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private and public capital stock depreciate at the same rate. Second, 
that the ratio of private to public capital formation remains constant.
We have checked that the second assumption Is not far from true, at least 
for part of our sample period. We have also provided Independent checks 
that the series for private depreciation and private net Investment are 
quite Insensitive to the relaxation of our assumptions. Very similar 
series would have been obtained If we set the (assumed) benchmark values 
for net capital stock equal to zero, or If we had series for net (rather 
than gross) capital stocks. In line with our Interest In the role of 
credit In Investment, we proposed a measure for the net flow of finance.
In Chapter 3. This has not been tried before In the literature on 
Investment under financial repression. The measure nets Interest 
payments on outstanding loans from new credit. We have discussed Its 
accuracy given selective credit controls and long-term (fixed rate) loans.
In Chapter 4, we made further contributions to the construction of a 
series for the user cost In Greece. We took as our task the correct 
Incorporation of a number of fiscal parameters In the latter. This 
refinement was necessary not only for the study of the Investment function 
In general but also for the study of financial repression In Greece. If 
the Interpretation of the positive sign on the user cost was to be 
maintained with some confidence, we had to make sure that our measure was 
as accurate as possible. Such detailed calculations are not encountered 
elsewhere In the literature on Investment under financial repression. In 
order to carry out this adjustment we had to survey the relevant 
stipulations of the theoretical and empirical literature and adapt them 
for the Institutional setting of Greece. Specifically, we constructed a 
series for the tax rate on the undistributed profits of Greek
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corporations. Our series is preferable to the published (statutory) 
rate. This is because it incorporates a non—negligible adjustment for 
other fiscal burdens on the undistributed profits of limited liability 
companies. Similarly, we transformed, (by means of appropriate 
weighting), the statutory allowable percentage annual rates of 
depreciation for tax purposes, (differentiated by type of capital), to an 
economywide effective rate to be inserted in the user cost of capital.
Our most significant contribution to the computation of a series for 
the user cost in Greece relates to investment allowances. We constructed 
an index in order to calculate the effective rate of investment allowances 
in Greece over the period 1959-1985. Our contribution is both 
theoretical and empirical-institutional in nature. Our index involves 
additional sophistication compared to what is done in the literature in 
connection with effective rates of investment allowances Additional 
sophistication was required in order to account for specific institutional 
features. In particular, we attempted to capture the implications of the 
provision that deductions (on account of investment allowances) could be, 
and in fact were, brought forward long after investment expenditures had 
been incurred. The index captures the consequences of 'carrying foward' 
by averaging claims of investment allowances and investment expenditures 
(all in real terms) over time. Moreover, in order to deploy this index 
with precision, we had to take carefully into account the detail of the 
decrees which granted investment allowances (especially in relation to the 
periods over which investment was eligible and/or the deductions could be 
brought forward).
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Not only is the index novel but the findings to which it led are also 
quite remarkable. Our findings of very low (total economywide) effective 
rates of investment allowances contrast with the very generous allowable 
deductions specified in the statutes (as a percentage of the eligible 
investment expenditures incurred). In Chapter 4, we have identified a 
number of factors that may explain these findings. Our analysis was 
guided by the detail of the legislation on investment allowances and the 
available disaggregations of the investment series in Greece. Thus, we 
have ensured that our results are not an artefact of a somewhat 
idiosyncratic index. Rather, we have produced independent evidence that 
our index gives rise to reasonable answers, For example, we calculated 
the effective rate of investment allowance, for the single decree which 
did not provide for ’carrying forward’, by the method employed in the 
literature. This effective rate, too, turned out to be very much lower 
than the corresponding statutory percentage. The analysis of Chapter 4 has 
also enabled us to reach an informed, and unique, conclusion on the 
importance of investment allowances for aggregate investment: it was 
slight. Even so, the authorities continued to grant fresh investment 
allowances over a period exceeding 30 years. Perhaps no other investment 
incentive was offered so persistently and to such a wide range of 
beneficiaries. Surely, this must be an indication that investment 
allowances were (mistakenly) viewed as a fiscal instrument of prime 
importance. The analysis of Chapter 4 leads to the following 
recommendations in this connection. For investment allowances to have a 
noticeable influence on the level of aggregate investment: 
a) eligibility for their benefits must be extended (at least to the
service sector);
b) the allowances must be indexed (to price inflation);
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c) the stipulation of a maximum percentage of profits not to be
exceeded by the deductions in any single period must be abolished.
What are the general conclusions that can be drawn about the features 
of the investment function in Greece (apart from the influence of credit 
conditions)? The common conclusion from studies of investment in the US, 
(restated most recently by, for example, Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss 1988), 
that an accelerator specification performs best, is not confirmed by our 
findings. Although the precise role of the user cost remains subject to 
some uncertainty, we have found that this variable contributes to a better 
explanation of investment and better statistical properties for the 
investment equation. Moreover, ours is one of the few studies to apply 
the 'general to specific' econometric methodology (with its panoply of 
diagnostic statistics) to the specification of the investment function and 
indeed on Greek data. Given annual observations, only a simplified 
version of this methodology could be applied. This econometric procedure 
ensured that we obtain investment equations free from residual 
autocorrelation (and mostly stable). By contrast, a number of the 
equations reported in the mainstream literature (e.g. ibid) suffer from an 
autocorrelated error. The importance of this difference from the 
literature can be appreciated if residual autocorrelation is viewed as a 
warning sign for mispecification. Similarly, the investment literature 
acknowledges the possibility of simultaneity bias. However, this problem 
is actually dealt with only infrequently. By contrast we have verified 
that our estimates remain unchanged when two stage least squares are 
applied. A complete macroeconomic model of simultaneous (structural) 
equations was put forward to motivate the exogenous variables 
used in this exercise. On the other hand, we have confirmed the common 
observation (Chirinko 1986) that the 'neoclassical' investment
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specification does not perform as well as other formulations of the 
investment function. An investment equation with lags of Jorgenson's 
composite (and credit availability) as regressors does not fit on Greek 
data.
Our empirical work, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, led us to a major 
conclusion about the impact of taxes and fiscal incentive policies on 
investment in Greece. We may advise researchers of investment in Greece 
that adjustment of the user cost for fiscal parameters makes very little 
difference to the estimates of the investment equation. In part, this may 
be a further indication that the influence of the user cost on investment, 
in the Greek economy, has not been neoclassical but, rather, as described 
in the financial repression literature. Specifically, we obtained the 
following results as well: Reductions in asset lifetimes, allowable for 
tax purposes, were granted many times over our sample period. We 
demonstrated that incorporation of a corresponding small adjustment to the 
economywide rate of tax depreciation makes a negligible difference for the 
estimates of the investment function. Similarly, we undertook an 
analysis of the detail of the legislation which provided for investment 
grants. Thus, we concluded that the economywide importance of this 
incentive (eligibility being limited to selected regions and types of 
investment) was slight. Hence, we are able to recommend that grants can be 
safely ignored when estimating investment functions for Greece. We then 
proved that the remaining type of investment incentive (i.e. investment 
allowances) induced only minor reductions in the effective price of 
capital goods in Greece.
Finally, we have demonstrated that the measure which deflates the
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nominal user cost by an index of nominal wages (rather than output prices) 
does not yield substantially different estimation results. Our research 
indicates that what does make some difference for the structure of the 
investment equation in Greece is the precise choice of dependent variable. 
In particular, the statistical properties of the equation, and the form of 
the distributed lag, change when investment excluding expenditures on 
residential buildings is tried as the regressand. This is not 
surprising, since the housing decisions of individuals are bound to be 
subject to different influences from the production decisions of firms. 
Nevertheless, private investment excluding residential buildings, too, is 
positively, rather than negatively, related to the corresponding measure 
of the user cost.
I began researching this thesis with a rather vague intuition that the 
Greek economy is bound to be somewhat different from the (Anglo-Saxon) 
economies, about which I was taught at the LSE. Work on the Greek 
economy cannot be original, insightful or useful (e.g. for policy 
purposes) unless such differences are acknowledged^. In the 
Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis, I was able to 
present the financial repression approach. I believe this approach 
describes, quite aptly, crucial phenomena in the Greek economy. Finally, 
in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I confirmed, by means of empirical 
methods, that the features of financial repression (especially in 
connection with aggregate private investment) can be identified in the 
Greek economy.
3. For example, the standard reference, Meltzer (1951), cannot
illuminate the monetary transmission mechanism in Greece where 




ABEL, A. "Empirical investment equations; an integrative framework", 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 12, 1980, 
p p .39-91.
AGARWALA, R. and G.C. GOODSON "An analysis of the effects of investment 
incentives on investment behaviour in the British Economy", Economica. 
36(144), November 1969, pp.377-388.
AGHEVLI, B.B. "Inflation, finance and growth". Journal of Political 
Economy. 85(6), December 1977, pp.1295-1307.
AGHEVLI, B.B. and M.S. KHAN "Government deficits and the inflationary 
process in developing countries". International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers. 25(3), September 1978, pp.383-416.
ALOGOSKOUFIS, G.S. "Unanticipated money, output and prices in Greece", 
European Economic Review. 19 (2-3), October 1982, pp.289-303.
-------------------- "Macroeconomic policy and aggregate fluctuations
in a semi-industrialized open economy: Greece 1951-1980", European
Economic Review. 29(1), October 1985, pp.35-61.
ANDERSON, G.J. "A new approach to the empirical investigation of
investment expenditures". Economic Journal. 91(361), March 1981, 
p p .88-103.
ANDO, A.K., F. MODIGLIANI, R. RASCHE and S.J. TURNOVSKY "On the role 
of expectations of price and technological change in an investment 
function". International Economic Review. 15(2), June 1974, pp.384-414.
APPELBAUM, E. and R. HARRIS "Optimal capital policy with bounded
investment plans". International Economic Review. 19(1), February 
1978, pp.103-114.
ARROW, K.J. "Optimal capital policy, the cost of capital and myopic
decision rules". Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics.
16, 1964, pp.21-30.
------------  "Optimal capital policy with irreversible investment".
in Value capital and growth, Ed, J.N. Wolfe, Aldine 1968, pp.1-19.
ARTUS, P., P-A. MUET, P. PALINKAS and P. PAULY "Economic policy and 
private investment since the oil crisis: a comparative study of
France and Germany", European Economic Review. 16(1), May 1981, 
p p .7-51.
AUERBACH, A.J. and J.R. HINES Jr. "Investment tax incentives and
frequent tax reforms", American Economic Review. 78(2), May 1988,
pp.211-216.
BAILEY, M.J, "The welfare costs of inflationary finance". Journal of 
Political Economy. 64(2), April 1956, pp.93-110.
BALTAS, N.C. "Modelling credit and private investment in Greek
agriculture", European Review of Agricultural Economics. 10(4), 
1983, pp.389-402.
375
BANK OF GREECE Monthly statistical bulletin, Bank of Greece (various 
issues).
---------------  The Harissopoulos committee for the study of the
banking system: summaries of the reports, Ed. C.B. Karadjas,
Bank of Greece 1981, (in Greek).
----------  The Greek economy: research papers and statistical
series, Bank of Greece 1982 (in Greek).
-----------  Report of Governor D. Chalikias for the year 1987,
Bank of Greece 1988.
BARRO, R. "Unanticipated money growth and unemployment in the United 
States", American Economic Review. 67(2), March 1977, pp.101-115.
BATAVIA, B. , N. LASH and A. MALLIARIS "The dynamics of inflation and 
economic policy: the case of Greece, 1953-1983", Greek Economic
Review. 8(2), December 1986, pp.200-217.
BEAN, C.R. "An econometric model of manufacturing investment in the 
U.K.", Economic Journal. 91(361), March 1981, pp.106-121.
----------- "A little bit more evidence on the natural rate hypothesis
from the U.K.", European Economic Review. 25(3), August 1984, 
pp.279-292.
BECKERMAN, P. "The consequences of upward financial repression". 
International Review of Applied Economics. 2(2), June 1988, 
pp.233-249.
BERGSTROM, V. and J. SODERSTEN "Do tax allowances stimulate investment?" 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 86(2), 1984, pp.244-268.
BERNANKE, B.S. "The determinants of investment: another look",
American Economic Review. 73(2), May 1983, pp.71-75.
BERNANKE, B.S. and A.S. BLINDER "Credit, money and aggregate demand", 
American Economic Review. 78(2), May 1988, pp.435-439.
BERNANKE, B. , H. BOHN and P.O. REISS "Alternative non-nested
specification tests of time-series investment models". Journal of 
Econometrics. 37(3), March 1988, pp.293-326.
BILSBORROW, R.E. "The determinants of fixed investment by manufacturing 
firms in a developing country". International Economic Review.
18(3), October 1977, pp.697-717.
BIRCH, E.M. and G.D. SIEBERT "Uncertainty permanent demand and investment 
behaviour", American Economic Review. 66(1), March 1976, pp.15-27.
BISCHOFF, C.W. "The effect of alternative lag distributions" in Tax
incentives and capital spending, Ed. G. Fromm, Brookings Institution 
1971(a), pp.61-130.
---------------  "Business investment in the 1970s: a comparison of
models", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1, 1971(b), pp.13-63.
376
BITROS, G.C. "The fungibility factor in credit and the question of the 
efficacy of selective credit controls", Oxford Economic Papers.
33(3), November 1981, pp.459-477.
BLEJER, M.I. and M.S. KAHN "Government policy and private Investment In 
developing countries". International Monetary Fund Staff Papers.
31(2), June 1984, pp.379-403.
BLINDER, A.S. "Credit rationing and effective supply failures".
Economic Journal. 97(386), June 1987, pp.327-352.
BLINDER, A.S. and J.E. STIGLITZ "Money, credit constraints and economic 
activity", American Economic Review. 73(2), May 1983, pp.297-302.
BOATWRIGHT, B.D. and J.R. EATON "The estimation of Investment functions 
for manufacturing Industry In the U.K.", Economica. 39(156), November 
1972, pp.403-418.
BREUSCH, T.S. and L. GODFREY "A review of recent work on testing for 
autocorrelation In dynamic simultaneous models". In Macroeconomic 
analysis: essays In macroeconomics and econometrics, Ed. D. Currie,
R. Nobay and D. Peel, Groom Helm 1981, pp.63-105.
BRIMMER, A.F. "Central banking and economic development: the record
of Innovation", Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. 3(4), November 
1971, pp.780-792.
BRISSIMIS, S.N. and J.A. LEVENTAKIS "Inflationary expectations and the 
demand for money: the Greek experience", Kredlt und Kapltal. 4,
1981, pp.561-573.
BRUNO, M. and J. SACHS The economics of worldwide stagflation.
Harvard University Press 1985.
BUFFIE, E.F. "Financial repression, the new structuralists and
stabilization policy In seml-lndustrlallzed economies". Journal of 
Development Economics. 14(3), April 1984, pp.305-322.
BURKETT, P. "Financial 'repression' and financial 'liberalization'
In the third world: a contribution to the critique of neoclassical
development theory". Review of Radical Political Economics. 19(1), 
Spring 1987, pp.1-21.
CHIRINKO, R.S. "Business Investment and tax policy: a perspective on
existing models and empirical results". National Tax Journal.
39(2), June 1986, pp.137-155.
---------------  "Business tax policy, the Lucas critique and lessons from
the 1980's", American Economic Review. 78(2), May 1988, pp.206-210.
CHIRINKO, R.S. and R. EISNER "Tax policy and Investment In major U.S. 
macroeconomic econometric models". Journal of Public Economics. 
20(2), March 1983, pp.139-166.
CHO, Y.J. "Inefficiencies from financial liberalization In the absence 
of well-functioning equity markets", Journal of Money. Credit and 
Banking. 18(2), May 1986, pp.191-199.
377
CHO, Y.J. "The effect of financial liberalization on the efficiency 
of credit allocation: some evidence from Korea", Journal of
Development Economics. 29(1), July 1988, pp.101-110.
CLARK, P.K. "Investment in the 1970s: theory, performance and
prediction", Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv. 1, 1979, 
p p .73-124.
COATS, W.L. Jr. and D.R. KHATKHATE "Money supply implications of 
commercial banks' financing of government debt in developing 
countries", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 40(2),
May 1978, pp.173-193.
COEN, R.M. "The effect of cash flow on the speed of adjustment", in 
Tax incentives and capital spending, Ed. G. Fromm, Brookings 
Institution 1971, pp.131-196.
COURAKIS, A.S. "Banking policy and commercial bank behaviour in Greece", 
in Competition and regulation in financial markets, Ed. A. 
Verheirstraeten, St Martin's Press 1981(a), pp.220-261.
----------------  "Financial structure and policy in Greece: retrospect
and prospect", Greek Economic Review. 3(3), December 1981(b), 
p p .205-244.
------------  "Constraints on bank choices and financial repression in
less developed countries", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 
46(4), November 1984, pp.341-370.
CURRIE, D. and M. ANYADIKE-DANES Interest rates, inflation and growth 
in financially repressed economies. University of London: Queen
Mary College, Department of Economics 1980 (Queen Mary College, Dept, 
of Economics, Working Paper No.67).
DAVIDSON, J.E.H., D.F. HENDRY, F. SRBA and S. YEO "Econometric 
modelling of the aggregate time-series relationship between 
consumers' expenditure and income in the United Kingdom", Economic 
Journal. 88(352), December 1978, pp.661-692.
DEMOPOULOS, G.D. Monetary policy in the open economy of Greece,
Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) 1981.
DINENIS, E. Q, gestation lags and investment: is the flexible
accelerator a mirage?, Centre for Labour Economics, London School 
of Economics 1985 (Centre for Labour Economics, London School of 
Economics Discussion Paper No.236).
DOOLEY, M.P. and D.J. MATHIESON Financial liberalisation and stability 
in developing countries (Paper for the conference on capital 
market developments and financial stability, Ditchley Park 1986).
DRYLLERAKIS, J. Incentives for investment in industry and handicraft 
(849/78, 289/76, 1078/71), Zacharopoulos 1979 (in Greek).
DURBIN, J. "Testing for serial correlation in least squares regression 
when some of the regressors are lagged dependent variables". 
Econometrics. 38(3), May 1970, pp.410-421.
378
EISNER, R. and M.I. NADIRI "Investment behaviour and the neoclassical 
theory", Review of Economics and Statistics. 50(3), August 1968, 
pp.369-382.
FAINI, R. and F. SCHIANTARELLI "Incentives and investment decisions: 
the effectiveness of regional policy", Oxford Economic Papers. 
39(3), September 1987, pp.516-533.
FAREBROTHER, R.W. "The Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation when 
there is no intercept in the regression". Econometrica. 48(6), 
September 1980, pp.1553-1561.
FARIMANI, M., J. BUONGIORNO and H.E. THOMPSON "A financial model of 
investment, with an application to the paper industry". Applied 
Economics. 20(6), June 1988, pp.767-783.
FAZZARI, S.M. and M.J. ATHEY "Asymmetric information, financing
constraints and investment". Review of Economics and Statistics. 
69(3), August 1987, pp.481-487.
FAZZARI, S.M., R.G. HUBBARD and B.C. PETERSEN Financing constraints 
and corporate investment. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
September 1987 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper N o .2387).
--------------------------------------------------  "Financing constraints
and corporate investment", Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv. 
1, 1988a, pp.141-206.
"Investment, financing
decisions and tax policy", American Economic Review. 78(2), May 
1988b, pp.200-205.
FELDSTEIN, M.S. "Inflation, tax rules and investment: some econometric
evidence", Econometrica. 50(4), July 1982, pp.825-862.
FELDSTEIN, M.S. and J.S. FLEMMING "Tax policy, corporate saving and 
investment behaviour in Britain", Review of Economic Studies.
38(4), October 1971, pp.415-434.
FISCHER, S. "Seignorage and the case for a national money", Journal 
of Political Economy. 90(2), April 1982, pp.295-313.
FISCHER, S. and F. MODIGLIANI "Towards an understanding of the real 
effects and costs of inflation", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.
114(4), 1978, pp.810-833.
FRIEDMAN, M. "Government revenue from inflation". Journal of Political 
Economy. 79(4), July-August 1971, pp.846-856.
FRY, M.J. "Manipulating demand for money", in Essays in modern 
economics, Ed. M. Parkin, Longman, 1973, pp.371-385.
---------- "Money and capital or financial deepening in economic
development?". Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. 10(4), November 
1978, pp.464-475.
379
---------- "Saving, investment, growth and the cost of financial
repression", World Development. 8(4), April 1980, pp.317-327.
FRY, M.J. "Government revenue from monopoly supply of currency and
deposits". Journal of Monetary Economics. 8(2), September 1981(a), 
pp.261-270.
---------- "Monopoly finance and Portugal's government deficits".
Economie. 5(2), May 1981(b), pp.315-323.
------- "Analysing disequilibrium interest-rate systems in developing
countries". World Development. 10(12), December 1982(a), pp.1049-1057. 
  "Models of financially repressed developing economies".
World Development. 10(9), September 1982(b), pp.731-750.
-------  Money, interest and banking in economic development, Johns
Hopkins University Press 1988.
GALBIS, V. "Financial intermediation and economic growth in less- 
developed countries: a theoretical approach", Journal of
Development Studies. 13(2), January 1977, pp.58-72.
----------- "Analytical aspects of interest rate policies in less-
developed countries". Savings and Development. 6(2), 1982, pp.111-165.
GALEOTTI, M. "Recent developments in investment theory", Giornalli degli 
Economisti e Annali di Economia. 43(5-6), May-June 1984, pp.393-415.
GARDNER, R. and R. SHELDON "Financial conditions and the time path of 
equipment expenditures". Review of Economics and Statistics. 57(2),
May 1975, pp.164-170.
GERTLER, M. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity".
Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. 20(3,ii), August 1988, 
p p .559-588.
GILBERT, C.L. "Professor Hendry's econometric methodology", Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 48(3), August 1986, pp.283-307.
--------------  "LSE and the British approach to time series econometrics",
Oxford Economic Papers. 41(1), January 1989, pp.108-128.
GOODHART, C.A.E. Money, information and uncertainty, Macmillan 1975.
------------------ "Structural changes in the British capital markets",
in The operation and regulation of financial markets, Ed. C.A.E. 
Goodhart, D. Currie and D.T. Llewellyn, Macmillan 1987, pp.31-53.
GORDON, R.J. "The short-run demand for money: a reconsideration".
Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. 16(4,i), November 1984, 
pp.403-434.
GOULD, J.P. "Adjustment costs in the theory of investment of the firm". 
Review of Economic Studies. 35(1), January 1968, pp.47-55.
GRAVELLE, H. and R. REES Microeconomics, Longman 1981.
380
GREENWALD, B.C. and J.E. STIGLITZ "Imperfect information, finance 
constraints and business fluctuations", in Finance constraints, 
expectations and macroeconomics, Ed. M. Kohn and S-C Tsiang,
Clarendon Press 1988a, pp.103-140.
GREENWALD, B.C. and J.E. STIGLITZ "Money, imperfect information and 
economic fluctuations", in Finance constraints, expectations and 
macroeconomics, Ed. M. Kohn and S-C Tsiang, Clarendon Press 1988b, 
p p .141-165.
GREENWALD, B.C., J.E. STIGLITZ and A. WEISS "Informational
imperfections in the capital market and macroeconomic fluctuations", 
American Economic Review. 74(2), May 1984, pp.194-199.
HAAPARANTA, P. "Liberalization policies and welfare in a financially 
repressed economy: comment on Kahkonen", International Monetary
Fund Staff Papers. 35(1), March 1988, pp.205-208.
HALIKIAS, D.J. Money and credit in a developing economy: the Greek
case. New York University Press 1978.
HALL, R.E. "Investment, interest rates and the effects of stabilization 
policies", Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv. 1, 1977, pp.61-121.
HALL, R.E. and D.W. JORGENSON "Application of the theory of optimum 
capital accumulation", in Tax incentives and capital spending,
Ed. G. Fromm, Brookings Institution 1971, pp.9-60.
HARVEY, A. The econometric analysis of time series, Philip Alan 1981.
HELLIWELL, J. and G . GLORIEUX "Forward-looking investment behaviour". 
Review of Economic Studies. 37(4), October 1970, pp.499-516.
HENDRY, D.F. "Predictive failure and econometric modelling in
macroeconomics: the transactions demand for money", in Economic
Modelling, Ed. P. Ormerod, Heinemann 1979, pp.217-242.
HENDRY, D.F. and G.E. MIZON "Serial correlation as a convenient
simplification and not a nuisance: a comment on a study of the
demand for money by the Bank of England", Economic Journal. 88(351), 
September 1978, pp.549-563.
HENDRY, D.F. and T. Von UNGERN-STERNBERG "Liquidity and inflation effects 
on consumers' expenditure", in Essays in the theory and measurement 
of consumers' behaviour, Ed. A. Deaton, Cambridge University Press 
1980, pp.237-260.
HOCHMAN, H.M. "Some aggregative implications of depreciation
acceleration", Yale Economic Essays. 6(1), Spring 1966, pp.217-274.
HONG, K. "Macroeconomic dynamics in a financially repressed economy". 
Journal of Economic Development. 10(1), July 1985, pp.169-194.
HONG, W. "Institutionalized monopsonistic capital markets in a 
developing economy". Journal of Development Economics. 21(2),
May 1986, pp.353-359.
381
HORIUCHI, A. "The 'low interest rate policy' and economic growth in
postwar Japan", Developing Economies. 22(4), December 1984, pp.349-371
HULTEN, C.R. "Tax policy and the investment decision", American Economic 
Review. 74(2), May 1984, pp.236-241.
IMF International financial statistics yearbook, IMF 1986.
JAO, Y.C. "Financial deepening and economic growth: theory, evidence
and policy", Greek Economic Review. 7(3), December 1985, pp.187-225.
JOHNSON, O.E.G. "Credit controls as instruments of development policy 
in the light of economic theory", Journal of Money. Credit and 
Banking. 6(1), February 1974, pp.85-99.
JOHNSTON, J. Econometric methods, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill 1984.
JORGENSON, D.W. "The theory of investment behavior", in Determinants 
of investment behavior, Ed. R. Ferber, National Bureau of Economic 
Research 1967, pp.129-175.
----------------  "Econometric studies of investment behavior: a survey".
Journal of Economic Literature. IX(4), December 1971, pp.1111-1147.
KAHKONEN, J. "Liberalization policies and welfare in a financially
repressed economy". International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 34(3), 
September 1987, pp.531-547.
KAPUR, B.K. "Alternative stabilization policies for less-developed 
economies". Journal of Political Economy. 84(4,i), August 1976, 
p p .777-795.
KELLY, G.P. and W.E. NORTON "Investment in dwellings: an econometric
analysis", in Three studies of private fixed investment, Ed. W.E. 
Norton, Reserve Bank of Australia 1971, pp.31-38.
KEPE The effectiveness of tax incentives in Greece and proposals for 
their reform, KEPE 1967 (in Greek).
KHATKHATE, D.R. "False issues in the debate on interest rate policies 
in less developed countries", Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review. No.133, June 1980, pp.205-224.
KHATKHATE, D.R. and D.P. VILLANUEVA "Operation of selective credit 
policies in less developed countries: certain critical issues".
World Development. 6(7-8), July-August 1978, pp.979-990.
KIM, Y.C. and J.K. KWON "The utilization of capital and the growth of 
output in a developing economy: the case of South Korean
manufacturing". Journal of Development Economics. 4(3), September 
1977, pp.265-278.
KING, M.A. "Taxation and investment incentives in a vintage investment 
model". Journal of Public Economics. 1(1), April 1972, pp.121-148.
KITCHEN, R.L. Finance for the developing countries, Wiley 1986.
382
KIVIET, J.F. "On the rigour of some misspecification tests for modelling 
dynamic relationships", Review of Economic Studies. 53(2), No.173, 
April 1986, pp.241-261.
KUMAR, R.C. "Money in development: a monetary growth model a la
McKinnon", Southern Economic Journal. 50(1), July 1983, pp.18-36.
KRENGEL, R. and D. MERTENS Fixed capital and future investment needs 
in Greek industry, KEPE 1967, (Economic Monograph No.16).
LAIDLER, D.E.W. The demand for money: Theories, evidence and problems,
(Third Edition), Harper and Row 1985.
LANYI, A. and R. SARACOGLU Interest rate policies in developing
countries. International Monetary Fund 1983 (International Monetary 
Fund, Occasional Paper 22).
LAWRENCE, C. and A. SIOW "Interest rates and investment spending: some
empirical evidence for postwar U.S. producer equipment 1947-1980", 
Journal of Business. 58(4), October 1985, pp.359-375.
LEFF, N.H. and K. SATO "Macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries 
instability, short-run growth and external dependency". Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 62(2), May 1980, pp.170-179.
LEVENTAKIS, J.A. "A monetary interpretation of inflation: the Greek 
case", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 116(3), 1980, pp.551-559.
LIANG, M-Y. "A note on financial dualism and interest rate policies: 
a loanable funds approach". International Economic Review. 29(3), 
August 1988, pp.539-549.
LOEB, P.O. "Specification error tests and the Jorgenson-Stephenson 
investment function". Applied Economics. 18(8), August 1986, 
p p .851-861.
LUCAS, R.E. "Optimal investment policy and the flexible accelerator", 
International Economic Review. 8(1), February 1967, pp.78-85.
LUND, P.J. "The econometric assessment of the impact of investment 
incentives", in The economics of industrial subsidies, Ed. A.
Whiting, HMSO 1976, pp.245-265.
McCALLUM, B.T. "Rational expectations and the natural rate hypothesis: 
some consistent estimates", Econometrica. 44(1), January 1976, 
pp.43-52.
McKINNON, R.I. Money and capital in economic development, Brookings 
Institution, 1973.
---------------  "Financial repression and the liberalization problem
within less-developed countries", in The world economic order: 
past and prospects, Ed. S. Grassman and E. Lundberg, Macmillan 1981, 
pp.365-386.
383
MACKRELL, N . , J. FRISCH and P. ROOPE "Equations for business fixed 
investment", in Three studies of private fixed investment, Ed.
W.E. Norton, Reserve Bank of Australia 1971, pp.5-22.
McLa r e n , K.R. "Equipment investment: an alternative approach", in
Three studies of private fixed investment, Ed. W.E. Norton, Reserve 
Bank of Australia 1971, pp.23-30.
MALCOMSON, J.M. "Tax policy and investment demand: a vintage approach".
Journal of Public Economics. 19(2), November 1982, pp.225-242.
MANASSAKIS, N. "Investment and finance of Greek industry", in The Greek 
economy: research papers and statistical series. Bank of Greece
1982, pp.164-185 (in Greek).
MANIATIS, G.C. "Reliability of the equities market to finance industrial 
development in Greece", Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
19(4), July 1971, pp.598-620.
---------------  "The concentration of industrial bank credit in Greece",
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commercialli. 19(2), 
February 1972, pp.150-165.
MARTY, A.L. "Growth and the welfare cost of inflationary finance". 
Journal of Political Economy. 75(1), February 1967, pp.71-76.
------------  "Growth, satiety and the tax revenue from money creation".
Journal of Political Economy. 81(5), September-October 1973, 
pp.1136-1152.
MATHIESON, D.J. "Financial reform and stabilization policy in a 
developing economy". Journal of Development Economics. 7(3), 
September 1980, pp.359-395.
MELLISS, C.L. and P.W. RICHARDSON "Value of investment incentives for 
manufacturing industry 1946 to 1974", in The economics of industrial 
subsidies, Ed. A. Whiting, HMSO 1976, pp.23-43.
MELTZER, L.A. "Wealth, saving, and the rate of interest". Journal of 
Political Economy. 59(2), April 1951, pp.93-116.
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY NATIONAL EXPENDITURE AND CAPITAL STOCK 
DIVISION 1. Net fixed capital stock 2. Depreciation of fixed 
capital stock 1948-1981, Ministry of National Economy 1983.
MOLHO, L.E. "Interest rates, saving and investment in developing 
countries: a re-examination of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis".
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 33(1), March 1986(a), 
p p .90-116.
------------  "Selective credit controls in Greece: a test of their
effectiveness". International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 33(3), 
September 1986(b), pp.477-508.
MONTIEL, P. "An optimizing model of household behavior under credit 
rationing". International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 33(3), 
September 1986, pp.583-615.
384
MUNDELL, R.A. "Growth, stability and inflationary finance", Journal 
of Political Economy. 73(2), April 1965, pp.97-109.
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE Annual Report 1986, National Bank of Greece 1987.
- Annual Report 1987, National Bank of Greece 1988.
NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERVICE OF GREECE Statistical data on the declared 
income of legal entities and its taxation during the fiscal year ... 
National Statistical Service of Greece, Issues 1958-1985 (in Greek).
NEWLYN, W.T. "The inflation tax in developing countries" Journal of 
Development Studies. 13(2), January 1977, pp.8-21.
NIARCHOS, N.A. and C.W.J. GRANGER "The gold sovereign market in Greece 
- an unusual speculative market". Journal of Finance. 27(5),
December 1972, pp.1127-1135.
NICHOLS, D.A. "Some principles of inflationary finance". Journal of 
Political Economv. 82(2), March-April 1974, pp.423-430.
NICKELL, S.J. The investment decisions of firms, Nisbet and Cambridge 
University Press 1978.
OECD Economic surveys: Greece, OECD 1986 (OECD Economic Surveys).
  Economic surveys : Greece, OECD 1987 (OECD Economic Surveys).
OECD DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Flows and stocks of fixed 
capital, OECD 1987.
----------------  Quarterly national accounts,
OECD (various issues).
PACI, R. "Accumulation process and investment incentives in a vintage 
investment model: the case of Sardinia", Rivista Internazionale
di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali. 32(7-8), July-August 1985, 
pp.765-794.
PAPADAKIS, J.M. Money and economic activity: the Greek experience
1950-1975, K. Michalas 1979 (in Greek).
PAPAIOANNOU, G.J. "Thinness and short-run price dependence in the
Athens Stock Exchange", Greek Economic Review. 4(3), December 1982, 
pp.315-333.
PAVLOPOULOS, P.G. The underground economy in Greece: a first evaluation
of its quantitative boundaries, lOBE 1987 (Special Research Essays 
No.17) (in Greek).
PESARAN, M.H., R.P. SMITH and J.S. YEO "Testing for structural stability 
and predictive failure: a review". The Manchester School. 53(3),
September 1985, pp.280-295.
PETROCHILOS, G.A. "Foreign banks in Greece", National Westminster Bank 
Quarterly Review. February 1985, pp.57-69.
385
POTERBA, J.M, and L.H. SUMMERS "Dividend taxes, corporate investment 
and 'q'", Journal of Public Economics. 22(2), November 1983, 
pp .135-168.
PROVOPOULOS, G.A. Greek fiscal institutions, Sakkoulas 1983 (in Greek).
QUANDT, R.E. and H.S. ROSEN "The demand and supply for investment goods: 
does the market clear?". Journal of Macroeconomics. 4(1), Winter 1982,
pp.1-21.
REA, J.D. "Indeterminacy of the Chow test when the number of observations 
is insufficient", Econometrica. 46(1), January 1978, p.229.
ROE, A.R. "High interest rates: a new conventional wisdom for
development policy? Some conclusions from Sri Lankan experience", 
World Development. 10(3), March 1982, pp.211-222.
ROJAS-SUAREZ, L. "Devaluation and monetary policy in developing 
countries: a general equilibrium model for economies facing
financial constraints". International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 
34(3), September 1987, pp.439-470.
ROSS, H.N. and S. THOMADAKIS "Rate of return, firm size and development 
subsidies: the case of Greece", Journal of Development Economics. 
12(1-2), February-April 1983, pp.5-18.
SARANTIS, N.C. "Foreign influences, exchange rates, expectations and 
price inflation in a developing economy: the case of Greece",
Journal of Development Economics. 14(1-2), January-February 1984,
p p .1-18.
SARGENT, T.J. Macroeconomic theory. Academic Press 1979.
SAVAGE, D. "The channels of monetary influence: a survey of the
empirical evidence". National Institute Economic Review. No.83, 
February 1978, pp.73-89.
SAVIN, N.E. and K.J. WHITE "The Durb in-Watson test for serial 
correlation with extreme sample sizes or many regressors", 
Econometrica. 45(8), November 1977, pp.1989-1996.
SCHIANTARELLI, F. "Investment models and expectations: some estimates
for the Italian industrial sector". International Economic Review. 
24(2), June 1983, pp.291-312.
SCHWORM, W.E. "Financial constraints on capital accumulation".
International Economic Review. 21(3), October 1980, pp.643-660.
SHALLER, D.R. "Working capital finance considerations in national 
income theory", American Economic Review. 73(1), March 1983, 
pp.156-165.
SHAPIRO, M.D. "Investment, output and the cost of capital", Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activitv. 1, 1986, pp.111-164.
SIEGEL, J.J. "Inflation, bank profits and government seignorage", 
American Economic Review. 71(2), May 1981, pp.352-355.
386
SILBER, W.L. "Selective credit policies: a survey", Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro Quarterlv Review. No.107, December 1973, pp.328-351.
SINAI, A. and 0. ECKSTEIN "Tax policy and business fixed investment 
revisited". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 4(2-3), 
June-September 1983, pp.131-162.
SMITH, B.D. "Private information, deposit interest rates and the
'stability* of the banking system". Journal of Monetarv Economics. 
14(3), November 1984, pp.293-317.
SNOWDEN, P.N. "Financial market liberalisation in LDCs: the incidence
of risk allocation effects of interest rate increases", Journal of 
Development Studies. 24(1), October 1987, pp.83-93.
SPENCER, B.C. "The small sample bias of Durbin's test for serial
correlation: when one of the regressors is the lagged dependent
variable and the null hypothesis is true". Journal of Econometrics. 
3(3), August 1975, pp.249-254.
STEGMAN, T. "The estimation of an accelerator-type investment function 
with a profitability constraint, by the technique of switching 
regressions", Australian Economic Papers. 21(39), December 1982, 
pp.379-391.
STEIGUM, E. Jr. "A financial theory of investment behavior", Econometrica. 
51(3), May 1983, pp.637-645.
STIGLITZ, J. and A. WEISS "Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information", American Economic Review. 71(3), June 1981, pp.393-410.
SUMMERS, L.H. "Taxation and corporate investment: a q-theory approach",
Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv. 1, 1981, pp.67-140.
SUMNER, M.T. "Comments on P.J. Lund The econometric assessment of the 
impact of investment incentives", in The economics of industrial 
subsidies, Ed. A. Whiting, iIMSO 1976, pp.266-271.
--------------  "The effects of an anticipated tax change on investment in
Britain", Journal of Public Economics. 26(2), March 1985, pp.237-248.
SUNDARARAJAN, V. "The debt-equity ratio of firms and the effectiveness 
of interest rate policy: analysis with a dynamic model of saving
investment and growth in Korea", International Monetarv Fund Staff 
Papers. 34(2), June 1987, pp.260-310.
SUNDARARAJAN, V. and S. THAKUR "Public investment, crowding-out and
growth: a dynamic model applied to India and Korea", International
Monetarv Fund Staff Papers. 27(4), December 1980, pp.814-855.
TAGGART, R.A. "Deregulation of deposit rate ceilings in the United
States: prospects and consequences", in Competition and regulation
in financial markets, Ed. A. Verheirstraeten, Macmillan 1981, 
p p .35-54.
387
TOTSIS, C.N. ed. Code of tax incentives together with the interpre­
tations of the ministry of economic affairs and legal precedents, 
Pamissos 1984 (in Greek),
TREADWAY, A.B. "On rational entrepreneurial behavior and the demand 
for investment", Review of Economic Studies. 36(2), April 1969, 
pp.227-239.
TUN WAI, V. and C. WONG "Determinants of private investment in 
developing countries". Journal of Development Studies. 19(1),
October 1982, pp.19-36.
TYBOUT, J.R. "Credit rationing and investment behavior in a developing 
country". Review of Economics and Statistics. 65(4), November 1983, 
pp.598-607.
TYBOUT, J.R. "Interest controls and credit allocation in developing 
countries". Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. 16(4,i),
November 1984, pp.474-487.
UNION OF GREEK BANKS Report of the committee for the reform and 
modernization of the banking system [The Karadjas Committee],
Union of Greek Banks 1987 (Contemporary Issues, No.5) (in Greek).
URI, N.D. "Testing for stability of the investment function". Review 
of Economics and Statistics. 64(1), February 1982, pp.117-125.
VAN WIJNBERGEN, S. "Interest rate management in LDCs", Journal of 
Monetarv Economics. 12(3), September 1983, pp.433-452.
VERNARDAKIS, N. Econometric models for the developing economies: a 
case study of Greece, Saxon House 1978.
VON FURSTENBERG, G.M. "The uncertain effects of inflationary finance 
on growth in developing countries". Public Finance. 38(2), 1983, 
pp.232-266.
WARD, P.M. The measurement of capital: the methodology of capital stock
estimates in OECD countries, OECD 1976.
WISLEY, T.O. and S.R. JOHNSON "An evaluation of alternative investment 
hypotheses using non-nested tests". Southern Economic Journal. 52(2), 
October 1985, pp.422-430.
ZOLOTAS, X. "The role of banks in a developing country", in International 
monetary issues and development policies: selected essays and
statements: X. Zolotas, Ed. H. Ellis, Bank of Greece 1977,
pp.391-395.
